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Critical infrastructures like oil & gas, power grids, water treatment facilities, domain
name system (DNS) etc., are attractive targets for attackers — both due to the potential
impact of attacks on such systems, and due to the enormous attack surface exposed by
such systems. Unwarranted functionality in the form of accidental bugs or maliciously
inserted hidden functionality in any component of a system could potentially be exploited
by attackers to launch attacks on the system.
As it is far from practical to root out undesired functionality in every component of a
complex system, it is essential to develop security measures for protecting CI systems that
rely only on the integrity of a small number of carefully constructed components, identifed
as the trusted computing base (TCB) for the system. The broad aim of this dissertation is to
characterize elements of the TCB for critical infrastructure systems, and outline strategies
to leverage the TCB to secure CI systems.

A unifed provider-middleman-consumer (PMC) view of systems was adopted to characterize systems as being constituted by providers of data, untrusted middlemen, and
consumers of data. As the goal of proposed approach is to eliminate the need to trust
most components of a system to be secured, most components of the system are considered to fall under the category of “untrusted middlemen.” From this perspective, the TCB
for the system is a minimal set of trusted functionality required to verify that the tasks
performed by the middle-men will not result in violation of the desired assurances.
Specifc systems that were investigated in this dissertation work to characterize the
minimal TCB included the domain name system (DNS), dynamic DNS, and Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that monitor/control various CI systems.
For such systems, this dissertation provides a comprehensive functional specifcation of the
TCB, and outlines security protocols that leverage the trust in TCB functionality to realize
the desired assurances regarding the system.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The functioning of modern societies rely heavily on the functioning of several complex
systems. Some such systems are seen as critical, as their failure can have a signifcant
impact on the security of a nation. Examples of critical infrastructure systems include
power grids, water supply systems, oil and gas production/transportation systems, mass
transportation systems, and increasingly, the Internet.
From the perspective of benefciaries of a system, the primary requirement for any
system is to effectively provide services. From a perspective of the providers/operators of
the system, the system should be proftable, and inexpensive to operate/maintain. In pursuit
of effective and proftable systems, some systemic risks to the operation of the system are
often ignored.
The components of complex systems are often themselves complex systems. Very
often, in the design and operation of any system, it is simply assumed that all components
of the system can be trusted to faithfully perform their assigned tasks. More specifcally,
while the design of many systems do often cater for accidental failure of components,
failures resulting from carefully orchestrated attacks on components are ignored.

1

The likelihood of hidden malicious/accidental functionality in any hardware/software
component, especially in complex components of questionable provenance, is a serious
threat to the security of critical national infrastructures. The very importance of crucial
systems make them good targets for attackers — both domestic and foreign. With every
passing day, more and more exploitable vulnerabilities in various components of critical
infrastructure systems are discovered. Patching such vulnerabilities may not always be
easy, or even possible (especially in legacy systems). Furthermore, such patches/fxes
themselves may introduce fresh vulnerabilities.

1.1

Hypothesis and Research Goals
Due to the substantial risks posed by failure of critical infrastructure systems, we

simply can not afford to blindly trust all components of the system. For any system with
a desired set of assurances, the trusted computing base (TCB) [35] is a small amount of
hardware/software that needs to be trusted in order to realize the desired assurances. It is
crucial, especially for critical systems, to clearly identify a minimal set of components that
constitute the TCB for the system, and focus our efforts on ensuring that the TCB is indeed
worthy of trust.
The hypothesis of the proposed research is that resource limited hardware modules
capable of performing only logical and hash operations will be able to serve as the TCB
for the critical infrastructures. The main goals of the proposed research are
1. Identifying the minimal TCB for some sample critical infrastructure systems, in
terms of a set of simple functions executed inside the confnes of trustworthy hardware modules.
2

2. Identifying effcient mechanisms to amplify the trust in the TCB in order to provide
the desired assurances.
As examples of critical infrastructure systems, we address the domain name system
(DNS) [43] which is vital to the functioning of the Internet, and Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [60] responsible for controlling various critical infrastructure systems.

1.2

Specifc Contributions of this Dissertation
At the core of the proposed approach is a unifed view of systems as constituted by

providers of data, untrusted middle-men, and consumers of data. Under the providermiddlemen-consumer (PMC) model, most components of any system to be secured are
assumed to be associated with the untrusted middle-men.
For purposes of arriving at a functional specifcation of the TCB components our research began by investigating various applications/system under the PMC model. Some of
the characteristics of the system that were considered for classifcation of various systems
under this model included
1. dynamics of the provider (static or dynamic number of data sources)
2. dynamics of data (does data have a pre-specifable life time, or is it necessary to
prematurely invalidate some data) and
3. the nature of the tasks performed by middle-men (does middle-men merely relay
data to consumers or do they have to process data before making them available to
consumers)
Under the PMC model, the domain name system (DNS) can be classifed as one with
dynamic number of providers, and static data (DNS records), where the middle-men simply relay data. SCADA systems can considered as composed of static providers of data
3

(sensors and actuators of SCADA systems) which provide dynamic data (current sensor/actuator states) to middle-men (SCADA system components) that monitor the state
of the SCADA system. The middle-men perform some system dependent tasks to determine the state of the SCADA system and report the state of the system to the consumer
(stake-holders of the SCADA system).
A characterization of the minimal TCB for the domain name system was obtained,
leading to the publication of a journal article [71]. Specifcally, the TCB was identifed to
be a stateless atomic relay function.
That DNS employs static DNS records is a well appreciated limitation of DNS. If DNS
records are dynamic, then the TCB functionality required to assure the integrity of DNS
records needs to be state-ful. More specifcally, even while the module executing the TCB
functions is constrained to possess very little memory, it is required to “track” potentially
unlimited amounts of data. This was catered for by adding to the TCB functionality, the
ability to maintain an index ordered Merkle tree described in Section 2.3.2. A generic
TCB for a dynamic look-up server was published in a conference proceeding [70].
For effectively monitoring the state of a SCADA system a frst pre-requisite is to ensure
completeness of inputs — or that a fresh snapshot of current states of all sensor/actuators
are available. For this purpose the TCB functionality was expanded to include the ability
to maintain an ordered merkle tree [69]. A conference paper outlining this approach was
presented in [69].
Once completeness of inputs is guaranteed, the next step is to ensure that the system
dependent algorithms for computing the overall state of the system (the output provided to
4

the stake-holder, based on sensor states) can be executed inside a resource limited trustworthy boundary. Due to the fact that the number of the inputs could be different for different
SCADA systems, it is necessary to possess mechanisms to handle any number of sensor
inputs. This was handled by representing sensor data as leaves of a merkle hash tree [42].
The concept of “synthetic sensors” was introduced represent states that are functions of
multiple sensor states. A conference paper outlining this approach was presented in [68].
Our work in [69] and [68] merely addressed some components of the TCB functionality
required to secure SCADA systems. A comprehensive security architecture for SCADA
systems was outlined in [72]. This architecture, based on a trusted hardware module —
which we refer to as a SCADA TCB (STCB) module — is intended to be usable for any
SCADA system, irrespective of the nature and size of the system. The STCB based security
architecture includes specifcations for a) the functionality of STCB modules; b) processes
to be adopted by the designer and the deployer of the system; and c) an STCB protocol,
for updating the state of STCB modules, and obtaining SCADA state reports.
The rest of the document is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 includes a brief introduction to DNS and SCADA systems and a survey
of current efforts to secure such systems. The importance of identifying a minimal TCB
for critical infrastructure systems is discussed in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 outline
work towards securing DNS. Chapters 6 and 7 outlines work towards identifying TCB
components for SCADA systems. Chapter 8 outlines a comprehensive architecture for
securing SCADA systems. Chapter 9 offers conclusions and discusses future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE SURVEY

2.1

Domain Name System
The domain name system is a tree-hierarchical naming system for services that can

be accessed over the Internet. At the top of the inverted DNS tree (see Figure 2.1) is the
root. Below the root are generic top level domains (gTLD) like com, org, net, edu,
etc., and country-code top level domains (ccTLD) like ca (Canada), in (India), etc. A
leaf named b.cs.univ.edu in the DNS tree is a server-host in a branch cs.univ.edu,
which stems from a thicker branch univ.edu, which stems from an even thicker branch
.edu, stemming from the root of the DNS tree.

A branch of the tree (including its sub-branches and leaves) under the administrative
control of an authority, is a DNS zone. The authority for a zone is responsible for i)
assigning names for branches and leaves under the zone; ii) creating DNS resource records
corresponding to such names, and/or iii) delegating an entity as the authority for a branch
within the zone.
The authority for the root zone has delegated a gTLD zone like .edu to a .edu-gTLD
authority, who has in turn delegated the zone univ.edu to another authority, who may
have delegated a zone cs.univ.edu to yet another authority (say Z). All DNS records
for the zone cs.univ.edu (or all DNS records with names ending with cs.univ.edu)
6
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Figure 2.1
The domain name system (DNS) tree

are created by Z. The zone authority also specifes the names of authoritative name servers
(ANS) for the zone. A “zone master fle” which includes the set of all DNS RRs pertaining
to the zone is then provided every ANS of the zone. ANSs of the root zone are also referred
to as root name-servers.
A client desiring to access a HTTP service www.cs.univ.edu requires the IP address
of the web-server with a domain name www.cs.univ.edu. This information is in an Atype record in the master fle for a zone under which the name www.cs.univ.edu falls,
and can be obtained by querying any ANS for the zone. To obtain this information, the
querier only needs to know the IP address of a root name-server. While the root name
server cannot directly provide the answer to the query “www.cs.univ.edu, A,” it can
provide the names and IP address of the ANSs for gTLD and ccTLD zones. In this case,
the root server will respond with the names and IP addresses of all .edu ANSs.
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The querier can now send the same query to any of the .edu ANS, which will respond
with the name and the IP address of the ANSs for the zone univ.edu. When the same
query “www.cs.univ.edu, A” is the directed to an ANS for the zone univ.edu, the
response includes the names and IP addresses of ANSs for the zone cs.univ.edu.
Finally, any of the ANSs for the zone cs.univ.edu is queried to obtain the desired
the A-type record. If the zone cs.univ.edu had not been sub-delegated, then the ANS
for the zone univ.edu would have directly provided the response. Thus, knowing only
the IP address of one root name server, any one can obtain any DNS record by specifying
the name and type, and performing a series of queries.

2.1.1

DNS Records

Every DNS resource record (RR) is a fve-tuple consisting of i) name, ii) class, iii)
time-to-live (TTL), iv) type, and v) value; for example, name=www.cs.univ.edu, IN,
TTL=2345, type=A, value=159.43.7.82. The class is always IN (for Internet RRs);

the feld TTL is specifed in seconds, and indicates how long a RR can be cached. In the rest
of this document, to keep notations simple, we shall ignore the felds “class” and “TTL.”
A-type RRs indicate an IP address in the value feld. An NS-type record
name=cs.univ.edu, type=NS, value=ns1.dserv.net indicates that a name-server

with a domain name ns1.dserv.net is an ANS for the zone cs.univ.edu.
A set of records with the same name and type, but with different value felds, is collectively referred to as an RRSet. For example the NS-type RRSet for the name cs.univ.edu
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may include two NS records - one indicating the ANS ns1.dserv.net, and the other indicating another ANS named ns1.cs.univ.edu.
The NS type records are used for delegation. An RRSet of NS records for a delegated
zone (say) cs.univ.edu can be found in the master fle of the parent zone univ.edu.
Similarly the NS RRSet for univ.edu can be found in the master fle of the zone .edu,
and so on. Along with NS records which specify ANSs, the A-type records for the ANSs
are also included in the master fle as glue records1 .
The creator of RRs for a zone, viz., the zone authority, is always off-line. Once the
master fle for zone has been provided to the ANSs, and the names of ANSs conveyed to
authority of the parent zone (and included as NS records in the master fle of the parent), the
zone authority simply expects the ANSs to faithfully accept and respond to DNS queries
regarding the zone.

2.1.1.1

Query-Response Process

DNS queries and responses are typically payloads of UDP packets and have the
same packet format. They include a header, and four sections: QUESTION, ANSWER,
AUTHORITY and ADDITIONAL. In a query packet QUESTION section indicates the queried

name and type (all other sections are empty). The response has an identical QUESTION section. The ANSWER section contains the desired RRSet. The AUTHORITY section includes
1

Note that zone univ.edu (or even edu) cannot be authoritative for the zone dserv.net. Thus,
while univ.edu can provide an authoritative response regarding the name of the ANS for the child zone
cs.univ.edu, it cannot provide an authoritative A-type record for the server ns1.dserv.net. To
avoid possible circular dependency problems, the necessary non authoritative A-type records are included as
glue records.
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NS records indicating the authoritative zone and the ANS for the zone. The ADDITIONAL
section contains A-type glues for the NS records.
In practice, clients initiate queries using stub-resolvers running on their own host machine. Stub-resolvers do not directly query ANSs. Instead, they use preferred name-servers
(PNS) as intermediaries. PNSs are also referred to as local DNS servers or local recursive resolvers or caching-only name-servers, and are typically operated by Internet service
providers (ISP).
An application requiring the IP address of (say) www.cs.univ.edu queries a stubresolver running on the same host. The stub-resolver redirects the query to a PNS. To do
so, the host (or the stub-resolver) should know the IP address2 of at least one PNS.
All PNS needs to be aware of the IP address of at least one root server. The PNS
queries a root-server for (www.cs.univ.edu,A), and receives NS records (with glued
A-type records) for ANSs of .edu. The PNS then queries a .edu ANS to receive NS
records of univ.edu, and so on. Finally, an ANS of the zone cs.univ.edu responds to
the query with the desired A-type RRSet, which is relayed back to the stub-resolver.
PNSs may cache RRs for a duration specifed by the TTL feld in the RR, and may
respond to queries from stub-resolvers using cached RRs. Similarly stub-resolvers may
also cache RRs and respond to queries from applications running on the same host using
the cached RRs.
2

Typically, IP addresses of PNSs are provided to a host by a DHCP server. In UNIX-like machines the
IP addresses of PNS are stored in a fle /etc/resolv.conf.
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2.1.2

Securing DNS

The main goal of attacks on DNS is to simply divert traffc away from genuine services,
or more often, to divert such traffc to impersonators phishing for personal information
from unsuspecting clients. A common strategy for attackers is to impersonate ANSs to
provide fake DNS responses to PNSs, thereby “poisoning the cache” of the PNS, and
consequently the caches of many stub-resolvers which employ the poisoned PNS.
The header of a DNS query includes a 16-bit transaction ID tid ; the UDP packet carrying the query indicates a 16-bit source port p chosen by the querier. A DNS packet carrying
the query will be accepted only if it is addressed to port p. The DNS response in the UDP
packet will be accepted only if it indicates an expected transaction ID tid .
To create a fake response that will be accepted by an PNS, an out-of-path (or external)
attacker, who does not have plain-sight view of the query packet, will need to guess the
values tid and p. A typical strategy for an out-of-path attacker is to register a domain, run
her own ANS for the domain, and query the targeted PNS for a name under her domain.
When the query from the PNS is ultimately directed to the attacker’s ANS, the attacker
learns enough information to narrow down the two values tid and p within small range.
Recently, Kaminsky [32] pointed out that DNS cache poisoning attacks can have even
more severe consequences. Instead of attempting to poison RRs corresponding to a specifc zone, the attacker can impersonate a root server and send fake glue records for “IP
addresses of gTLD name servers.” Thus, queries to every .com zone, for example, will
then be directed to a computer under the control of the attacker, which could redirect such
queries to other “ANSs” under her control.
11

2.1.3

Link-Security Approaches

While properly randomizing the two 16-bit values (tid and p) is a good frst step, they
offer no defense against in-path attackers. In-path attackers who may be in the same LAN
as the server or the resolver, or lie in-between the resolver and the server, have plain-sight
access to the values tid and p in the UDP DNS packets, and can thus easily fake responses.
Securing links between DNS servers (for example, by using a secret shared between a
resolver and the server queried by the resolver) can prevent such attacks.
Specifcally, two entities A and B who share a secret KAB can prevent even in-path
attackers from impersonating them by i) encrypting the message sent over the link using
the shared secret KAB , or ii) appending a message authentication code (MAC) h(V k KAB )
where h() is cryptographic hash function, and V may be the message, or a cryptographic
hash of a message M (or V = h(M)); as long as h() is pre-image resistant, only an entity
with access to the secret KAB can compute a valid MAC for a message.
Strategies like SK-DNSSEC [56] and DNSCurve [12] adopt such an approach. In
symmetric key DNSSEC [56] all PNSs have the ability to establish secure channel with the
root servers. ANSs higher in the hierarchy act as trusted servers and facilitate establishment
of secrets with ANSs lower in the hierarchy, using the Needham-Schroeder protocol [45]
(which is the basis for the Kerberos [46] authentication protocol). When a PNS queries
the root server for “cs.coll.edu, A”, the root server’s response includes a Kerberos-like
ticket which permits the PNS to establish a secure channel with a .edu DNS server. The
.edu DNS server then issues a ticket for securely communicating with an ANS for the

zone coll.edu.
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DNSCurve [12] employs a Diffe-Hellman scheme over a special elliptic curve C for
setting up a private channel between DNSCurve enabled DNS servers. A DNSCurve enabled server A chooses a secret a.
The secret between two DNSCurve enabled servers/resolvers A and B (where B’s
secret is b) is KAB = C(b, α) = C(a, β), where α = C(a, S), β = C(b, S), and S is a
public parameter.
Link-security approaches assume that the DNS servers themselves are trustworthy.
Note that while link-security approaches protect DNS RRs from out-of-path attackers (who
do not have access to values tid and p) and in-path attackers (those with access to tid and
p), there is nothing that prevents an entity controlling the DNS server from modifying an
RR. In practice, such an attacker can be the operator of a DNS server, or some other entity
who has somehow gained control of the DNS server. Such an attacker can receive RRs
over protected links, illegally modify RRs, and relay fake RRs over “protected” links.

2.1.4 DNSSEC
Ideally, the “middle-men” should not be trusted: only the authority of a zone should
be trusted for providing information regarding the zone. This is the approach taken by
DNSSEC [9], where every RRSet in the zone master fle is individually signed by the zone
authority.
Every DNSSEC-enabled zone authority has an asymmetric key pair. The public portion
of the key pair is certifed by the authority of the parent zone. For example, the public key
of the zone cs.univ.edu is signed by the authority of zone univ.edu. The public
13

key of the zone cs.univ.edu can be obtained by querying for a DNSKEY-type RR for
the name cs.univ.edu. To authenticate the public key in the DNSKEY RR, the parent
zone univ.edu introduces two RRs in its zone fle: a delegation signed (DS) RR which
indicates a key-tag (a hash) for the public key of its child, and an RRSIG(DS) record which
is the signature for the DS record.
For verifying the RRSIG(DS) record the public key of the parent zone univ.edu is
required - which is the DNSKEY RR for the name univ.edu. To authenticate the public
key of the parent, it is necessary to obtain the DS and RRSIG(DS) record from its parent
zone - .edu, along with the DNSKEY RR for .edu. Finally, the public key of .edu can
be verifed by obtaining DS and RRSIG(DS) records from the root zone (by querying any
root server). The public key of the root zone is assumed to be well publicized.
To summarize, for every RRSet in the zone cs.univ.edu is a RRSIG(RRSet) record
which contains the digital signature for the RRSet. In response to a query for an RRSet,
the corresponding RRSIG record is also included in the response. To verify the RRSIG,
the required DNS RRs are
1) DNSKEY RR of cs.univ.edu
2) DS, RRSIG(DS) corresponding to DNSKEY RR of cs.univ.edu, and DNSKEY
RR of the parent zone univ.edu (fetched from the parent zone univ.edu);
3) DS, RRSIG(DS) corresponding to DNSKEY RR of univ.edu, DNSKEY RR of
.edu;

4) DS, RRSIG(DS) corresponding to DNSKEY RR of .edu, from the root zone.
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2.1.5

Authenticated Denial

Consider a scenario where the zone authority for the domain wesellstuff.com
outsources its DNS operations to dnsnet.net. It is indeed conceivable that a competitor
wealsosellstuff.com could bribe some personnel in dnsnet.net (or any entity who

has acquired control over the ANS) to remove the record for wesellstuff.com (thereby
driving the competitor out of business).
To ensure that DNS servers and/or their operators need not be trusted, DNSSEC demands a pertinent response from an ANS for every query that falls under the zone. If the
queried name exists, the ANS should provide a signed RRSet. If the queried name does not
exist, the ANS is expected to provide authenticated denial by providing some information
signed by the zone authority3 which demonstrates that the queried record does not exist. If
the ANS ignores the query, or provides a non pertinent response, the resolver will send the
query again, or will query another ANS for the zone, till it receives a pertinent response.
For example, in response to a query for name abc.xyz.fgh the querier expects a
signed RRSet by the authority for the zone under which the name abc.xyz.fgh falls, or
alternately, expects
1) a signed response from the authority of the root zone that no record for a name .fgh
exists; or
2) a signed response from the authority of the zone .fgh that no record for the name
xyz.fgh exists; or
3

Only the zone authority is trusted to provide information regarding the zone - even information indicating
that a record does not exist.
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3) a signed response from the authority of the zone xyz.fgh that no record for the
name abc.xyz.fgh exists.
As the zone authority is off-line, a response denying every possible (as yet unknown)
query, regarding the almost infnitely many possible names and types that can fall under
the zone, should somehow be signed by the zone authority and included in the master
fle provided to ANSs. This is accomplished cleverly through NSEC records [76]. A
signed NSEC record abc.example.com, NSEC, cat.example.com indicating two
enclosers is interpreted as an authenticated denial of all enclosed names: viz., names that
fall between abc.example.com and cat.example.com in the dictionary order. For
example, if queried for a record named cab.example.com, this NSEC RR signed by the
authority of the zone example.com (the signature included in a RRSIG(NSEC) RR) is
proof that no such record exists.

2.1.5.1

DNS-Walk

Even while DNS RRs are not meant to be private they should only be provided when
explicitly queried by name and type. NSEC permits one to query random names and learn
about unsolicited names of enclosers that do exist in the zone master fle. For example, a
querier may send a query for a random name like axx.example.com and get to know the
two enclosers abc.example.com, cat.example.com that actually exist. The attacker
can then query for a random name like cate.example.com and obtain its enclosers, say
cat.example.com, data.example.com, and so on.
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The ability to easily enumerate all services under a zone is obviously a useful starting
point for any attacker. An attacker wishing to obtain all DNS records for a zone can easily
“walk-through” all records in the zone master by simply making a sequence of random
queries. Such supercilious queries also have the ill-effect of further burdening the DNS
infrastructure.

2.2

SCADA systems
Process Control Systems (SCADA systems) play a major role in present day criti-

cal infrastructures like power grid, water management, petrochemical, oil and natural gas
distribution systems etc. While modern technologies provide solutions for better performance, management, reliability of systems, they also expose the critical infrastructure to
crucial attacks which could endanger lives of people along with economy.

2.2.1

SCADA System Components

A typical SCADA system includes the following components:
Master Terminal Unit (MTU): A master terminal unit is a server that is supervised
by some trained personnel through a Human Machine Interface (HMI). A MTU usually
comprises of racks of programmable logic controllers (PLCs). PLCs are programmable,
confgurable systems that run continuously. The PLCs read inputs from some addressed
interfaces, processes the inputs and writes the output to some addresses. The MTU is
responsible for i) collecting the data from different Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and
ii) sending commands to them through a wide variety of communication channels (Ethernet/wireless/radio/proprietary). A HMI is software that runs on the MTU provides a graph17

ical representation of the supervised system, and is also a central point for confguring the
functionality of the SCADA system - either manually or automatically.
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): RTUs are generally on the feld close to the sensors
which sense various physical processes. The sensors on the feld report the data to RTUs.
Most RTUs house some PLCs and analog-to-digital (A-D) converters. Typically RTUs
are periodically polled by MTUs for collecting data, and for sending dynamic instructions/commands. In turn, PLCs at the feld send commands to actuators on the feld to
control some physical process.
Sensors: A sensor is an analog or digital device that measures some parameter of a
physical process and provides analog or digital data to an RTU.
Actuator: An actuator is a mechanical device for moving or controlling a mechanism
or system. It takes energy, usually transported by air, electric current, or liquid, and converts that into some kind of motion [14].
Alarm: Alarms play a major role in SCADA systems by notifying the personnel about
any hazardous situations and/or failure of devices etc. Alarm conditions are programmed
in PLCs that poll an alarm in continuous intervals. A PLC sends a command to raise an
alarm when an abnormal condition is met.
A typical SCADA system consists of all the above mentioned subsystems which collectively work for some very critical systems like Oil/ Gas/ Water / Electricity distribution
where failure could result in hazardous effects on surroundings.
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Figure 2.2
SCADA System Architecture

2.2.2

SCADA Security

Several issues concerning our ability to secure SCADA systems have been addressed
by many researchers for various types of SCADA systems [60], [30], [1], [51]. Practical
solutions to securing SCADA systems have been marred by i) the lack of well accepted
standards (both for hardware and communication protocols), and ii) the uniqueness of
each system, demanding specifc domain knowledge for addressing security issues in each
system.
For many industrial control systems security is not seen as a priority, or even a feature.
Vendors who develop the control systems for the clients do not provide security unless
it is asked for. Clients on the other end do not request for security features as the risk
assessments do not show up any security related risks. Many legacy SCADA systems do
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not employ any explicit security mechanism on the assumption of an established secure
perimeter through isolation, and their obscure nature.
The SCADA systems that are used today have different sensor devices, data acquisition
and processing units such as RTUs/ PLCs at feld level and servers off the feld usually
monitored through HMI software by maintenance personnel. The unauthenticated data
sent by the devices to a control system (a RTU/PLC) is delivered to the Master Terminal
Unit through communication channels like Ethernet/Radio modem. As the communication
channel between the master terminal unit and a feld device do not typically employ any
kind of authentication, it can be subjected to spoofng attacks like man in the middle attack
and message injection attacks.
Apart from a wide range of easy attacks on the communication channels, several security loopholes can be exploited by attackers to gain control of the supervisory system. For
example, operators of a plant may use e-mails, through which Trojan horses and worms
can be planted in applications that can manipulate data or send commands [48]. More
generally, such loop-holes include defects in the SCADA software, bugs in the underlying
operating system, and even untrusted hardware in general purpose computers which run
the software.
Efforts to secure SCADA systems have also been marred by its substantially different requirements, compared to better know information technology (IT) systems [18].
“SCADA systems and corporate IT systems focus on very different information assurance
priorities. IT systems priorities are confdentiality, authentication, integrity, availability,
and non-repudiation, SCADA systems on the other hand emphasize reliability, real-time
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response, and tolerance of emergency situations, personnel safety, product quality, plant
safety, usually to the exclusion of any security mechanism that might hinder these [18]”.
It is no surprise that standard IT security mechanisms are not appropriate for all SCADA
systems as each system has its own requirements and dependencies. Over “90% of major SCADA and automation vendors have all of their manuals and specifcations available
on-line to the general public [48] ”. Notwithstanding the fact that frewalls are used to
isolate the SCADA LANs from the Internet, it is not impractical for a cyber attacker who
invests time to learn the specifcations from readily available manuals to create a far reaching disasters on critical infrastructures. In particular, the human machine interface (HMI)
software which servers as the nerve center for many SCADA applications runs on untrusted
general purpose platforms, and is often reachable over a wide area network. Relying on
the integrity of this nerve center to control the system is a dangerous approach.

2.2.3

Vulnerabilities

In a SCADA system several individual components (sensors, actuators, RTUs, MTU ,
etc.) are bridged through a communication network. While each component plays a prominent role in effective functionality of the entire system, any component that is vulnerable
to common cyber attacks will have a cascading effect on the whole system. For most
of the SCADA networks are protected by software frewalls that act as perimeter [61], a
simple misconfguration of frewall can easily open up back doors for various components
connected through the network.
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Although the workstations inside the perimeter are protected by individual software
frewalls, a rogue employee may plug a fash drive that carries worm/ virus. Apart from the
frewalls, the critical infrastructure systems are monitored by intrusion detection systems
IDS that continuously monitor for any malicious activity over the network. Most advanced
IDS system can only watch for known vulnerabilities. The ineffectiveness of standardized
security schemes in detecting worms like Stuxnet could cost a lot of fscal damage.
Most of the SCADA systems demand high availability, reliability, timeliness. The vendors of the SCADA systems compete more over the mentioned demands and ignore the
security measures like confdentiality, integrity despite of their usage in critical infrastructure. The SCADA vendors have little to no response to the known critical public exploits.
A very less number of administrators care about patching their systems against exploits. A
study done by ICS-CERT shows 60% [6] of failure rate in patching process.
Different layers of a Distributed Control System (DCS/ SCADA) system have distinct
known vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be broadly categorized as
1. Network Layer Vulnerabilities
2. Application Layer Vulnerabilities.

2.2.3.1

Network Layer Vulnerabilities

A SCADA network comprise of two major subnets
1. Corporate Network.
2. Control Network.
The components in the control network are entrusted with data acquisition from sensors/
actuators, data logging, data storage in historian, processing the data to issue commands
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etc. On the other hand the business network / corporate network is involved with the
IT issues like management, planning, customer service, inventory control etc. A proper
communication channel wired/ wireless is in place for data exchange between both of
these subnets. For effective monitoring vendors also provide remote access to the system,
which today can be done using a mobile app over a smart phone.
Several different entry points to the control / corporate network area usually guarded
by a single or multi-layered frewall. In a typical scenario, the control network is protected
by two frewalls,
1. Corporate network frewall
2. Control network frewall
The corporate network is connected to internet which indirectly connects every component
in the control network to the internet, but through one or more frewalls and IDS systems.
Any component in control network (SCADA) that is virtually connected to internet is prone
to all the known / unknown cyber attacks probably with an increased level of diffculty to
penetrate for attackers.
The most widely used RTU technology in SCADA systems vendors utilize the dial up
feature offered to perform a mass / individual update of frmware on these components.
Gaining access to vendor’s internal resources would reduce the complexity for an attacker
to compromise the components in the SCADA system [3]. The communication schemes
widely in practice in today’s industry are a. MODBUS, b. DNP3, c. Zigbee.
The communications protocol widely used in legendary SCADA systems- MODBUS
does not offer any security features. Even the most recent protocol DNP3 offers little to no
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security. The DNP3 protocol is mostly used by utilities like power industry for communication of master and remote telemetry units. Zigbee is a wireless communication standard
for SCADA systems that is gaining momentum with little evaluation of its security. In this
protocol a smart energy device is tied with a certifcate with serial number and manufacturer. Each device authenticates itself to other using its private key based on the asymmetric
key cryptography [11]. Authors in [27] show different tools like KillerBee [81] to expose
the faws in this communication protocol.

2.2.3.2

Application Layer Vulnerabilities

The SCADA systems are integrated with various software applications and hardware
peripheral devices at application layer such as
1. Database systems like SQL Server for data historian, that are used to store/ retrieve
data for reporting, trending and analysis.
2. Human Machine Interface (HMI) that provides entire / partial state of the system.
3. Remote desktop applications for remote control/ monitor.
4. Hardware includes USB, CD-ROM, multimedia cards etc.
The SCADA systems depend on data historian for trending and analysis. The data collected by the devices is saved to and retrieved from a database. For performing operations
on the database a language SQL (Structured Query Language) is widely used by industry. These databases return a response (a record / set of records) for a query issued as a
command. The SQL based databases are prone to SQL injection attacks, if they are not
maintained properly [82].
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HMI is an interactive interface for administrator and other personnel who monitor the
SCADA system. Highly complex systems like Nuclear reactors, Air traffc control systems
rely on a HMI to visualize the state of entire system at any given instance. For ease and
accessibility, many vendors of this software provide remote control applications to monitor
the system via an app on a mobile. While the feature provides easy access, it stands out
as huge vulnerability. An adversary only requires the login information to remotely access
the HMI application and issue false commands to destabilize the system.
The access points like workstation’s peripheral devices like USB ports, CD-ROMs,
other device ports are highly vulnerable to malware injections, further gaining control over
the system. Very strict access control mechanisms are required to avoid such attacks.

2.2.4

Attacks on SCADA Systems

With high levels of security and well architectured networks, SCADA systems stood
one of the primary targets of cyber attackers. Attackers are able to enter the core of the
system through various entry points of the system. Most of the attacks surfaced recently
are successfully performed on critical infrastructure like nuclear plants, water management
systems etc.
In 2010, a virus known as Stuxnet - specifcally targeted towards nuclear plants to
shutdown the centrifuges inside the plant and overwrite the setpoints of pressure and other
values was undetected for more than a year duration [40]. Stuxnet was able to use about
twenty zero day vulnerabilities [75] to gain control over the plant. Stuxnet has the potential
to turn off pumps, control actuators, and still report that everything is normal. Now, the
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popularity of this worm made it available on many blogs and websites. Availability of such
powerful worms could lead to more drastic attacks upon re-engineering.
In November 2011, the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center reported a
cyber-attack on a small, rural water utility outside Springfeld. The report stated that few
attackers have gained access to the system and controlled the pumps remotely. “ A hacker
calling himself “Prof” posted screen shots from his computer showing him logged onto the
control system of a water utility in the Texas town of South Houston” [77].
In May 2003, Slammer worm related to unpatched version of Microsoft SQL surfaced
and resulted in loss of data. The data acquisition server was infected through the corporate
network when an employee installed the software on his laptop which is the primary entry
point for Slammer worm [44] . The Slammer worm along with other virus has affected a
major petroleum company that resulted in remarkable fnancial damage [65].
Hidden malicious/accidental functionality in any SCADA system component could be
exploited by an attacker to launch attacks such as the above. Such hidden functionality
could exist in (the logic programmed into) programmable logic controllers (PLC) in RTUs
and MTUs, in any computer used to run SCADA software for programming PLCs, or in
any peripheral of the computer running the HMI software or the SCADA data logger, in the
operating system of such computers, in the HMI software, or even, ironically, in a computer
that runs the intrusion detection system (IDS) intended for protecting the SCADA system.
It is indeed for very good reasons that such threats have been recognized as “Advanced
Persistent Threats” [7, 23, 28, 55, 78]. Due to the high value of targets, the possibility of
sophisticated state sponsored attacks have to be considered. Sophisticated malicious func26

tionality may be introduced even during the manufacturing process of various components
that could ultimately end up in SCADA systems. In addition, we can not afford to ignore the possibility that an attacker may have actually participated in the deployment of
the SCADA system, or testing of the deployed system, and taken advantage of such an
opportunity to inject hidden functionality in some component.

2.2.5

Related Work

In the effort towards securing SCADA systems, many security mechanisms are proposed. The emphasis on providing the critical infrastructure requirements like reliability, timeliness, availability, etc., overshadows the importance of security. Many secure
strategies developed for critical infrastructure suggest better end to end security and other
schemes of similar nature. A simple attack like turning off an alarm remotely, can invite
more devastating undetected attacks. The fact check that “ Does the system adhere to the
rules laid by its designers, If not, is it detectable ?” is ignored in most of the security
schemes for critical infrastructure.

2.2.5.1

Collaborative, Trust-Based Security Mechanism

Current research towards protection of the critical infrastructure focuses more on communication security and less on the protection of entire system. In a recent work done by
G. Coates and K. Hopkinson, a trust-based security architecture is proposed for securing a
utility network [18]. In their methodology, a trust system is created and added in strategic
locations to protect existing legacy architectures, to enhance security. The trust system is
built with the following characteristics.
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1. TRUST system is a communication security device, with frewall and intrusion detection capabilities, designed for use with time-critical systems.
2. Trust system, is a software agent performing active security analysis and response.
3. In a network where nodes have suffcient unused hard drive capacity, memory, and
processing power, the agent would be loaded directly onto the node.
4. The agent then provides an active interface between incoming messages and the
nodes code, data, and applications,The emphasis on providing the critical infrastructure requirements like reliability, timeliness, availability, etc., overshadows the
importance of security. Many secure strategies developed for critical infrastructure
suggest better end to end security and other schemes of similar nature. A simple
attack like turning off an alarm remotely, can invite more devastating undetected
attacks similar to other software frewalls.
5. The trust system intercepts status messages or commands from network nodes.
6. The trust system validates input, identifes risks and bad data, and initiates appropriate alerts.
7. Trust system thwarts the illegitimate data that does not obey the policies.
8. Trust system provides data fltering feature to guard data from unauthorized personnel.
This software agent is simply a collaboration of all the general purpose security features like Intrusion detection system, frewalls, access control matrix etc. Authors advise
strategic locations like electronic security perimeter (NIST) [61] for installing this agents.
While such type of trusted agent may be useful for data sanitization and improving the frewall, IDS, and access control mechanisms, it might not be useful in detecting a change of
setpoint made by an attacker, or cannot detect anything about a modifcation of “operation
rule” by an unauthorized personnel.

2.2.5.2

DNP3 Secure Authentication

In an effort to secure the communication over DNP3 protocol, “the user group of DNP3
protocol for SCADA communication has adopted an extension to DNP3 called Secure Au28

thentication that meets IEC 62351-5 requirements. This extension is now part of the DNP3
protocol and is also part of IEEE 1815, the IEEE version of DNP3” [11]. In this scheme,
the master station and the RTU share a secret, called update key. For a communication session between master terminal and RTU a session key is required for mutual authentication.
The update key is used to compute a session key. After establishing the session secret,
master station or RTU can initiate a challenge-response mechanism to validate authenticity
of sender of the message. “The standard specifes that any message can be challenged, but
all critical messages must be. Critical messages are essentially those that perform some
kind of “write” operation” [11].

2.2.5.3

IEEE SCM

Another ongoing effort towards security in SCADA systems is the IEEE SSPP ( Serial
SCADA Protection Protocol). This standard defnes a security protocol for control system
serial communication. “The fundamental objective of SSPP is to ensure the integrity of
SCADA messages, that messages are not forged, modifed, spliced, reordered or replayed.
With an appropriate cipher suite SSPP also provides confdentiality” [2].
The IEEE SCM (SCADA Cryptorgraphic Module) implements a three layer Serial
SCADA Protocol Protection (SSPP) for accomplishing its goals - providing link security
using a BITW approach. At the top is the session layer responsible for formatting methods
and data to be sent in sessions, and for distinguishing between different kinds of messages
and performing session key negotiation and exchange. The transport layer provides cryptographic support for messages passed by the session layer to preserve confdentiality and
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integrity. The link layer formats the output of the transport layer into octets suitable for
transmission over a communication link.
Ideally, the tasks performed by the SCM should be limited to bare minimum. As the
security requirements for cryptographic operations are different from the requirements for
the performance of auxiliary tasks, they should not be combined in the same module.

2.3

Merkle Hash Tree
A binary Merkle hash tree is constructed using a cryptographic hash function h() (like

SHA-1). A tree with N = 2L leaves has a height L. Let the leaves of the tree be l1 · · · lN .
Let vi = h(li ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N be represent N nodes in level-one of the tree (one corresponding
to each leaf). The next level (level 2) of the tree consists of N/2 nodes, each obtained by
hashing a pair of nodes in level 1. At level 3 are N/4 nodes obtained by paired hashing of
the N/2 nodes in level 2, and so on. Level L − 1 has two nodes, and level L has a single
node - the root r of the tree. The root of the tree is a commitment to all leaves.
Corresponding to any leaf li is a set of L intermediate nodes vi (one from each level)
such that r = h0 (li , vi ), where the function h0 () represents a sequence of hash operations.
Specifcally the set of hashes vi are intermediate nodes that can be seen as commitments
to all leaves except li . If h() is pre-image resistant, it is infeasible to “cook-up” a set
of values li0 , and vi0 that satisfes r = h0 (li , vi ). Thus, if provided with values li and vi
satisfying r = h0 (li , vi ), the entity that possesses r can rest assured that li is indeed a
legitimate leaf of the tree and vi are indeed valid intermediate leaves of the tree.
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Just as any leaf can be independently verifed against the root, it is also possible to
update each leaf independently. For example, if li is updated to li0 the root can be updated
to r0 = h0 (li0 , vi ) to refect the new leaf li0 . After the root has been updated, the old leaf li
can no longer be demonstrated to be a part of the tree.

2.3.1

Merkle Tree Limitations

Two well known limitations of the merkle hash tree are i) the power of two requirements for the total number of leaves; and ii) the ability to readily recognize non existence
of a record. The implication of the frst limitation is ineffciency in scenarios where the
total number of leaves N is not a power of 2. Specifcally, if 513 records need to be stored,
then a tree of length 1024 need to be maintained.
The second limitation is however more serious. For the module (which maintains only
the root) to be convinced that no record regarding some index a exists, the module should
verify the integrity of every leaf and in this process, deduce that no leaf for a exists. Obviously, this is far from practical. That the module can not verify non existence can be
abused to perform replay attacks.
As a specifc example, consider a scenario where some new information is available
regarding a record for some index a (and thus needs to be updated). However, the untrusted
server (which stores all records) can incorrectly claim that no information exists currently
for a, and request the new information for a to be added as a new record. After this, as both
the old and new records are part of the tree, the server has the ability to advertise either
record.
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A Binary Merkle tree -16 leaves.
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2.3.2

Index Ordered Merkle Tree

The index ordered merkle tree is a simple modifcation to the merkle tree which addresses both limitations of the merkle tree. In an IOMT a leaf Li (the ith leaf in the IOMT)
associated with data index a is of the form Li = (a, va , a0 ) where the middle value va is the
data associated with index a, and a0 is the next data-index.
That a leaf Li = (a, va , a0 ) can be verifed by the module to be consistent with the root
implies that i) a leaf exists for index a, and ii) no leaf exists for any index that falls between
a and a0 . The set of uniquely indexed current leaves is an ordered list where every index
points to the next higher index; the exception is the highest index (address) which wraps
around and points to the least index.
A value x is covered by (a, a0 ) if (a < x < a0 ), or (for the wrapped around pair) if
(x < a0 ≤ a) or (a0 ≤ a < x). If a = a0 all values except a are covered, and implies that a
is the only index.
The issues associated with the power of 2 requirement is addressed by simple modifcations to hash functions HL () used for deriving a leaf node from an IOMT leaf and HV ()
used for combining two nodes to obtain a parent node. In an IOMT empty leaf is of the
form Li = (0, 0, 0). The function vi = HL (Li ) which maps a leaf to a leaf node is defned
as

vi = HL (i, vi , i) =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ h(i, vi , i0 ) if i 6= 0
⎪
⎪
⎩ 0

33

if i = 0

(2.1)

The function HV (u, v) which maps two internal nodes to a common parent is defned as
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
u
if v = 0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
p = HV (u, v) =
(2.2)
v
if u = 0
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ h(u, v) if u 6= 0, v 6= 0
Consequently, an IOMT with a root 0 can be seen as a tree with any number of zero leaves
of the form (0, 0, 0).
By performing some simple checks the IOMT ensures that only one leaf can exist for
an index. Specifcally, a leaf with an index c can be inserted only if can be demonstrated
that no leaf with index c exists currently by providing a leaf that covers c. Specifcally, to
insert a leaf for an index c two leaves need to be provided: i) an empty leaf (0, 0, 0) and
ii) a leaf for some other index a - say (a, va , a0 ) such that (a, a0 ) covers c. After insertion
the two leaves will be modifed to (c, vc , a0 ) and (a, va , c) respectively. To insert a leaf with
index a when the root is zero, the root is simply set to HL (a, va , a). Similarly, when a leaf
(x, vx , x0 ) needs to be deleted a leaf (b, vb , b0 ) should be provided such that x0 = b. After
deletion the frst leaf becomes (0, 0, 0) and the second becomes (b, vb , x0 ). To delete a sole
leaf (a, va , a) the current root HL (a, va , a) is set to 0.
Except for the case of insertion of the frst leaf or deletion of a sole leaf, to insert or
delete a leaf two leaves will need to be modifed simultaneously. Two leaf hashes vl and
vr can be simultaneously mapped to the root r by mapping the leaf hashes to the common
parent, and then mapping the common parent to the root. Let vp be lowest common parent
of two leaf nodes vl and vr . More specifcally, let vp = HV (vpl , vpr ) where vpl and vpr are the

34

left and right child of vp . Let vl , vr and vp be a set of hashes satisfying vpl = f (vl , vl ),
vpr = f (vr , vr ), and r = f (vp , vp ). Thus,
r = f (HV (f (vl , vl ), f (vr , vr )), vp )
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(2.3)

CHAPTER 3
TCB FOR UNTRUSTED MIDDLEMAN

The digital information age is characterized by the unprecedented ability of entities
to disseminate and receive digital information using a wide variety of computing devices.
Depending on the specifc nature of the application, the information could take various
forms like stock quotes, audio/video, blog, tweet, post, HTML document, fle, domain
name system (DNS) record, etc, and exchanged over a variety of communication channels.
Irrespective of the nature of the information any such application can be seen as a set of
information sources P and a set of consumers C. Most often, as it is impractical for such
sources and sinks to interact directly with each other, they rely on a middle-man - or more
generally a set of middle-men M.

P

C

M
Figure 3.1
PMC Model
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For example, In the process of disseminating DNS records [43] created by zone authorities to any Internet client, DNS servers are middle-men. In a SCADA system, the sensors
are providers, monitor is a middleman, and consumers are actuators. Numerous network
based applications that exist today, and perhaps several application paradigms that may
evolve in the future can be characterized broadly under this provider-middleman-consumer
(PMC) model.
While the issue of securing interactions between providers and consumers have received substantial attention, most research merely address the problem of securing the
channels between i) providers and the middle-men, and ii) middle-men and consumers [12]
, [74]. In doing so it is implicitly assumed that the middle-men are trusted. Most often a
middle-man is a server - an untrusted software running on an untrusted platform, under
the control of untrusted entities. The broad focus of the proposed research are security
strategies to prevent potential abuses by identifying minimal TCB for middle-men.

3.1

TCB
A trusted computing base (TCB) [35] is a resource constraint set of software and

hardware that serves as a base for securing a system amidst of untrusted components within
the system.
It is not feasible to verify and certify a large complex application’s software and hardware for its integrity. The verifcation complexity of a software/hardware increases with
its size and complexity. In order to trust a TCB, the hardware and software that constitutes
the TCB should be trusted. Any trusted system should be verifable. As the verifcation
37

complexity increases with the size and complexity , it is important for a TCB to be as simple as possible with minimal software and hardware. The question is what is the minimal
functionality to be offered by a TCB to amplify the trust and be verifable.

3.2

Minimal TCB
Any security solution is essentially a strategy to realize some assurances relying on

the integrity of a minimal trusted computing base (TCB). More specifcally, the trust in a
few components/entities that constitute the TCB is amplifed using security protocols to
achieve the desired assurances.
Typically, TCB functionality is offered by tamper-responsive trustworthy computing
modules. Examples of trustworthy computing modules include
1. cryptographic co-processors entrusted with the task of protecting and performing
computations using sensitive secrets; and
2. trustworthy platform modules (TPM), which offer the TCBs functionality in the
TPM-TP model.

3.2.1

Read-proofng and Write-proofng

Just as the guaranteed TCB functionality is leveraged to provide some assurances
regarding the security of the system, for realizing the guaranteed TCB functionality, two
fundamental assurances are leveraged.
The frst is read-proofng of secrets protected by the module. This is necessary to ensure
that the modules cannot be impersonated.
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TCB Functionality

Readproofing

Writeproofing
Figure 3.2

Simplifed Trusted Computing Model

The second is write-proofng of software executed by the module. The software dictates
the TCB functions. Write-proofng software is necessary to ensure that the TCB functions
cannot be modifed.
The two requirements are however not independent. With the ability to modify software
at will, an attacker can force the module to reveal its secrets (for example, by inserting a set
of commands to write the secret bytes out to the serial port). On the other hand, secrets that
are protected can be used to authenticate software that will be executed by a computer in
the module. Without the knowledge of the secret the attacker cannot modify the software
(more specifcally, such modifcations will be detected due to failure of authentication).
In practice read-proofng is seen as a stepping stone to the more elusive goal of tamperproofng software. Attacks aimed at modifying software to reveal secrets can be prevented
by ensuring that software does not have access to at least some of the secrets that are protected. Some secrets may be generated, stored and used by dedicated hardware [54], [37].
However, authenticating software with the secrets provides a boot-strapping problem [67].
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After all, some software should be loaded (typically the BIOS) which includes instructions
to load the secret and carry out the steps required to perform authentication.

3.3

TCB Models
In the trusted computing group (TCG) [58] specifcation for trusted platforms, trusted

platform modules (TPM) [59] are used to attest measures of loaded software, thereby permitting third parties to verify that only authorized software has gained control of a platform. To leverage TPMs to realize a trusted platform it is (unfortunately) required to trust
several other components of a general purpose computer like CPU, BIOS, RAM, CPURAM bridge, and possibly other peripherals that have direct access to the RAM. Practical
deployments of TCG trusted platforms have been hindered by several factors like i) several attacks that have been identifed to violate the envisioned security goals of the TCG
architecture [57]; and that ii) thorough review necessary to pre-certify software (BIOS,
boot-loader, operating system and application software) is far from practical.
The “late launch” feature in the current version of TPMs (version 1.2) in conjunction with new instructions supported by Intel and AMD processors (Intel-TXT and AMDSKINIT) [41] together provide an assurance that a “small piece of application logic (PAL)”
[41] can be run unmolested on a general purpose platform - by trusting only the CPU,
RAM, a CPU-RAM bridge. More specifcally, the BIOS and other peripherals do not
have to be trusted, and all other software that can take control of the platform need not
be verifed/measured. Unfortunately, some attacks have been found against the late launch
architecture recently [79].
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Another approach is the use of IBM 4758 [54] trustworthy computing module which
sports a general purpose processor inside a protected boundary, runs a specialized operating
system, and can execute special application code unmolested inside the trusted boundary.
In such an approach the minimal TCB for a SCADA monitor can be executed inside such
modules.
In yet another approach, Chavez et al [17] realize a trust anchor through the use of
secure obfuscation techniques to run protected code. Specifcally [17] suggests the use
of such a trust anchor for a SCADA monitor. However, in the preliminary work reported
in [17] does not describe the precise nature of the tasks performed by the trust anchor.

3.3.1

Security Model

In the envisioned security model an untrusted middle man U is associated with a
trusted module T. The trusted module is assumed to be severely resource limited, and performs a set of simple tasks T . By performing tasks T module T provides some important
assurances regarding the tasks performed by U.
Data provided by providers to the middle-man U are assumed to be public, and are
authenticated by providers for verifcation by T. Data sent by middle-men to consumers
are authenticated by T to vouch for the integrity of the data. However, the module T will
vouch for the data only if untrusted U can prove to T some properties about the data. Thus,
the purpose of the tasks T performed by the module is simply to verify the proof submitted
by U.
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3.4

Critical Infrastructures from the perspective of module T
Numerous CI applications that fall under the provier-middleman-consumer (PMC)

model can be classifed into several categories depending on the nature of data, the set of
data identifers, and the specifc tasks performed by middle-men.

3.4.1

Static vs Dynamic Data

Data pertaining to an identifer may be static or dynamic. Static data has a well defned
expiry period (which can be infnite) and cannot be revoked prematurely; dynamic data can
be revoked prematurely. An example of static data is an address-type DNS record (with a
pre-specifed life-time). In scenarios where it is impractical to foresee the validity duration
of data, it is necessary to treat the data as dynamic. An example of dynamic data is routing
information; the route to some destination may change prematurely due to unforeseen
changes in the network topology.
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3.4.2

Static vs Dynamic Data Identifers

The data identifers may themselves be static or dynamic. For example, at the top
level of the domain name system, the same set of DNS records (corresponding to top-level
domains and country-code domains) are held by root servers. However at lower levels of
DNS, as new zones could be introduced at any time, the identifers are dynamic. Thus, the
data at top-most level of DNS is an example of static data with static identifers. Data at
lower levels of DNS are examples of static data with dynamic data identifers.
An example of a system with static identifers and dynamic data is a SCADA system.
In such a system a fxed number of sensors are information sources that provide dynamic
measurements. A central monitor (middle-man) processes the data to check if the monitored system is in an acceptable state. If not, an alarm should be triggered. In this case the
alarm module can be considered as the consumer of data.

3.4.3

TCB Tasks

Depending on the nature of application and functionality of middleman, the tasks of a
TCB bound to middleman can be classifed as a. Stateless, b. Stateful.

3.4.3.1

Stateless TCB

In several applications middle-men simply store and relay data. In such applications,
on receipt of a query for a data with a specifc identifer, the middle-men is expected to
provide the requested data.
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The modules associated with such middlemen do not have to be aware of the exact
nature or format of the data. The modules do not store any data that is specifc to the
application and hence stateless. Examples of such applications include well know services
like WWW, DNS, Email, and so on.
The stateless TCB approach does not suit the applications with dynamic data. For
example, if a zone authority is allowed to add records, or a web service that provides
updates of stock quotes etc. The Stateless TCB does not maintain any state of the system.
In other words, a Stateless TCB does not store any data pertaining to the application.
Our approach towards securing DNS through a Stateless TCB by performing a simple
atomic relay is provided in Chapter 4.

3.4.3.2

Stateful TCB

In some applications, when queried for a data corresponding to some identifer, middlemen may need to process data associated with multiple data identifers to respond to the
query. In such cases, in order to assure the operations performed by the middle-man, the
module T may require to perform some additional application-domain specifc functions.
Examples of such services include web-brokering (matching a clients request with many
possible service offerings), and SCADA systems (where the monitor has to check data
from all sensors to decide if the system is in an acceptable state), and a dynamic lookup
service (unlike static DNS, the data in the records is dynamic / expire prematurely).
Our approach towards securing SCADA systems through a TCB performing trusted
process check is provided in Chapters 6, 7. A generic solution by using Stateful TCB
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is provided for data dissemination systems with dynamic data, dynamic identifers, and
dynamic consumers is given in Chapter 5
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CHAPTER 4
ATOMIC RELAY FOR DNS

DNSSEC has seen poor levels of adoption as upgrading a “plain-old” DNS server to
support DNSSEC will often necessitate a hardware upgrade due to an order of magnitude
increase in the size of DNSSEC records (compared to plain DNS records), and substantial
increase in the size of DNS responses [5]- [22]. In many cases DNSSEC may require more
expensive TCP instead of UDP as the transport protocol for carrying large DNS responses.
DNS resolvers and clients will also need to endure substantial computational burden due
to the need to verify multiple digital signatures. Furthermore, the feasibility of zone enumeration also encourages attackers to perform supercilious queries, thus exacerbating the
issue of high DNSSEC overhead.

4.1

Extending Link-Security Approaches
Cryptographic mechanisms for individually securing each link traversed by DNS records,

viz., the links i) between the off-line zone authority and ANSs of the zone (for securely conveying master fles); ii) between PNSs and ANSs; and iii) between clients and their PNSs,
demand substantially lower overhead compared to the hierarchical PKI-like approach employed by DNSSEC. Unfortunately, link-security approaches implicitly assume that the
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middle-men are trustworthy: while RRs are protected in transit, there is no protection for
RRs while they reside in the DNS servers.
Specifcally, symmetric key DNSSEC [56] and DNSCurve [12] simply assume that
1) the keys employed by DNS servers (which are used to compute the link secrets) are
well protected from untrustworthy entities (else, any entity with access to the secrets of a
DNS server can impersonate the DNS server to send fake RRs); and that
2) the intermediary DNS servers i) will not modify RRs, and ii) will not deny RRs that
do exist.
The proposed TCB-DNS, where every DNS server houses a low complexity trustworthy module (TM), is also a link-security approach. However, TCB-DNS does not make
such unjustifable assumptions regarding the trustworthiness of DNS servers. Instead,
TCB-DNS assumes that
1) secrets protected by the TM (which are used to compute link-secrets) cannot be
exposed; and
2) the trivial functionality of the TM cannot be modifed.
To warrant trust, an obvious requirement is that the TM functionality is as simple as
possible. To motivation for TCB-DNS stems from the intuition that TMs that perform
trivial functions are suffcient to provide the desired assurances A1, A2 and A3.

4.2

Principle of Operation
In TCB-DNS every DNS server is equipped with a low-complexity TM. From the

perspective of DNS servers, the TMs are black boxes that accept a formatted stream of bits
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as input, and output a message authentication code (MAC). Such MACs accompany plain
DNS responses sent by DNS servers. The operations performed inside the TM (to map the
input bits to a MAC) are a fxed sequence of logical and cryptographic hash operations.
This simple TM functionality is the TCB of a DNS server, which is leveraged to realize all
three assurances A1 - A3 with negligible overhead.

4.2.1

Atomic Relay

In the path of a RRSet originating from zone authority Z to the client (a stub-resolver
C), are an ANS for the zone Z and the PNS used by the host C. An atomic relay, as the
name suggests, relays a value from one entity to another, in one atomic step. A TM A in
the ANS performs an atomic relay of a value V from the zone authority Z to a PNS TM
P , thus eliminating the need to trust the ANS in which the TM A is housed. Similarly
the TM P in the PNS performs an atomic relay of the value V from the ANS TM A to a
stub-resolver C, eliminating the need to trust the PNS.
From the perspective of the TM A, it receives some input bits which specify the identity
of the source Z, a value V to be relayed, a message authentication code (MAC) MV,ZA ,
and the identity of the entity P to which the value V needs to be relayed. The TM A uses
its secrets to compute pair-wise secrets KZA and KAP (the precise mechanism for doing
this is explained later Section 4.3.1). Using the pair-wise secret KZA , TM A verifes the
MAC MV,ZA = h(V, KZA ) appended by Z. Following this, the TM A computes a MAC
MV,AP = h(V, KAP ) using the secret KAP .
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The values relayed by TMs are hashes of RRSets. The hashes of RRSets are computed
by zone authorities and individually authenticated to each ANS TM using MACs. ANS
TMs can atomically relay the hashes to any PNS TM which can then atomically relay the
hash to any stub-resolver. The TMs thus provide a parallel channel for securely conveying
hashes of RRSets by leveraging link-secrets (which are computed using secrets protected
by the TM).
Note that in both DNSSEC and TCB-DNS end-to-end integrity of an RRSet is realized by securely conveying a pre-image resistant hash of the RRSet. In DNSSEC this is
achieved by signing the hash. In TCB-DNS the integrity of the hash is assured to the extent
we can trust the TMs involved in relaying the hashes.
DNSSEC provides assurance A1 by signing hashes of regular DNS RRs, and provides
assurance A2 by signing hashes of NSEC/NSEC3 RRs. Obviously, by atomically relaying
the hashes of regular RRSets and NSEC/NSEC3 records, TCB-DNS can also provide both
assurances provided by DNSSEC. However, a simple addition to the capability of the TMs
can provide TCB-DNS with yet another useful feature - the ability to provide assurance
A3, and thereby eliminate the possibility of DNS-walk.

4.2.2

“Intelligent” Atomic Relay

If we merely relay hashes of NSEC/NSEC3 records, then TCB-DNS will also be susceptible to DNS-walk. Fortunately, to realize assurance A3, the only additional intelligent
feature required of TMs is the ability to recognize that “a value V falls inside an enclosure
(Vl , Vh ).”
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The atomic relay function performed by a TM with identity X, takes the form
MXD = ARX (S, D, V, Vl , Vh , MSX ).

(4.1)

In executing this TCB function the TM X accepts some fxed-length inputs like i) S and
D: the identities of a source and destination; ii) cryptographic hashes V , Vl , and Vh ; and
iii) a MAC MSX provided by the source S. The TM outputs a MAC for the value V under
two conditions:
1. the MAC MSX is consistent with V ; or
2. the MAC MSX is consistent with values Vl k Vh , and V is enclosed by (Vl , Vh ).
In the latter case, the TM interprets a pair of values (Vl , Vh ) authenticated by the zone
authority as proof that no value enclosed by (Vl , Vh ) exists in the master fle. If V is
enclosed, the TM outputs a MAC for V to inform D that an “enclosure for V was found.”
In DNSSEC that a value V is enclosed by (Vl , Vh ) is checked by the querier. The need
to reveal the enclosures to the querier is the reason that assurance A3 cannot be provided.
In TCB-DNS the enclosure is checked by the ANS TM (not provided to the querier). To
the extent that the TM can be trusted, the querier trusts that an enclosure exists for the value
V (and consequently, is convinced that an RR with the name corresponding to V does not
exist).
More specifcally, in TCB-DNS,
1) if the queried name and type exists the response includes the desired RRSet in the
ANSWER section; a MAC for a value V (where V is hash of the RRSet) is also included in

the response.
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2) to deny a name and type ni k ti the ANSWER section indicates the name and type
ni k ti ; the MAC for the value V = h(ni k ti ) is included in the response to imply that the
indicated name and type does not exist.
Typically, to provide authenticated denial for a queried name-and-type, a plurality
name-and-types will have to be explicitly denied (as will be explained later in Section 4.6.1).

4.3

Computing Link Secrets
For performing the atomic relay, a TM needs to compute two pairwise secrets - one

shared with the sender (the previous hop), which is used to verify the hash V (or the
encloser (Vl , Vh ) for authenticated denial), and one shared with the destination (the next
hop). Specifcally,
1. ANS TMs require the ability to establish a pairwise secret with i) the zone authority
for receiving hashes of RRSets, and ii) all PNS TMs for securely conveying hashes
of RRSets.
2. PNS TMs require the ability to establish a pairwise secret with i) all ANS TMs for
receiving hashes, and with ii) all clients who employ the PNS for conveying the
hashes.
For reducing TM complexity it is essential to identify a low complexity mechanism for
computing pairwise secrets. While many effcient strategies exist, the modifed LeightonMicali scheme (MLS) proposed in [49] is particularly well suited for establishing pairwise
secrets between TMs in DNS servers (between a large number of ANS TMs and a large
number of PNS TMs). We also extend MLS to facilitate link-secrets between i) zone
authorities and ANS TMs and ii) between PNS TMs and clients.
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4.3.1

MLS

Let KX represent a secret privy only to an entity with identity X and a key distribution
center (KDC). Similarly, let KY represent a secret known only to an entity Y and the
KDC. In MLS, the secret shared between two entities X and Y is KXY = h(KX , Y ) or
KY X = h(KY , X).
If the pairwise secret is KXY = h(KX , Y ), then entity X computes the pairwise secret
by directly hashing its secret KX ; entity Y employs a public (non-secret) value PY X =
h(KX , Y ) ⊕ h(KY , X) to compute KXY = h(KXY ) as
KXY

= h(KY , X) ⊕ PY X
= h(KY , X) ⊕ h(KX , Y ) ⊕ h(KY , X)
(4.2)

= h(KX , Y ).

On the other hand, if the pairwise secret is KY X = h(KY , X), entity Y computes the pairwise secret directly, and entity X employs the public value PY X = h(KX , Y )⊕h(KY , X).
MLS is an identity-based scheme, where the identity assigned to an entity can be chosen
to refect the credentials of the entity. For example, the identity of a zone authority can
simply be the hash of the name of the zone. In MLS some bits of the identities (say of two
entities X and Y ) are also used to determine which of the two entities should employ the
pair-wise public value.
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4.3.2

Key Distribution for TCB-DNS

In TCB-DNS the KDC can be entity under the control of a regulatory authority (for
example, ICANN). The core TCB-DNS entities are TMs associated with DNS servers.
The fringe TCB-DNS entities include zone authorities (who need to securely convey RRs
to ANSs) and clients (stub-resolvers) who query DNSs. Pair-wise secrets for TCB-DNS
can be i) between two core entities (between two TMs), or ii) between a core entity and a
fringe entity.
For the former case, a sequence number included in the TM identity specifes which of
the two core entities should use the public value to compute the pairwise secret. For the
latter (pairwise secret between a core entity and a fringe entity) the fringe entity employs
the public value - the core entity does not.
The identity X of a TM (associated with an ANS or a PNS) is of the form X = Xt k qx
where Xt is a succinct code describing the nature of X and duration of validity; the value
qx is a unique number assigned sequentially to every DNS server TM. To establish a secret
between TMs X = Xt k qx and Y = Yt k qy where (say) qx < qy , Y is required to use
the value PXY to compute the pairwise secret KXY ; X can compute KXY directly using
its secret KX .
The TCB-DNS identity Z of a zone authority is of the form Z = Zt k Zname where
Zname is a one-way function of the domain name of the zone. To enable Z to compute a
pairwise secret KZA with an ANS TM A the zone authority is issued
1. a secret KAZ = h(KA , Z) by the KDC, or
2. a secret KZ , along with a public value PZA ; or
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3. a TM with identity Z (with secret KZ stored inside the TM), along with a public
value PZA .
In the TCB-DNS identity of a client C = Ct k C 0 , C 0 can be a unique random value. If
P is the identity of a TM in a PNS used by the client C the client C is issued i) a secret
KP C = h(KP , C) or ii) a secret KC and a public value PCP .
Thus, once keys have been distributed to TCB-DNS entities, computing any link-secret
will require the TM to only perform a single hash computation (or a hash computation and
an XOR operation). Periodically, the KDC disseminates signed revocation lists indicating
identities of entities revoked.
Note that unlike the “basic” key distribution scheme for a static network of size N
(where each node is issued N − 1 secrets) MLS can cater for a dynamic network - as new
core entities (DNS server TMs) can be added at any time. In the basic scheme, to add a
new node every old node should be provided a new secret, which is impractical. In MLS
the new node is provided with one public value corresponding to every “old” node - old
nodes do not need a public value to establish a secret with newly added nodes.

4.3.3

Multiple KDCs

At the top of the hierarchy of DNSSEC is a single root CA - which is the authority
for the root zone. Though the root zone is expected to sign only public keys for gTLD
and ccTLD zones, the all powerful root zone authority has the ability to misrepresent
public keys for any zone. While ideally we would desire that this power be distributed
amongst multiple independent entities, such an approach can further increase the overhead
for DNSSEC.
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However, MLS can be easily extended to support multiple KDCs with minimal overhead. If we use m (for example, m = 4) independent KDCs, an entity X receives m
secrets (one from each KDC), KXi , 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Two entities X and Y can comi
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (one in each of the
pute m independent pairwise secrets of the form KXY

m parallel systems). All these secrets are simply XORed together to compute KXY as
1
2
m
KXY = KXY
⊕ KXY
· · · ⊕ KXY
.
i
can be computed only by X, Y , and the ith KDC. The secret KXY =
The secret KXY
1
2
m
KXY
⊕ KXY
· · · ⊕ KXY
can be computed only by TMs X and Y (and together, by all m

KDCs). While there are m public values associated with each secret, the m values can be
1
m
⊕ · · · ⊕ PXY
, where
XORed together and stored as one value; for example, PXY = PXY
i
= h(KXi k Y ) ⊕ h(KYi k X).
PXY

Thus, a TM with identity X stores m secrets KXi , 1 ≤ i ≤ m inside its protected
boundary. To enable the TM to compute KXY , the entity (DNS server) using the TM
X provides two inputs: (Y, PXY ). The TM performs m hash operations and m XOR
operations to compute
KXY

= h(KX1 , Y ) ⊕ · · · ⊕ h(KXm , Y ) ⊕ PXY
1
m
= KXY
⊕ · · · ⊕ KXY

(4.3)

In the rest of chapter we shall use the notation KXY = F (Y, PXY ) to represent the process
of computing the pairwise secret KXY by entity (or TM) X.
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4.3.4

Renewal

For renewal of secrets of a TM X = Xt k qx the regulatory authority simply issues
a new TM with TCB-DNS identity X 0 = Xt0 k qx0 , with secrets KX10 · · · KXm0 . If at the
time of renewal, the last issued sequence number was q, the new TM is issued a sequence
number qx0 = q + 1. The owner of the TM is issued q public values (where each public
value is the XOR of m public values). If the secrets of an ANS TM A is renewed, only the
zone authorities using the ANS need to be issued new public values for A. If the TM P
of a PNS is renewed, only the clients who use the PNS are issued with new public values
corresponding to P .
More specifcally, a node with sequence number q is the q th node to join the network,
and is issued one secret and q − 1 public values (or m secrets and q − 1 public values if
we use multiple KDCs). For renewal we simply add a new node. The public values are
the same size as the pair-wise keys (say 160-bits). A DNS server with a TM sequence
number 10 million will need access to at most 200 MB of storage for public values (which
can easily be stored in the hard-disk of the DNS server). There is no practical limit on the
number of fringe entities (zone authorities and clients). Each fringe entity requires access
only to a small number of public values (as they need to establish a pairwise secret only
with a small number of core entities - zone authorities with TMs of all ANSs for the zone,
and clients with all its PNSs).
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4.4

The TCB-DNS Protocol
In this section we begin with a detailed specifcation of the atomic relay algorithm.

We then we outline the operation of TCB-DNS by outlining the steps for creating TCBDNS master fles (in Section 4.4.2) and illustrating the sequence of events in typical a
query-response process (in Section 4.4.3).

4.4.1

The Atomic Relay Algorithm

A TM with identity X stores a secret KX inside its protected boundary - which is
known only to TM X and the KDC. To relay a value from S to D the TM requires to
compute secrets KXS and KXD . For this purpose the TM needs two additional inputs public values PXS and PXD . Thus, the atomic relay function of a TM X takes the form
MXD = ARX ((S, PXS ), (D, PXD ), V, Vl , Vh , MSX )
In a scenario where X does not require to use a public value to compute KXS , the input
PXS = 0 is provided to the TM (as XOR-ing by 0 leaves a value unchanged). It is the
responsibility of the (untrusted) DNS server to store and provide appropriate public-values
to its TM; if a DNS server provides incorrect public values to its TM the MAC will be
rejected by the next-hop1 which verifes the MAC.
The TM X accepts a formatted stream of bits bi = (S k PXS ) k (D k PXD ) k V k
Vl k Vh k MSX as input from the DNS server which houses the TM; the TM performs a
simple sequence of logical and cryptographic hash operations, and outputs a MAC MXD
1

If the next-hop is a PNS, when an invalid response is received, the PNS will send the query again or
query another ANS. Similarly if the next-hop is a stub-resolver C, then C will resend the query or query
another PNS.
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or a fxed constant ERROR.. An algorithmic description of the sequence of operations is
depicted in Figure 4.1.

ARX (S, PXS , D, PXD , V, Vl , Vh , MSX ) {
KXD = F (PXD , D);
IF (S == X);
RETURN h(V k KXD );
KXS = F (PXS , S);
IF (Vl == 0)
Vi = V ;
ELSE IF (((Vl < V ) ∧ (V < Vh )) ∨ ((V > Vl ) ∧ (Vl > Vh )))
Vi = h(Vl k Vh );
ELSE RETURN ERROR;
IF (MSX ! = h(Vi k KSX ));
RETURN ERROR;
RETURN MXD = h(h(S k V ) k KXD );
}
Figure 4.1
Atomic Relay Function

As shown in the algorithm in Figure 4.1, the TM computes the pairwise secret KXD
for authenticating TM output to destination D. If S = X (source is indicated as the TM
itself), the TM construes this as a request to output a MAC h(V k KXD ) verifable by D.
This feature, as we shall see soon, permits zone authorities to use DNS TMs for protecting
zone secrets.
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In general (for S 6= X) the TM proceeds to compute the pairwise secret KXS required
for validating the inputs (V , Vl and Vh authenticated by source S using a MAC MSX :
1. if Vl is zero the TM verifes that the MAC MSX is consistent with V and KXS ;
2. if the value Vl is non-zero, the TM verifes that i) the input MAC MSX is consistent
with the two values (Vl k Vh ), and ii) that V is enclosed by (Vl , Vh ). A value V is
enclosed by (Vl , Vh ) if Vl < V < Vh . If Vl > Vh then V is enclosed by the “wrapped
around” pair if V > Vl > Vh or V < Vh < Vl .
On successful verifcation the TM outputs a MAC for the value (S k V ) computed using
the pairwise secret KXD between X and D.
For ease of following the discussion in the rest of this section, note that
MZA,V

= ARZ (Z, 0, A, PZA , V, 0, 0, 0)
= h(V k KZA )

(4.4)

is a MAC for a value V computed by a TM Z (for verifcation by a TM A). We shall see
soon that zone authorities can employ TMs in this fashion to authenticate hashes of RRSets
for verifcation by ANS TMs. Also note that
MAP,VZ = ARA (Z, 0, P, PAP , V, 0, 0, MZA,V )
= h(h(Z k V ) k KAP )

(4.5)

is a MAC computed by TM A which can be verifed by an entity P . The MAC represents
A’s claim that “a value V was received from Z.” If the MAC is verifable, to the extent P
trusts A, P can accept the claim that the value V was provided by Z.
Finally,
MAP,VZ0 = ARA (Z, 0, P, PAP , V 0 , Vl , Vh , MZA,V 0 )
= h(h(Z k V ) k KAP )
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(4.6)

is also a MAC verifable by an entity P ; on successful verifcation, P concludes that “a
value V was received from Z.” P does not need to differentiate between the two cases. In
the former case, V was explicitly conveyed to A by Z through a MAC MV,A . In the latter
case, V is any value, not explicitly conveyed by Z, but happens to fall within an enclosure
(Vl , Vh ) (and the enclosure is authenticated by Z using MAC MV 0 ,A ).

4.4.2

Preparation of TCB-DNS Master File

Consider a zone example.com, which employs ANSs with TMs A and B for the
zone. The sequence of steps performed by the zone authority to prepare a master fle are as
follows. Let the TCB-DNS identity of the zone be Z where Z = Zt k Zname , where Zname
is the hash of the name of the zone (example.com). Recall that Zt includes a succinct
representation of the time of expiry of the secrets assigned to Z.
1 Prepare a regular plain DNS master fle. Some of the required additions to plain
DNS RRs are as follows:
1. Each RR will indicate an absolute value of time as the time of expiry. This value can
be a 32-bit value like UNIX time, and can be different for each RR. In general the
time of expiry of any RR should not be later than Zt .
2. NS-type RRs (which indicate the name of an ANS) includes two additional values
(a) the TCB-DNS identity of the ANS-TM, and
(b) the value Zt (note that from the name of the zone in the NS RR, one can compute the value Zname ; along with the value Zt the TCB-DNS identity of the
zone can be computed as Z = Zt k Zname ).
In general, a RRSet R has multiple RRs with the same name and type, and each RR
indicates its own a time of expiry.
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2 Let r be the total number of RRSets. For an RRset R with name nj and type tj
compute i) the hash of the RRSet vj = h(RRSet); and ii) u0j = h(nj k tj k τ ), where τ is
the time at which the authentication for all enclosures expire. Repeat for all r RRSets.
3 Sort the hashes u01 · · · u0r in an ascending order; Let the sorted hashes be u1 · · · ur .
Now, compute values d1 · · · dr as
dj =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ h(uj k uj+1 ) j < r
⎪
⎪
⎩ h(ur k u1 )

(4.7)

j=r

Note that for the last “wrapped around” enclosure (ur , u1 ) the frst value ur is greater than
the second (u1 ).
4 For each of the 2r + 1 values in {v1 · · · vr , d1 · · · dr , τ } compute MACs MZA,i =
0
= h(dj k KZA ), 1 ≤ j ≤ r, and MZA,τ = h(τ k KZA ). If
h(vi k KZA ), 1 ≤ i ≤ r, MZA,j

the zone authority Z employs a TM Z then a MAC like MZA,i = h(vi k KZA ) is computed
by using the atomic relay function of the TM as
MZA,V

= ARZ (Z, 0, A, PZA , vi , 0, 0, 0)
= h(vi k KZA ).

(4.8)

Prepare a supplementary master fle with
1. the values (τ, MZA,τ );
2. r rows of the form (i, MZA,i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and
0
), 1 ≤ j ≤ r,
3. r rows of the form ((uj , uj+1 ), MZA,j

5 Provide the supplementary master fle to ANS with TM A along with the regular
master fle. The zone authority repeats step 4 for ANS B to create a supplementary master
0
).
fle with values (τ, MZB,τ ); r rows (i, MZB,i ), and r rows ((uj , uj+1 ), MZB,j
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4.4.3

Verifcation of RRSets

We shall consider a scenario where an ANS with TM A is queried for an RRSet
cad.example.com,A by a PNS with TM P . Let us further assume that the query was

initiated by a stub-resolver C.

4.4.3.1

Events at ANS with TM A

Let the identities A and P of the TMs be A = At k qa and P = Pt k qp . If qp < qa
(sequence number of P is less than that of A) the ANS fetches PAP from storage (else
PAP = 0). If the queried name and type (ni , ti ) exists, or if a suitable delegation exists, the
ANS
1. extracts the RRSet from the plain DNS master fle, and computes the hash of the
RRSet, vi ;
2. extracts the MAC MZA,i for vi from the supplementary master fle;
3. requests TM A to compute
MAP,i1 = ARA ((Z, 0), (P, PAP ), vi , 0, 0, MZA,i )
= h(h(Z k vi ), KAP ).

(4.9)

In the response sent to the PNS, the ANS includes the RRSet in the ANSWER section along
with the value MAP,i1 . If the response is a delegation, the NS RRSet can be included in the
AUTHORITY section along with the value MAP,i1 . The TM A does not know, or care, if the

response is an answer or a delegation.
To deny a name-and-type (ni , ti ),
1. ANS extracts the values (τ, Mτ,ZA ) from the supplementary master fle for zone Z.
2. ANS computes vi = h(ni k ti k τ );
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3. ANS fnds encloser for vi (say (uj , uj+1 )), and corresponding MAC MZA,j from the
supplementary master fle;
4. ANS requests TM A to compute MAP,τ1 and MAP,i1 as
MAP,τ1
MAP,i1

= ARA ((Z, 0), (P, PAP ), τ, 0, 0, MZA,τ )
= h(h(Z k τ ), KAP )
= ARA ((Z, 0), (P, PAP ), vi , uj , uj+1 , MZA,j )
= h(h(Z k vi ), KAP ).

For reasons that will be explained later in Section 4.6.1, typically the ANS will need to deny
multiple name-and-type values in a response. Let us assume that q name-and-type values
need to be denied. For each such name-and-type (nl , tl ) the ANS computes vl = h(nl k
tl k τ ), fnds an encloser for vl and the corresponding MAC in the supplementary master
fle, and requests the TM to compute MACs of the form MAP,l1 (each of the q requests are
made independently - each request results in the use of the atomic relay function ARA ()
by the TM A).
In the response sent to the PNS the ANS includes (in the ANSWER section)
1. values τ and MAP,τ1 ,
2. q denied name-and-type values ni k ti ,
3. q MACs of the form MAP,i1 .

4.4.3.2

Events at the PNS with TM P

Before the PNS had sent a query to the ANS for a name and type belonging to zone
Z, the PNS would have queried an ANS for the parent zone of Z - say W = Wt k Wname ,
and obtained an NS-type RRSet for the name Zname (where Z = Zt k Zname ).
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Let us further assume that the NS-type RRSet was authenticated by a TM G = Gt k qg
(housed in an ANS for the zone W ). In other words, the PNS would have received a value
MGP,j1 to authenticate the NS-type RRSet, where
MGP,j1 = h(h(W k vj ), KGP ),

(4.10)

and, vj is the hash of the NS-type RRSet.
In TCB-DNS, the PNS is expected to verify the NS RRSet before sending a query to
the delegated server. In this case, where the PNS had chosen to approach the ANS A for
the zone Z (based on the information included in the NS-type RRSet authenticated by G)
the PNS computes vj1 = h(W k vj ), and requests its TM P to compute
x = ARP ((G, PGP ), (A, PP A ), vj1 , 0, 0, MGP,j1 )

(4.11)

As long as x 6= ERROR, the PNS considers the NS records to be valid.
Similarly, prior to querying G (ANS for W , the parent of Z) the TM would have
received a response from an ANS for the parent of W (unless W is the root zone which has
no parent - in our case W is the gTLD zone .com). Such a response from an ANS of W ’s
parent zone would have also been verifed as above before a query was sent to G. Thus,
after the response from the parent zone W was verifed, the PNS P had sent a request to A
for a name and type under zone Z.
TCB-DNS does not require queries to be authenticated. Queries merely indicate the
TCB-DNS identity of the querier.
Now, after the response is received from A, the PNS P has all the necessary information
to send the answer to the stub-resolver C which initiated the query.
64

Typically, the PNS will need to include an RRSet in the ANSWER section (along with a
MAC computed by its TM P ). For responses containing authenticated denial for q nameand-types the response will include q + 1 values authenticated individually using q + 1
MACs. For both cases, an NS-type RRSet will be included in the AUTHORITY section
indicating ANS for the zone, along with a MAC computed by the TM P .
More specifcally, the hash of the RRSet in the ANSWER section is relayed atomically
from A to C, by P . Similarly, for authenticated denial, the q hashes corresponding to
multiple non-existing names, and the value τ , are relayed atomically from A to C by P .
The hash of the NS-type RRSet is however relayed atomically by P from G to C.
For example, to relay the RRSet with hash vi received from A the PNS frst hashes the
RRSet to obtain vi and requests its TM to compute
MP C,i2 = ARP ((A, PP A ), (C, 0), vi1 , 0, 0, MAP,i1 )
= h(h(A k vi1 ) k KP C )
= h(h(A k h(Z k vi )) k KP C )

(4.12)

If the hash of RRSet vi computed by the PNS is not the same as the one authenticated by
the zone authority Z, the MAC MAP,i1 will be found inconsistent by the TM P , which will
return ERROR.
Similarly, to relay the NS-type RRSet received from G along with a value MGP,j1 , the
PNS hashes the RRSet to obtain vj , and uses its TM P to compute2
MP C,j2 = ARP ((G, PP G ), (C, 0), vj1 , 0, 0, MGP,j1 )
2
The value W is obtained from the NS type RRSet for the parent zone W , which was obtained by
querying W ’s parent - the root.
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= h(h(G k vj1 ) k KP C )
= h(h(G k h(W k vj )) k KP C )

(4.13)

The response from the PNS to C thus includes
1. the NS-type RRSet (with hash vj ) for Z along with the values W , G and MP C,j2 in
the AUTHORITY section, AND
2. the queried RRSet with hash vi , along with a MAC MP C,i2 , and the identity A of the
ANS, OR
3. authenticated denial of q name-and-type values (by including q + 1 values and q + 1
MACs), and the identity A of the ANS.
If the parent zone W does not support TCB-DNS (the ANS for W is not equipped with a
TM) then the NS RRSet is relayed without any TCB-DNS authentication.

4.4.3.3

At the Stub-Resolver C

The stub resolver performs the following steps:
1 Extracts name of zone from the AUTHORITY section; hashes name to compute Zname
and hence Z = Zt k Zname ;
2 If the NS RRSet in the AUTHORITY section has TCB-DNS authentication
1. Client C computes the hash vj of the NS-type RRSet in the AUTHORITY section and
verifes that MP C,j2 = h(h(G k h(W k vj )) k KP C ).
2. Parses W as W = Wt k Wname and verifes that Wname is a legitimate parent of
Zname .
3 C verifes that Zname is a legitimate parent of the queried name.
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4 C verifes that name of the zone is a parent of the queried name3 in the ANSWER
section;
5 If the ANSWER is the desired response, hash the RRSet to compute vi ; compute
vi1 = h(Z k vi ), vi2 = h(A k vi1 ), and using key KCP verify that MP C,i2 = h(vi2 k KP C ).
6 If the ANSWER is an authenticated denial indicating q values of the form ni k ti , for
each of the q values compute vi = h(ni k ti k τ ), vi1 = h(Z k vi ), vi2 = h(A k vi1 ), and
verify that MP C,i2 = h(vi2 k KP C ).
RRs which have expired (as indicated by time-of-expiry feld added to each RR in an
RRSet) will be ignored. If the ANSWER section indicate authenticated denial and the value
τ smaller than the current time, the response is ignored. If any of the TMs A and P and G
involved in relaying the RRSets has been revoked by the KDC, the RRSet is ignored.

4.4.4

Proof of Correctness

Consider a scenario where the verifer C determines that the set of values {Z, A, vi , MP C,i2 }
satisfy
MP C,i2 = h(h(A k h(Z k vi )) k KP C ).

(4.14)

In concluding that the RRSet (with hash vi ) in the ANSWER section was indeed created by
the zone authority Z (as indicated in the AUTHORITY section), TCB-DNS assumes
1. the integrity of TMs A and P : more specifcally, i) secrets assigned to TMs are not
privy to other entities, and ii) the atomic relay function cannot be modifed;
3

Just as there is nothing that stops an authority of example.com from signing an RRSet for
www.yahoo.com in DNSSEC, in TCB-DNS a zone authority can authenticate any value. However, resolvers will not accept RRSet as valid as Zname = h(example.com) is not a parent of
www.yahoo.com.
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2. the keys of the zone authority Z (possibly protected by a TM Z) are not privy to
anyone else; and
3. the hash function h() is pre-image resistant.
With these assumptions, it is easy to see that:
1. as the hash function h() is pre-image resistant, the value MP C,i2 was computed by
an entity with access to the secret KP C (thus the verifer can conclude that the value
MP C,i2 was computed by TM P );
2. the TM P can compute MP C,i2 only if it was provided values vi1 = h(Z k vi ) and
MAP,i1 , satisfying MAP,i1 = h(vi1 k KAP );
3. only TM A could have computed the value MAP,i1 provided to P ;
4. TM A can compute MAP,i1 only if it was provided values {vi , MZA,vi } satisfying
MZA,vi = h(vi k KZA ).
5. as only Z has access to secret KZA , the value vi was created by Z.
Note that to conclude that “value vi was indeed created by Z,” it is not necessary that the
parent zone W supports TCB-DNS. However, it is indeed desirable that all zones adopt
TCB-DNS. If the parent zone also supports TCB-DNS, then the client can also verify the
integrity of the NS RRSet for zone Z, and thereby confrm that A is indeed a TM associated
with an ANS for the delegated zone Z.

4.5

Practical Considerations
TCB-DNS can be implemented with minimal modifcations to current DNS servers.

The specifc modifcations required to support TCB-DNS are as follows:
1. Every RRSet will indicate an absolute time of expiry (say, 32-bit UNIX time) specifed by the zone authority; this value is unrelated to the TTL value4 specifed in each
RR.
4

The TTL value specifes how long an RR can be cached by resolvers.
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2. Each NS record will indicate the TCB-DNS identity of the ANS TM (this is similar
to the requirement in DNSCurve where the elliptic-curve public key of the ANS is
indicated in the NS record).
3. DNS queries will indicate an additional feld - the TCB-DNS identity of the querier.
If an NS record for a zone W provided by a parent zone does not indicate the identity
of a TM, the implication is that the indicated ANS for the zone W does not support TCBDNS. It is also possible for a zone to employ as its ANSs, some TCB-DNS aware servers
and some plain DNS servers. The NS records corresponding to TCB-DNS compliant ANSs
will indicate the TCB-DNS identity of the ANS. NS records corresponding to plain DNS
servers will not. Thus, a PNS which supports TCB-DNS may prefer to query a TCB-DNS
compliant ANS for the zone W . Similarly, a plain DNS PNS may choose to direct its query
to a plain DNS ANS for zone Z.
If a TCB-DNS server receives a query which does not indicate the TCB-DNS identity
of the querier, the querier is assumed to be unaware of TCB-DNS. In this case a plain DNS
record is sent as a response. If a TCB-DNS unaware server is queried by a TCB-DNS
compliant resolver the DNS server will simply ignore the additional feld.

To Router

DNS Server

DNS Server

BITW

Figure 4.2
Original Confguration
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To Router

TCB-DNS can easily support bump-in-the-wire implementations. Converting a plain
DNS server to TCB-DNS server can be as simple as adding an additional BITW unit
equipped with a DNS-TM. Only the BITW unit will need to have access to the TCB-DNS
supplemental master fle. The BITW unit will
1. verify TCB-DNS authentication appended to incoming DNS packets, strip authentication, and relay plain DNS packets to the DNS server; and
2. append TCB-DNS authentication to outgoing DNS packets.

4.5.1

Ideal TMs

Deployment of TCB-DNS requires an infrastructure in place for some regulatory authority (for example, ICANN or IANA) to oversee the production and verifcation of trustworthy DNS TMs. Mandating rigid and simple functionality can go a long way in reducing
the cost for deploying such an infrastructure, reducing the cost of the TMs, and rendering
them more worthy of trust.
Just as guaranteed TCB functionality can leveraged to provide some assurances regarding the security of the system, for realizing guaranteed TCB functionality two fundamental
assurances provided by trustworthy computing modules are leveraged - read-proofng and
write-proofng.
Read-proofng of secrets protected by the TMs is necessary to ensure that the modules
cannot be impersonated. Write-proofng of software executed by the TMs is necessary to
ensure that the TCB functions (usually dictated by the software) cannot be modifed. The
two requirements are however not independent. With the ability to modify software at
will, an attacker can force the TM to reveal its secrets (for example, by inserting a set of
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commands to write the secret bytes out to the serial port). On the other hand, secrets that
are protected can be used to authenticate software. Without the knowledge of the secret the
attacker cannot modify the software (more specifcally, such modifcations will be detected
due to failure of authentication).

System Security

TCB Functionality

Readproofing

Writeproofing

Figure 4.3
Bump-in-the-Wire (BITW) Implementation

In practice read-proofng is easier to realize [50], and is often a stepping stone to the
more elusive goal of write-proofng [24]. Attacks aimed at modifying software to reveal
secrets can be prevented by ensuring that software does not have access to at least some
of the secrets that are protected. Some secrets may be generated, stored and used by
dedicated hardware [54]. However, authenticating software with the secrets provides a
boot-strapping problem [67]. After all, some software should be loaded which includes
instructions to load a secret and carry out the steps required to perform authentication.
Realizing TMs that truly deserve trust calls for some simple common-sense restrictions to be imposed on the TMs. If the entire functionality of the TM is trivial enough
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to be hard-wired (and thus eliminate the need for mutable code), we can side-step issues
associated with guaranteeing the functionality of the TM. If the TM functionality is simple
and immutable, it is less expensive to verify such functionality as the testing infrastructure
can be easily automated. If the TMs do not draw signifcant electrical power to perform
its tasks (and consequently disseminate very little heat) we can then afford to physically
shield the TMs extremely well from external intrusions aimed at exposing secrets.
It is for these reasons, that in identifying good TCB functionality for TCB-DNS we
enforce these restrictions. The low-complexity, low-power, hard-wired TMs employed by
TCB-DNS will merely require i) protected registers for storing a few secrets, ii) a hash
function (for example SHA-1), and iii) hard-wired logic which drives a fxed sequence of
logical and hash computations.

4.5.2

Leveraging TPMs

While creating a dedicated infrastructure for DNS-TMs is the preferred approach to
realize highly trustworthy TMs, a practical alternative to lower the cost of the infrastructural requirements is to take advantage of an existing infrastructure for trusted platform
modules (TPM).
The trusted computing group (TCG) approach to realize a trusted platform includes a
thorough specifcation of trusted platform modules (TPM) [4], and recommendations on
how such modules can be leveraged to provide some assurances regarding the integrity of
the software stack running on a platform (a general purpose computer) equipped with a
TPM chip. Several manufacturers of TPM chips exist today. Many desktop/laptop com72

puters already posses a TPM chip, or have the capability (a slot in the motherboard) to
accept a TPM chip.
The TPM exposes several interfaces which can be used by the platform to submit values
for secure storage inside the TPM, and conveying such values to other parties, attested
using secrets protected inside the TPM. Specifcally, about 120 TPM interfaces have been
specifed in the current version of the TPM [29]. These interfaces are intended for a wide
variety of purposes like i) taking ownership of the TPM; ii) generation/regeneration of
keys; iii) submitting “measurements” of loaded software (in the form of hashes of loaded
software) and extending such hashes into platform confguration registers (PCR) inside the
TPM; iv) attestation of PCR values by the TPM for reporting the state of the platform; v)
binding secrets to specifc platform states (PCR values), etc.
The TCG model relies on three roots of trust: the root of trust for measurement (RTM);
root of trust for storage (RTS); and root of trust for reporting (RTR). RTS and RTR are
housed inside the TPM chip. The RTM is however constituted by components outside the
TPM. More specifcally, trusting the RTR and RTS amounts to trusting the integrity of the
TPM chip. However, trusting the RTM implies trusting numerous components of a general purpose computer like the BIOS, CPU, RAM, CPU-RAM bridge, and possibly even
some peripherals which have direct access to the RAM. In addition, to an infrastructure
for verifying code is trusted to verify software and disseminate measurements (hashes) of
authentic verifed software.
Almost every attack on the integrity of a TCG trusted platform [57] - [15] is a result
of the fact that the RTM is constituted by components outside the TPM, which obviously
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do not merit the same extent of trust as components inside the TPM chip. Furthermore,
the problem of verifying functionality of software is becoming increasingly intangible due
to the ever increasing size of software and frequency of updates. For these reasons, some
researchers have focused on strategies for securing applications running on untrustworthy
platforms by relying only on the TPM [52]. The recent TPM 1.2 version added some
additional TPM interfaces which expands the scope of applications that can be secured by
relying only on the TPM as the TCB. Some desirable additions to TPM interfaces have
been suggested in [66].
The atomic relay interface can be simply be an additional interface offered by the next
version of TPMs. More specifcally, TPMs will require two additional interfaces to serve as
the TCB for a DNS server: i) an interface for securely receiving MLS keys (which can then
be stored in some TPM PCRs reserved for this purpose), and ii) the atomic relay interface.

4.6

TCB-DNS vs. DNSSEC
The main reasons for the poor adoption of DNSSEC are i) the signifcant increase in the

size of zone fles (over that of plain-old DNS) due to the addition of RRSIG, DS, DNSKEY,
and NSEC/NSEC3 records; ii) increased bandwidth overhead for DNSSEC responses; and
iii) the susceptibility of DNSSEC to DNS-walk. Due to the substantial overhead, it is
especially expensive for large zones (for example, .com) to adopt DNSSEC.
DNSSEC and TCB-DNSSEC have many signifcant similarities:
1) Both do not require DNS servers and their operators to be trusted. Both protocols
achieve this requirement by their ability to securely convey a pre-image resistant one-way
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function of RRSets created by zone authorities to end-points (clients), without the need to
trust the intermediary servers.
2) In both protocols lifetimes are imposed on the validity of zone keys. Both specify
validity periods for the authentication appended for RRs (which can at most be till the
expiry of the keys used for validation).
3) Both use a strategy for ordering names (or a one-way function of names) to provide
authenticated denial of enclosed names (or hashes of names).
4) Both protocols do not possess a mechanism for revoking authentication. Consequently both protocols are susceptible to replay attacks - under some conditions. If the
authentication appended for an RRSet is indicated as valid till some time t, and if for some
reason, there arises a requirement to modify the RRSet before time t, then an attacker may
be able to replay the old RRSet (with a signature valid till time t) until time t.
The primary differences between DNSSEC and TCB-DNS include
1) the cryptographic mechanisms employed - DNSSEC relies on digital signatures,
while TCB-DNS relies on TMs to atomically relay MACs;
2) unlike TCB-DNS, DNSSEC does not provide assurance A3. Some of specifc differences in the mechanism for authenticated denial, and the rationale for the choices made
in TCB-DNS are outlined in Section 4.6.1.
3) DNSSEC demands substantially higher overhead compared to TCB-DNS;
Section 4.6.2 provides a comparison of the storage bandwidth overheads of DNSSEC and
TCB-DNS.
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4) DNSSEC is more susceptible to replay attacks compared to TCB-DNS; Section 4.6.3
outlines the reasons for this phenomenon.
Since the discovery of the Kaminsky attack [33] the need to secure DNS has attracted
renewed attention. Some modifcations have been proposed to DNSSEC to address the
main reasons for its poor adoption. However, while such efforts reduce some of the overhead for DNSSEC (and thereby reduce the resistance to adoption of DNSSEC), they are at
the expense of watering-down some of the originally intended assurances of DNSSEC.
In Section 4.6.4 and we discuss such a mechanism, TSIG [73], which can reduce overhead for clients, but has the unfortunate side-effect of requiring to trust the PNSs. In Section 4.6.5 we discuss another modifcation (NSEC3 opt-out) [19] which is intended to facilitate easier adoption of DNSSEC by large zones like .com. This feature has an unfortunate
side effect of interfering with the ability to provide authenticated denial. More recently,
some attacks that exploit the NSEC3 opt-out feature have also been demonstrated [10].

4.6.1

Authenticated Denial

Consider a scenario where the ANS for the zone example.com is queried for a nonexistent record “a.b.example.com, A.” A negative response indicates that i) the queried
name does not exist; and ii) no wild-card name like *.b.example.com exists; iii) no
delegation exists for a zone b.example.com; and iv) no alias (type CNAME) record
exists for the name a.b.example.com.
In NSEC the enclosures are textual strings indicating names. A single NSEC record
[example.com [A,MX,NS], NSEC, cat.example.com] is adequate for the resolver to
76

verify that all three conditions are true (all three names that have to be denied fall within
the single NSEC enclosure). In NSEC3 the enclosures are hashes of names. Each NSEC3
enclosure can only be used to deny a specifc name (which hashes to a value inside the
encloser). Thus, proof of enclosure of three different name-hashes have to be provided to
the resolver.
If a record of a type different from NS does exist for b.example.com or if a record
with name a.b.example.com does exist (but not the solicited type A), then the NSEC3
record has to indicate the list of types that do exist5 .
Though intended as an improvement over NSEC, in some ways NSEC3 is actually inferior to NSEC. In response to a query for a non existent record, NSEC revealed two unsolicited names; NSEC3 typically reveals six hashes corresponding to six unsolicited namehashes (which are subject to brute-force attacks). Furthermore, three RRSIG(NSEC3) signatures have to be verifed (instead of one RRSIG(NSEC)).
The mechanism in TCB-DNS for authenticated denial is closer to NSEC3 than NSEC.
The difference is that in TCB-DNS the name and type are hashed together (in NSEC3 only
the name is hashed). As with DNSSEC-NSEC3, multiple name-and-type hashes will have
to be denied by the ANS by using different enclosures. At frst sight, it may seem that an
NSEC-like approach may be preferable for TCB-DNS. After all, if only the TM is privy to
the enclosures - viz., textual strings (names) in NSEC and hashes (of names) in NSEC3,
there is no need for hashing names. However, checking NSEC enclosures will require TMs
to compare variable length text-strings, possibly of different formats (for example, ASCII,
5

Thus, there are two ways in which NSEC3 fails to realize assurance A3: i) by being susceptible to simple
dictionary attacks; and ii) by disclosing unsolicited types for a name.
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Unicode), which can substantially increase the complexity of TMs. With the NSEC3-like
approach only fxed-length hashes need to be compared. Thus,
1. in DNSSEC with NSEC3 the purpose of hashing is to “hide” names (albeit ineffectively);
2. in TCB-DNS the purpose of hashing the names is not to hide the names - it is to
lower the TM complexity.
In TCB-DNS, the reason for hashing name-and-type together is to ensure that (unlike
NSEC3) names do not have to be disclosed if queried for a non-existent type. In TCB-DNS
the number of encloser pairs equals the number of unique name-and-type values (which is
the same as the number of RRSets). In NSEC3 the number of hashes correspond to the
number of unique names.
The disadvantage of TCB-DNS is a small increase the number of encloser pairs. However, this is not a problem in practice. The increase in the number of encloser pairs would
only be an issue for zones which have a very large number of names, and many types corresponding to each name. However, such large zones (like gTLD .com) which have large
number of names, have only a single type (type NS) corresponding to most names!
Another difference between NSEC3 and TCB-DNS is the mechanism used for hashing
names. In TCB-DNS the hash is computed as a function of name, type and a value τ . The
value τ is the time of expiry of the authentication. In DNSSEC-NSEC3 the time of expiry
is indicated in the RRSIG record; the name-hash is computed after including a salt to the
name. Furthermore repeated hashing is employed to derive the name-hash. The reason
for using the salt is to prevent precomputed dictionary attacks. The purpose of repeated
hashing is to increase the computational complexity for dictionary attacks. As dictionary
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attacks are not possible in TCB-DNS (as the enclosers are never sent), TCB-DNS does not
need to deliberately increase the computational overhead for generating name-hashes.

4.6.2

Overhead

Table 4.1
Comparison of TCB-DNS and DNSSEC

DNSSEC
TCB-DNS

Bandwidth
2000
100

Overhead in Bytes
Cache per RRSet Cache per Name Assurances
200
300 A1, A2
24 + 60
A1, A2, A3

Table 4.1 provides a quick comparison of TCB-DNS and DNSSEC. The large size
of DNSSEC records is due to the fact that public keys and signatures are large (1000 to
2000 bits). This increases the cache memory requirements for name servers. The longer
RR sizes, and that multiple RRSIGs, DS and DNSKEY records need to be fetched and
verifed, results in substantial bandwidth overhead for responses.
For a typical query, the DNSSEC specifc bits that accompany the response (over and
above the plain DNS records) can easily be of the order of 2000 bytes. As described in
Section 2.1.4, the additional DNSSEC specifc records required to verify a RRSet include
(typically) one RRSIG(RR), 3 DNSKEY records, 3 DS records, and 3 RRSIG(DS) records.
Additionally, verifcation of an RRset requires the computational overhead for verifcation
of 4 signatures.
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For TCB-DNS the additional TCB-DNS specifc bits that accompany the response (to
a typical query) include i) the identity of the ANS and ii) one MAC in the ANSWER section,
and two identities (TCB-DNS identity of the parent zone, and identity of an ANS TM of
the parent zone) and one MAC in the AUTHORITY section. If the identities of TMs are 10
bytes long and identities of zones are 20 bytes long, and all MACs are 20 bytes long, the
additional bandwidth overhead is of the order of 70 bytes. If we consider the additional
values inserted in NS records the overhead may be close to 100 bytes (compared to 2000
bytes for DNSSEC).
For DNSSEC the increase in cache memory size for any RRSet is due to the addition
of one RRSIG for every RRSet (about 200 bytes for every RRSet if 1600-bit RSA modulus
is used). Additionally (for authenticated denial), corresponding to every unique name in
the master fle, one NSEC/NSEC3 record along with an RRSIG(NSEC/NSEC3) record are
required: amounting to an overhead of roughly 300 bytes for every unique name in the
master fle.
In TCB-DNS, corresponding to every RRSet two additional values are required for
regular responses - an index (of the RRSet within the master fle) and a MAC. For authenticated denial, corresponding to every unique name and type (the total number of which is
the same as the number of RRSets) three values are required: two hashes (enclosers), and
a MAC for the enclosure. Assuming 20 byte hashes and MACs, the overhead is about 60
bytes for every unique name and type.
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4.6.3

Replay Attacks

The fact that anybody can obtain verify a digital signature is a powerful feature of
digital signatures. This power can also be abused more easily when no mechanism exists
for revocation. A signed packet with prematurely invalidated contents can be more easily
abused, compared to a packet authenticated using a MAC.
A DNS RRSet signed by the zone authority can be sent by anyone, from any place, to
any place. However, in TCB-DNS, a MAC appended by a zone authority is intended only
for the TM of a specifc ANS. This implies that only the entity with control of the specifc
ANS (who has access to the TM) can replay such packets. This substantially reduces the
scope of possible replay attacks.
For both protocols, reducing the scope of replay attacks requires choice of short lifetimes for signatures (MACs for TCB-DNS). Unfortunately shorter life-times imply more
frequent re-computation of authentication. Due to the substantially lower computational
overhead required for TCB-DNS we can can actually afford to recompute MACs more
frequently.

4.6.4

DNSSEC with TSIG

As originally intended, DNSSEC provides the end-points with the ability to verify the
integrity of RRs. For most clients this is a substantial computational burden. This is especially true for an ever increasing number of battery operated mobile devices. Furthermore,
to receive the large number of DNSSEC specifc records from the PNS the clients may
have to employ more expensive TCP instead of UDP as the transport layer. Note that for
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PNSs this is less of an issue as it receives the multiple records required for verifcation as
multiple packets from different ANSs.
It is for this reason that in most standard installations of DNSSEC the verifcation
of RRs is performed only by the PNS. Stub-resolvers are expected to establish a secure
channel with PNSs using some light-weight mechanism like TSIG [73], and obtain verifed
RRSets over the secure channel. TSIG is a protocol which leverages shared symmetric keys
(established by other means - outside the scope of TSIG) for establishing secure channels.
In DNS, TSIG is used by zone authorities to securely send master fles to ANSs. This same
strategy can also be used for establishing a secure channel between clients and PNSs.
The implication of using such an approach to lower overhead for clients is that DNSSEC
can no longer claim that end-points do not have to trust the middle-men. With this approach, clients are required to trust the PNSs (and consequently their operators).
More specifcally,
1. If a DNSSEC enabled PNS X is compromised, or if the TSIG secret of X is privy to
an attacker, then X (or the attacker) can disseminate fake RRSets for any zone; such
RRSets will be blindly accepted by all stub-resolvers which query PNS X.
2. Similarly, if a DNSCurve enabled PNS X is compromised, or if the DNSCurve secret
of X is privy to an attacker, then X (or the attacker) can disseminate fake RRSets to
all stub-resolvers that query PNS X.
3. On the other hand, in the case of TCB-DNS, if a PNS X (with DNS-TM P ) is
compromised, the attacker cannot disseminate fake RRSets. It is only if the secrets
of the TM P become privy to the attacker (and if the TM P has not been revoked)
can the attacker disseminate fake RRSets to the stub-resolvers that query PNS X.
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4.6.5

NSEC3 Opt-out

For consummate realization of DNSSEC assurances even top level domains should
adopt DNSSEC. While authenticated denial is an especially important feature for gTLDs,
the overhead for this purpose can be substantial for large zones, and especially for zones
where new names are frequently added. More specifcally, zones with frequent addition /
deletion of names become more susceptible to replay attacks.
Consider a scenario where an RRSet corresponding to a new name (or name-hash) x
needs to be added. Before the name is added, a signed encloser (xl , xh ) will exist for x.
However, after inserting x the encloser (xl , xh ) needs to be revoked. Two new enclosers
should be added instead - (xl , x) and (x, xh ). Similarly, consider a scenario when an existing name y needs to be removed, and two signed enclosers (yl , y) and (y, yh ) currently
exist. In this case, both enclosers (yl , y) and (y, yh ) need to be revoked and replaced with
a new encloser (yl , yh ).
Due to the fact that it is not possible to foresee which of the currently valid records
will need to be revoked due to the addition of an (as yet unknown) name in the future, it is
necessary to choose small enough life-times for all NSEC/NSEC3 enclosers. Obviously,
for gTLDs like .com with several tens of millions of names, this is far from practical.
In TCB-DNS, due to the low overhead for computing MACs even gTLDs can afford
to recompute enclosers more frequently. However, frequent re-authentication of NSEC3
records in DNSSEC is expensive for two reasons. The obvious reason is that the computational overhead for digital signatures is high. The other reason is that NSEC3 deliberately increases the complexity of hashing names to render dictionary attacks more time83

consuming. Due to the substantial overhead involved in re-generation of signed NSEC3
records, DNSSEC is forced to employ larger life-times for NSEC3 signatures and consequently become more susceptible to replay attacks.
Recently, NSEC3 with an opt-out specifcation [19] has been proposed to make it more
practical for gTLDs to adopt DNSSEC. Using opt-out NSEC3 can reduce the instances
leading to revocation of RRSIG(NSEC3) RRs, thereby permitting longer lifetimes for
NSEC3 RRSIGs. An NSEC3 record indicating an encloser (xl , xh ) with an unset opt-out
bit is proof that no enclosing records exist. However, if the opt-out bit is set, the implication is that zero or more unsigned delegations may exist - thereby diluting assurance A2.
Furthermore, some serious security exploits resulting from using the opt-out approach have
been identifed recently [10].
Adoption of DNSSEC has been marred by the substantial overhead required, and the
issue of DNS-walk. The large increase in the zone fle size is especially severe for gTLD
DNS servers and DNS servers employed by specialized DNS service providers who run
DNS services for a large number of zones. This is further exacerbated by supercilious
queries from “DNS-walkers.” While the need to address DNS-walk is especially crucial for
large DNS operators, ironically, using NSEC/NSEC3 feature of DNSSEC for this purpose
is risky for such DNS servers due to the possibility of DNS-walk. Recent attempts to reduce
resistance to adoption of DNSSEC have unfortunately come at the expense of security.
The primary insight for TCB-DNS approach stems from the fact that cryptographic
techniques for independently securing each link in a query response process (like the approaches in symmetric key DNSSEC and DNSCurve) demand substantially lower over84

head. As the light-weight link-security approaches require the intermediaries (DNS servers)
to be trusted, a natural question then is “what is the minimal TCB for a DNS server?” As
long as this TCB is trustworthy we will not be required to trust other components of the
intermediary servers.
A TCB which simply relays hashes can provide assurances A1 and A2. By adding some
intelligence to the simple relay function (to verify that “one input lies between two other
inputs”) we can realize assurance A3, and thus eliminate the problem of DNS-walk. Due
to the negligible overhead (a few tens of bytes of bandwidth overhead, and computation
overhead amounting to a few hashes) even gTLDs can easily switch to TCB-DNS.
To summarize, the main advantages of TCB-DNS over DNSSEC are
1. TCB-DNS demands substantially lower overhead;
2. TCB-DNS eliminates the issue of DNS-walk;
3. TCB-DNS is less susceptible to replay attacks;
4. due to the low overhead for verifcation, TCB-DNS will not require clients to trust
PNSs (as in DNSSEC with TSIG);
5. due to the low overhead for re-authentication of enclosers, TCB-DNS does not need
to employ potentially dangerous practices like “NSEC3 opt-out.”
Deployment of TCB-DNS ideally requires a dedicated infrastructure in place for some
regulatory authority to oversee the production and verifcation of trustworthy DNS TMs.
Alternately, two additional interfaces (one for for accepting MLS keys, and the second for
performing the atomic relay) can be added to the next version of the trusted computing
group (TCG) specifcation for trusted platform modules (TPM).
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CHAPTER 5
MINIMAL TCB FOR DATA DISSEMINATION SYSTEM

A common characteristic of any data dissemination system (DDS) is that the providers
and consumers of data may not be able to (or desire to) interact directly with each other,
and consequently, rely on middle-men.
A mechanism for securing the end-to-end link between the client and a server platform
can eliminate the need to trust numerous other infrastructural components in the path between the client and the server. However, users are still required to trust the server. Trust
in a server implies confdence in the integrity of the server software, the platform on which
the server software is executed, personnel who may have control over the platform, and
that secrets employed by the platform (for authenticating served data to consumers and
acknowledging receipt of data to providers) are well protected.
This chapter proposes a comprehensive security solution for a generic DDS consisting
of a dynamic set of providers disseminating dynamic data through an untrusted middleman, to a dynamic set of consumers. The paper identifes a simple TCB for a generic
DDS that can be leveraged to realize all desired assurances regarding the operation of the
DDS. Specifcally, the TCB is a set of simple functions F1 () · · · Fn () executed inside the
boundary of a trusted module T. Our desire to simplify the TCB translates to a desire
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to limit the computational and storage burden required for module T to execute functions
F1 () · · · Fn ().
Central to the proposed solution is the capability of even severely resource limited
modules to maintain an index ordered merkle tree (IOMT). An IOMT is a simple extension
of the well known merkle hash tree [42] to provide the ability to verify non-existence.
Our specifc contribution is a precise characterization of the TCB functionality as four
functions: i) Fuk (), used to issue symmetric secrets to the users of the DDS (viz., providers
and consumers of data); ii) Fidl (), used to insert or delete leaves of an IOMT; iii) Fupd (),
used to update a record from a provider; and iv) Fqry () to respond to a query by any user.

5.1

Organization
In Section 5.2 we discuss the model for a generic DDS and enumerate the desired

assurances A. In Section 5.2.1 we discuss some of the current efforts to provide some
assurances regarding the operation of an untrusted middle-man, which rely on the use of
authenticated data structures (ADS), and some of the limitations of such approaches. In
Section 5.2.2 we provide a broad overview of the proposed approach where a trusted module T serves as the TCB for the DDS. In Section 2.3.2 we provide an algorithmic overview
of the index ordered merkle tree. Section 5.2.3 provides an algorithmic description of the
TCB functions executed by the trusted module T.

5.2

A Generic Data Dissemination System
We model a data dissemination system as being composed of a dynamic set of users

U and a look-up server L. Users could be providers or consumers, or both. Any user may
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provide a succinct record R = [o, l, v, τ ] regarding an object to a look-up server. The
object is uniquely identifed by the owner o and a label l assigned by the owner, and is
associated with a value v and a duration of validity τ of the record.
The owner o of a record is permitted to remove or modify the record at any time. Specifically, the owner may modify the record even while the current record has not expired. Any
record may be queried by any user by specifying the owner and label. The querier expects
the response to contain the most recent version of the queried record. More specifcally,
the querier expects the same response as she would if she had directly queried the owner
o.
If the object itself is succinct (for example, an email address, a public key, etc.), the object may also be stored by the look-up server, and may be returned along with the response
(in this case the value v may be a cryptographic hash of the email address or public key).
More generally, the value v provides some information regarding the object, and could
take several forms like the location of the object (a URL U ), the cryptographic hash of the
object (which can permit the client to verify the integrity of the object after it is obtained
from location U ), information necessary to establish a private channel with a data server at
location U , etc.
The look-up servers simply do not care about the specifc nature of the object or the
purpose of a specifc query. One query may be for the location v = U of a fle l = F
provided by a provider o = P . To establish a secret with the server U another query may
be made for a record provided by o = U . The object F fetched from U may include
components authenticated by another entity X. To verify the integrity of such components
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the client may desire the public key of X. This data may be disseminated through the same
DDS by another entity - for example, a certifcate authority o = C. If the CA C desires to
revoke the public key of entity X, the CA may simply instruct the look-up server to remove
the record indexed by o = C and l = X.
Some of the basic desired assurances regarding the operation of any DDS are as follows:
1) Records can be modifed only by owners; specifcally, modifcations to records by
any entity other than the owner will be detectable by consumers;
2) Servers should only respond with records corresponding to the most recent update,
and should not be able to replay prematurely invalidated records;
3) Servers will not be able to hide the presence of records that exist;
4) Servers will only provide a record if explicitly queried; more specifcally, servers
should not need to reveal the existence of records that were not explicitly queried.

5.2.1

Related Work

Several researchers have addressed issues in reliably querying an untrusted server
using authenticated data structures (ADS) [8, 16, 20, 21, 25, 26, 39]. In such scenarios,
clients who query a server trust only the originator/provider of the data (and not the server).
Specifcally, even while the originator of the data is not online, from a security perspective,
ADS based schemes strive to provide the same assurances possible in scenarios where the
queriers directly query the originator.
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Broadly, an ADS can be defned by a construction algorithm fc () and a verifcation
algorithm fv (). The provider A of a set of records DA computes a static summary d =
fc (DA ). The records DA are hosted by an untrusted repository/server. Along with a response R to a query by a client, the server is expected to send a verifcation object (VO) ν
satisfying d = fv (ν, R), and the signature of the provider for the summary d. The client is
now convinced that the response R would be the same if the client had directly queried A.
In ADS based approaches the owner A of the set of records DA constructs a hash tree
like data-structure with the records as leaves and the succinct summary d as the root of
the tree. From this perspective, the ADS construction algorithm fc () can be seen as the
algorithm to insert a leaf into the tree, and the VO can be seen as a set of hashes required to
verify the integrity of any leaf against the root d using the verifcation algorithm fv (). Most
commonly used hash tree data structures for ADS applications include skip-lists, red-black
trees and B-trees, all of which provide the capability to order records in a set (based on
some index).
The purpose of ordering records is to permit succinct responses to i) queries for non
existing indexes, ii) maximum/minimum value queries and iii) range queries. For example,
if a querier seeks a record for an index X that does not exist, a two adjacent records in the
tree can be sent (along with VOs to verify the two records against the root d signed by
the originator) - one for an index x and one for the next index y such that x < X < y.
As the tree is constructed by the originator, to the extent the querier trusts the originator
of the data, the querier is assured that the queried index does not exist. When queried for
all records in a range X to Y the server provides all records that fall in the range (each
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accompanied by an independent VO), and in addition, to prove completeness (to assure
the querier that the server has not omitted any existing record) the server provides two
additional records - a record for index x < X indicating X as the next record and a record
indicating that y > Y is the index that follows Y .

5.2.1.1

Limitations of Existing Approaches

Some limitations of the ADS based approach render it unsuitable for several practical
services with any of the following characteristics:
a) Multiple Independent Providers: In scenarios with multiple independent providers
a record for an index X may be provided by and entity A and the record with the next
higher index Y may be provided by an independent entity B. Clearly, neither A nor B can
construct the hash tree.
b) Truly dynamic data: In most ADS based applications it is assumed that whenever
any record is modifed, the new root is signed by the originator and issued to the server. In
scenarios where future modifcations are unforeseen, the originator needs to sign the roots
with short enough validity durations to ensure that the old root cannot be replayed by the
server. Thus, the originator needs to send fresh signatures for the current root periodically,
even if no updates were performed. In scenarios where the originator desires to be involved
only for purposes of providing updates, existing ADS schemes are unsuitable.
c) Revealing unsolicited information: In many application scenarios it is desirable that
servers should not be required to provide unsolicited information to queriers. As an example, in the case of the domain name system (DNS) [43], [9], to prove that no record with
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the queried DNS name exists, a DNS server is required to provide two name names that
cover the queried name, thus revealing unsolicited information. This is the cause of the
well known “DNS walk” or “zone enumeration” issue associated DNSSEC [76], [36].
d) Low bandwidth overhead is desired: In some scenarios, the overhead for the verifcation object (usually a sequence of hashes) required by clients for verifying any record
may be unacceptable.
e) Entrusting secrets to servers: In some application scenarios the data to be conveyed
to the client may be a secret. While ADSs can ensure integrity of data stored at untrusted
servers, they do not address issues related to privacy of the data. Thus, in scenarios where
middle-men need to be entrusted with secrets, conventional ADS schemes cannot be used.

5.2.2

Salient Features of the Proposed Approach

All the above inadequacies can be overcome if ADSs are constructed and verifed by a
trusted third party (TTP). Specifcally, as typical ADS construction and verifcation algorithms involve only simple sequences of cryptographic hashing and logical operations, the
TTP can be a low complexity trustworthy module T. As the intent of the TTP is to ensure
that middle-man cannot violate rules, module T functionality for constructing/verifying
ADSs is the TCB for a middle-man.
In the proposed security model, the look-up servers are untrusted. However, a look up
server has access to a trusted module T which performs some trivial functions f1 () · · · fn ()
that constitute the TCB for the system. While a look-up server may be required to maintain
and serve a dynamic number (say n) of records where n could be millions or even billions,
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the module T is assumed to possess only modest computational ability and small constant
O(1) storage capability.
Records submitted by providers are stored as leaves of an index ordered merkle tree
(IOMT), uniquely indexed as a function of the owner o and a label l (more specifcally,
h(o, l), where h() is a standard cryptographic hash function like SHA-1). The module
stores only the root of the IOMT (a single hash). By performing simple sequences of hash
operations, the module can verify the integrity of any record against the root of the tree.
In the proposed approach, a query from any user (a consumer) specifes the owner o and
label l. The querier expects a response that is cryptographically authenticated by module
T. Similarly, requests for updates by users (providers) are authenticated by providers for
verifcation by the module. On submitting an update request the providers expected an
authenticated acknowledgement from the module. On receipt of a response authenticated
by the module, to the extent that the users trust the module, they are assured that all four
assurances are met.

5.2.2.1

Query-Response Authentication

Modules have to verify authentication appended by providers for every update, and
sign every response for verifcation by the querier. Obviously, for servers that may have to
handle large volumes of queries and updates, the cost of authentication will be a signifcant
bottle-neck - especially if asymmetric primitives are employed.
To amortize the overhead for authentication, asymmetric primitives are used only for
setting up symmetric keys between the module and the users (providers and consumers).
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Message authentication codes (MAC) based on such symmetric keys are then used for
authentication of exchanges between users and the module.

5.2.2.2

Opportunistic Shared Secrets Between Users

Often, a query is to locate some service/entity S with whom the querier Q expects to
interacts soon after the query, and would thus desire a mechanism to secure the interaction. It is benefcial to use the trusted module to also opportunistically provide additional
information required for the Q and S and to establish a secret KQS . To cater for resource
limited portable devices, it is desirable that mechanisms for establishing the shared secret
be limited to symmetric primitives.
In the proposed approach, the shared secret established between the module and the
users are also leveraged to opportunistically establish shared secrets between users. Any
user (say provider S) can submit a record to the look-up server to request the trusted module
to serve as a mediator. In response to a query from some user Q for such a record from S,
the querier will receive a non secret value pQS that can be used to compute a symmetric
secret KQS . Both Q and S will need to perform only a single hash operation to compute
the common secret KQS .

5.2.2.3

Potential Applications

While almost any Internet/Intranet based service can be seen as falling under the category of a DDS, some specifc examples are as follows:
1) Dissemination of dynamic DNS records by zone authorities. Response to negative
queries will not reveal records that exist, and thus overcomes the DNS-walk issue that
94

plagues the current DNSSEC [9] approach to secure DNS. In addition, unlike DNSSEC,
the proposed approach can also be used to provide assurances for dynamic DNS (where
DNS records may expire prematurely). Furthermore, server platforms may also convey
records to facilitate any client (who performs a DNS look-up for the server) to opportunistically establish a shared secret with the server, which could be used as an IPSec security
association.
2) Mobile servers with highly dynamic addresses could disseminate their reach-ability
information (and enable clients to establish a secure channel with such servers);
3) Dissemination of dynamic revocation lists by certifcate authorities, without the
bandwidth overhead associated with certifcate revocation lists (CRL).
4) Publication of dynamic quotes by any “exchange”;
5) Dissemination of encryption secrets for Email messages; a user desiring to send an
encrypted Email to some address will merely make a query to a look-up server to obtain a
symmetric secret for encrypting the message.

5.2.3

TCB Functions

The module T exposes four functions Fuk (), Fidl (), Fupd (), and Fqry to the look-up
server housing the module. In general inputs to the functions include values sent by a
user to the look up server, and values stored by the server that are demonstrably consistent
with the IOMT root stored inside the module. The outputs of the module include values
like current time (according to the module), a message authentication code (MAC) for
verifcation by a user encrypted secrets that can be decrypted by the user.
95

5.2.3.1

Conveying User Secret

Interface Fuk () is employed to securely convey a secret Ko to a user with public key
Uo ( who is assigned an identity o = h(Uo )). The secret Ko may be used by the user to send
authenticated update requests regarding objects owned by the user or send authenticated
queries for objects provided by any user.

User :

Generate Key pair (Ro , Uo )

User :

Choose random challenge c, Compute C = Fenc (U, c)

User → LU :

Uo , C, (τ ),

LU → T :

Fuk (Uo , C, τ )

T:

o := h(Uo ); tek = t + τ ; Ko = h(S, o, tek );

T:

Koc := fdec (C) ⊕ Ko ;

T → LU :

t, C 0 = fenc (Uo , Koc ), µ = h(t, C 0 , τ, Ko )

LU → User :

t, C 0 , µ, (τ )

User :

Ko = fdec (Ro , C 0 ) ⊕ c; Verify µ = h(t, C 0 , τ, Ko )

User :

tek = t + τ

Any user can generate a key pair (Ro , Uo ) (using the specifc asymmetric scheme supported by the module) and send a challenge to the module T, encrypted using the module’s
public key, along with the user’s public key Uo . The user or the server can specify the
validity duration τ for the MAC key Ko issued to the user. The key Ko can be used by the
user for computing MACs to authenticate update requests or queries sent by user till time
tek = t + τ (time according to the module).

96

5.2.3.2

Inserting and Deleting IOMT leaves

The module maintains the root of an IOMT with any number of leaves of the form
(a, va , a0 ). It is the responsibility of the server to store the leaves and intermediate hashes.
The module considers a leaf as valid only if provided a set of hashes va satisfying f (la , va ) =
ξ where the leaf hash is computed as la = HL (a, va , a0 ).
If va 6= 0, the leaf is interpreted as a record provided by owner o with label l such that
a = h(o, l), and va = h(v, te , to ), where v is a value associated with the record, te is the
expiry time of the record, and to ∈ {0, tek } (to can be zero, or the expiry time tek of the
6 0 the module interprets this as a request to enable a private
key Ko of the owner o). If to =
channel between any querier of the record and the owner o.
If va = 0 (if the middle value in the leaf is zero) the leaf is a “place-holder” and implies
that no information is available regarding index a. The server can request insertion of any
place holder (if no leaf or place holder currently exists for the index to be inserted) or
delete any place holder. TMM function Fidl () verifes the simple conditions that need to be
satisfed for a place-holder to be deleted, and can be used to delete or insert a place-holder
can be described algorithmically as shown below.
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LU → T : (l, vl , l0 ), (r, vr , r0 ), i, vl , vr , vp
T → LU : ξ = Fidl ((l, vl , l0 ), (r, vr , r0 ), i, vl , vr , vp ){
IF (l = 0) ∧ (r = 0) RETURN; //At least one leaf should be non zero
IF (l = 0) ∨ (r = 0)//If one leaf is zero it is the only leaf
ξ1 := HL (i, 0, i); ξ2 := 0; //i is the sole index
ELSE
IF (l = i)//(l, vl = 0, l0 ) → (0, 0, 0)
IF (vl =
6 0) ∨ (r0 =
6 i) RETURN; //Prereqs not satisfed
ll0 := 0; lr0 = HL (r, vr , l0 );
ELSE IF (r = i)//(r, vr = 0, r0 ) → (0, 0, 0)
IF (vr =
6 0) ∨ (l0 =
6 i) RETURN; //Prereqs not satisfed
lr0 = 0; ll0 := HL (l, vl , r0 );
ELSE RETURN;
ll := HL (l, vl , l0 ); lr := HL (r, vr , v 0 );
ξ1 = f (HV (f (ll , vl ), f (lr , vr )), vp ); //Root before deletion
ξ2 = f (HV (f (ll0 , vl ), f (lr0 , vr )), vp ); ; //Root after deletion
IF (ξ = ξ1 ) ξ := ξ2 ; // delete index i
IF (ξ = ξ2 ) ξ := ξ1 ; //insert index i
RETURN ξ;
}

To delete a place holder the LU server provides two current leaves - a place-holder
(i, 0, i) corresponding to the index i to be deleted, and a leaf (j, vj , j 0 = i) which points to
the place-holder to be deleted. An exception is for deletion of a sole leaf (i, 0, i0 = i)) in
the tree (in which case the root ξ = HL (i, 0, i) should be set to 0).
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To compute the root from two leaves three sets of complementary hashes are provided
to the module. The module computes the roots ξ1 and ξ2 - the roots before and after deletion
respectively. If the current root ξ is either ξ1 or ξ2 it is reset to ξ2 or ξ1 respectively.
Specifcally, if the current root is ξ1 , and if the leaves provided satisfy the condition for
deleting index i, by setting the root to ξ2 a leaf with index i is deleted. On the other
hand, for the same inputs, if the current root is ξ2 then by setting the root to ξ1 a leaf
corresponding to index i is inserted.

5.2.3.3

Updating Records

Typically, to provide a record or update a record the owner needs to send the values
corresponding to the new record authenticated using a MAC µ. An exception for updating
a stored record is when the stored record has expired, in which case the server can request
the module to convert the record to a place holder (which can then be deleted if required
using Fidl ()).
A request for update from user o for a record with label l, includes a value v 0 , a period
of validity τ , and a fag f , a nonce n, and a MAC computed over values o, l, v, τ, f, n and
secret Ko . After completion of the update the user expects an acknowledgement authenticated by the module.
To enable the module to compute Ko = h(S, o, tek ) the inputs include the time of
expiry tek of the key Ko . If no leaf exists for index a = h(o, l) a place holder is inserted
by the server using Fidl (). If the current leaf is a place holder (as will be the case when the
record is provided for the frst time) this fact is indicated to the module by setting te = 0.
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In the updated record the value v is set as requested to v 0 . The expiry time te of the record
is set as te = t + τ . If the fag f is set in the request the value to is set to be the same as the
time of expiry tek of the key Ko of the owner. If f = 0 the value to is set to 0 instead.

User → LU : o, l, v 0 , n, τ, f, tek , µ = h(v 0 , l, τ, f, n, Ko )
LU : If no leaf with index a = h(o, l) insert index a using Fidl ()
LU : If leaf for index a is a place holder, set te = 0;
LU : If no request from user µ = 0; t > te
LU → T : (o, l, v, te , to , a0 , v, µ, tek , n, v 0 , τ, f )
T → LU : Fupd (o, l, v, te , to , a0 , v, µ, tek , n, v 0 , τ, f ){
a := h(o, l); va := (te = 0) ? 0 : h(v, te , to );
IF (ξ 6= f (Hl (a, va , a0 ), v)) RETURN;
IF (µ = 0) ∧ (t > te )//Expired record
RETURN ξ := f (Hl (a, 0, a0 ), v);
IF (t > tek ) RETURN; //Expired user key
Ko := h(S, o, tek ); t0e = t + τ ;
IF (µ =
6 h(v 0 , l, τ, f 0 , n, Ko )) RETURN;
t0o := (f = 1)? tek : 0;
va0 := h(v 0 , t0e , t0o ); ξ := f (Hl (a, va0 , a0 ), v);
RETURN ξ, t, µ0 := h(a, v 0 , t0e , f, n, Ko );
}
LU → User (only on successful execution of Fupd ()): µ0 , t
User : t0e = t + τ ; a = h(o, l); Check µ = h(a, v 0 , t0e , f, n, Ko );

Only if Fupd () executes successfully will the server receive a MAC µ0 that can be conveyed to the user.
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5.2.3.4

Querying Records

A user q may send a query for an object by specifying the owner o and label l and a
nonce. No information may exist regarding the queried index a due to one of the following
reasons
1. no leaf with index a exists; or
2. the leaf with index a is a mere place holder; or
3. the record has expired;
As any such reason can be verifed by the module, the module can send an acknowledgement to the effect that no data is available. On the other hand, if the queried index exists,
the module prepares an authenticated response which conveys the value v, and the remaining duration of validity (which is te − t). In addition, if the value to is not zero the module
includes an additional value pqo in the response which will enable q to compute a shared
secret with the owner o of the queried record.
Specifcally, if tek > t and to > t (both are current) the module computes Kq =
h(S, q, tek ), Ko = h(S, o, to ), and
pqo = h(Kq , o, to ) ⊕ h(Ko , q, tek ).

(5.1)

Using secret Kq the user q can compute Kqo = h(Kq , o, to ) ⊕ pqo = h(Ko , q, tek ) which
can be readily computed by o using its secret Ko . Thus, both q and o can compute a secret
by performing a single hash. The query response process can be algorithmically described
as follows:
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User q → LU : aq , n, µ = h(aq , n, Kq );
LU : either a = aq or a covers aq
LU : If leaf for index a is a place holder, set te = 0;
LU → T : (a, o, l, v, te , to , a0 , v, q, µ, tek , n)
T → LU : Fqry (a, o, l, v, te , to , a0 , v, q, µ, tek , n){
IF (t > tek )RETURN ; //Expired user key
Kq := h(S, oq , tek ); aq := h(o, l); pqo := 0;
IF (µ =
6 h(aq , n, Kq ) RETURN;
va := (v = 0) ? 0 : h(v, te , to );
IF (ξ 6= f (Hl (a, va , a0 ), v)) RETURN;
IF (te < t) RETURN;
IF (a = aq ) ∧ (va 6= 0) ∧ (t < te )//Unexpired Queried Record
IF (to > t)//Compute pairwise public value
Ko := h(S, o, to ); pqo = h(Ko , h(q, tek )) ⊕ h(Kq , h(o, to ));
µ0 = h(a, v, te − t, pqo , to , n, Kq );
ELSE IF (a = aq ) ∨ ((a < aq < a0 ) ∨ (aq < a0 < a) ∨ (a0 < a < aq ))
µ0 = h(aq , 0, 0, 0, 0, n, c); //Expired Record or Record NA
ELSE RETURN; //incorrect proof of non existence by server
RETURN ξ, t, µ0 , pqo ;
}
LU → User (only on successful execution of Fqry ()): t, µ0 , pqo , v, te , to ;
User : if v = 0 Verify µ0 = h(aq , 0, 0, 0, 0, n, Kq )
User : if v =
6 0 Verify µ0 = h(aq , v, te − t, pqo , to , Kq )
User : if to > 0 compute Kqo = h(Kq , h(o, to )) ⊕ pqo
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A simple trusted module with fxed functionality defned by functions Fuk (), Fidl (),
Fupd () and Fqry () can be utilized to assure the operation of any look-up server, and thereby
secure a wide range of applications under the DDS model. Specifcally, the server maintains all records and internal nodes of the IOMT, and is forced to ensure that the values
stored by the server remains consistent at all times with the root stored inside the module.
Any record that cannot be demonstrated to be consistent cannot be updated, or conveyed
to users. Specifcally, only if the updates are applied in a consistent manner can the server
send an authenticated acknowledgement to the user requesting the update; only if a record
is consistent with the root can the server send the record to the querier (along with a MAC
generated by the module).
In the proposed approach asymmetric cryptographic primitives are used sparingly only for establishing shared secrets between users and the module. Unlike conventional
ADS systems where for verifcation of any record the client requires a verifcation object
in the form of a set of log2 n hashes (where n is the total number of records stored by the
server), in the proposed approach the VO is provided by the middle-men to the module,
and only a single MAC is sent to the user to attest the accompanying record.
No component of the server, the user in control of the server, or the numerous components necessary for the functioning of any wide area network, need to be relied upon to
realize the desired assurances. As long as the cryptographic hash function h() is pre-image
resistant, and the functions executed by the module cannot be modifed, and the secrets
protected by module cannot be exposed, all desired assurances are guaranteed.
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Our motivation to reduce the complexity of operation performed by the module T is to
improve the trustworthiness of the module. The simpler the functionality of the module, the
better is the ability to verify the integrity of such functionality. Furthermore, due to generic
nature (fxed functionality irrespective of the type of the look-up service) such modules
can be easily mass produced; the process for verifying and certifying fxed functionality
modules can also be easily automated.
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CHAPTER 6
MINIMAL TCB FOR SCADA SYSTEM MONITOR

An essential prerequisite for the ability to monitor a SCADA system is an accurate
picture of the current states of all sensors and actuators of the system. Misrepresentations
of the state can be perpetrated either by sending misleading information (for example, by
impersonating a sensor) or by preventing sensor measurements from reaching the monitor (for example, jamming). We identify a minimal trusted computing base (TCB) for a
SCADA monitor, and a strategy to leverage the TCB effciently to realize the assurance
that “any misrepresentation of the SCADA system state will be identifed.” In the proposed approach the TCB is a severely resource limited trusted module. Periodic reports
from sensors/actuators are stored by the untrusted SCADA monitor as leaves of an ordered
Merkle hash tree; only the root of the tree is stored inside the module. The untrusted monitor is required to periodically offer proof to the trusted module regarding the integrity and
freshness of reports from all sensors.
At any instant of time, the state of a SCADA system is defned by the values sensed
by various sensors, and the states of different actuators (for example, on/off, open/closed)
in the system. An important prerequisite for the ability to monitor a SCADA system is
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a mechanism ensure that the monitor is provided a complete and accurate picture of the
SCADA system state.
Attacks on SCADA systems [60] aimed at misrepresenting the state of the SCADA
system can take two broad forms:
1. impersonation of sensors/actuators to provide incorrect state information, and
2. preventing a sensor/actuator report from reaching the monitor.
The former category of attacks can be addressed by mandating cryptographic authentication of sensor data. The emerging standard for SCADA cryptographic modules [63] can be
used for this purpose. The second category of attacks could be carried out by an attacker
in a variety of ways like i) jamming the channel, ii) cutting a wire, iii) destroying a sensor,
etc.

6.1

Problem Statement
An obvious strategy to detect such attacks would be to mandate periodic reports from

every sensor (which is a common requirement in any case in most SCADA systems). In
practice, every (authenticated) sensor report sent to the monitor can indicate the time te
before which the next update from the sensor is due (or te is the time of expiry of the
current report). For a system with N sensors, at any instant of time the monitor should
possess N fresh reports. More specifcally, at a time t, no record should indicate an expiry
time te < t (if any such stale record exists, the monitor will trigger an alarm).
To meet the required goals - ensuring that sensor records cannot be impersonated, or
illegally modifed, or even hidden1 from the monitor - we trust the monitor to
1

The existence of a stale record - or the absence of a fresh record - should not be hidden from the monitor.
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1. verify the cryptographic integrity of sensor records and store the records,
2. periodically verify the expiry time of all records to ensure that no record is stale, and
3. raise an alarm if a stale record is found.
In practice the monitor is often a general purpose computer. Consequently, it is ill-advised
to simply trust the monitor.

6.2

Minimal TCB
In this chapter we investigate a minimal TCB for a SCADA system monitor. In our

approach we assume that the monitor is an untrusted computer U. The monitor U is
required to periodically offer proof to a trusted module T that “no sensor record is stale.”
The trusted module T may be housed inside U, or plugged into U, or may merely be
accessible by U over an open network.
The module exposes some interfaces to U through which U submits authenticated
records from sensors, and few other values as proof that “no record is stale.” The functions
performed by the module to verify the proof are the TCB functions. As long as i) the
functionality of T cannot be modifed, and ii) secrets protected by T cannot be revealed,
this TCB can be leveraged to realize the desired assurance regarding the SCADA system
monitor - that the presence of any stale record cannot be hidden from the module T.
Our specifc contribution is the enumeration of the TCB as a set of (three) low complexity functions performed inside the module T: i) Update() for updating received sensor
records, ii) FProof() to submit proof of freshness of all N records; and iii) Init() for initializing the module.
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6.2.1

Principle of Operation

Every sensor shares a secret with the module; reports from sensors are authenticated
using message authentication codes (MAC), and indicate the time of expiry of the record.
When a report from any sensor is submitted to the module T, the module performs a fxed
sequence of simple logical and cryptographic hash operations.
The dynamic set of N current records form the leaves of a Merkle tree, and are stored
by the untrusted monitor U. Only the root of the tree is stored inside the module T.
Employing a Merkle tree permits the module to verify the integrity of any leaf (sensor
record) by performing log2 N hash operations (and comparing the result with the root
stored inside).
In general, different sensors may indicate different validity durations, depending on the
dynamics and the criticality of the process sensed. Sensors that are required to send frequent updates can indicate smaller validity times (seconds or even tenths of seconds) while
less critical sensors, or sensors sampling slowly varying processes, may indicate larger
intervals (several seconds or even minutes). The update interval for a particular sensor
may also change dynamically as some processes may need to be sensed more frequently at
certain times.
The untrusted monitor U is required to periodically prove to the module that no record
is stale (till some time te > t, where t is the current time), and thereby convince the module
to not trigger the alarm till time te . More specifcally, the time te is the earliest expiry time
among all N sensors. Thereafter, before time te the monitor should be able to convince
the module to not trigger the alarm till some time t0e > te , and so on. It is easy to see that
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time difference τ between submission of two such proofs is at most equal to the validity
duration of the sensor with most frequent updates (or least validity duration).
For a system with a large number (say N ) of sensors, it is obviously impractical for
the resource limited module to verify each of the N records individually in every interval
of duration τ to satisfy itself that no record is stale. A signifcant novelty in the proposed
approach lies in a strategy for indexing records added to the Merkle hash tree to ensure
that the module requires to verify only one record to conclude that no record is stale. This
indexing strategy is motivated by NSEC [76] - a strategy used in the domain name system
(DNS) security protocol, DNSSEC [9], to provide authenticated denial of existence of DNS
records.
In Section 6.4 we outline the proposed strategy for securing a SCADA monitor using a
minimal TCB.

6.3

Background

The ability to reliably monitor SCADA systems controlling critical infrastructure is
an important requirement for the security of any nation. As general purpose computers
cannot be trusted to perform this task it is necessary to identify a minimal amount of trusted
hardware to enforce this requirement.
Several approaches mentioned in Section 2.2.5 have been proposed to improve the
trustworthiness of software running on untrustworthy general purpose computers.
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The primary utility of a Merkle tree stems from a single cumulative verifcation point
for all its data records, which makes it easier to store that one value in a secure location
(instead of storing all the data records). This useful feature has been taken advantage of in
various application scenarios. The secure co-processor AEGIS [62] utilizes this feature to
expand trust in the root hash of the tree which is stored inside its secure memory to provide
a trusted boundary for the values stored outside. In [52] a Merkle tree is used to leverage
one trusted monotonic counter to realize a large number of virtual monotonic counters.
We assume that a resource limited trustworthy module T is the verifer which stores
the root of a Merkle tree. The prover is an untrusted monitor U which stores all N leaves
and the 2N − 1 internal nodes. The N leaves are records specifying the states of N sensors
- each record indicating the latest sensor measurement and the time of expiry of the record.
The untrusted U is expected to maintain the current state of all sensors. However, only the
trustworthy module T is trusted to enforce this requirement.

6.4

Trustworthy SCADA Monitor
We consider a SCADA system with i) N sensors/actuators (which send authenticated

sensor reports at dynamically varying frequencies (in the rest of this chapter we refer to
both sensors and actuators as sensors); ii) an untrusted monitor U, iii) a trusted module T; and an iv) alarm module A. Each sensor has a unique identity, represented as
S1 , S2 , . . . SN . The monitor is a software running on an untrusted general purpose computer U, and has access to a trustworthy module T.
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6.4.1

Overview of Proposed Approach

The module T has the following limited abilities:
1. T stores i) the dynamic root r of a Merkle tree; and iv) a secret K provided by a
trusted authority; it is assumed that no entity can illegally modify the values r, or
expose the secret K;
2. T can perform a fxed sequence of operations involving cryptographic hashing and
logical operations; and
3. T possesses a clock.
It is assumed that the clocks of all sensors (or cryptographic modules associated with sensors) and the alarm module are synchronized “reasonably well” with the clock2 of the
module T. A sensor Si (or a module associated with the sensor Si ) is assumed to have
access to a secret
Ki = h(K k Si ).

(6.1)

(which can be readily computed by T using its secret K). The alarm module A possesses
a secret KA = h(K k A) which can also be readily computed by T. If the alarm module
is provided values
V = [te k µ] where µ = h(te k KA ),

(6.2)

the alarm will be suppressed till time te . To ensure that alarm is not triggered the untrusted
monitor U is required to periodically obtain such values from the module T, and provide
them to the alarm unit. In order to obtain the value µ = h(te k KA ) from T, the monitor
U is required to prove to T that “no sensor record expires before time te .”
2
The clock drift δ should be substantially smaller than τ where τ is the smallest duration of validity of
sensor records.
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The sensors send sensed data in the form of authenticated sensor records. A sensor
record sent by a sensor Si is of the form
Ri = [Si k ξi k ti k µi ] where
µi = h(Si k ξi k ti k Ki ),

(6.3)

where ξi is the measured value, ti is the time of expiry (or time before which the next report
from the sensor Si is due), and µi is a MAC for verifcation by module T.
Sensor records are stored by U. Upon arrival they are submitted to the module T
(along with some other values, as we shall see soon). In response, T performs a sequence
of hash and logical operations and updates its root r. At any time t, U is required to store
N records - one for each sensor. Each record is a leaf of a Merkle tree, and only the root
of the tree is stored inside T.

6.4.2

Example of the Utility of the Proposed Approach

Consider a system with (say) N = 10000 sensors where different sensors have different periods of updates (and the period of updates themselves are dynamic). Assume that
on an average, 100 sensors update values once every second or so, 500 sensors update values once every ten seconds, 2000 sensors update values once every 100 seconds, and the
rest (7400) update values once every 400 seconds. Thus (on an average), during every 400
second interval the monitor receives about 75400 reports (or about 190 reports per second).
For this example, the minimum duration of validity τ is one second. Thus, at least once
every second the monitor U should prove to the module T that no sensor record is stale,
and obtain a MAC verifable by A.
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At a time t, to ensure that no record is stale the module will need to check every record
- to determine the record with the earliest expiry time te , and that te > t. Obviously,
all 10000 values cannot be stored inside storage limited T. As the records are stored
outside (as leaves of a merkle hash tree), in order to accept the record as authentic, module
T expects instructions vi to map any record (say leaf li ) to the root r as f (h(li ), vi ).
Unfortunately, it is far from practical for the module to verify each of the N = 10000
records every second. In other words, such an approach does not scale well (for large N ).
Central to the proposed approach is a strategy for maintaining an ordered list of sensor
records - ordered by expiry time - to ensure that only one record need to be verifed by the
module T to determine the earliest expiry time. More specifcally, for the example above
with 10, 000 sensors the module will not need to process 190 + 10000 sensor records every
second (190 record updates and 10000 records to be checked to identify the sensor with the
least expiry time). Instead, the module needs to process only 190 updates and 1 (instead of
100000) stored sensor record every second.

6.4.3 Auxiliary Sensor Data
At any time t, the set of N records stored by U is of the form
S1

ξi

t1

a1

S2

ξ2

t2

a2

..
.
SN ξN tN aN
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(6.4)

where ξi is the reported value for sensor Si , and ti is the time till which the sensor record
is valid. The last feld - the “auxiliary” value - ai in a record for sensor Si is obtained by
sorting the values t1 , t2 , . . . , tN of all N records in an ascending order. More specifcally,
the value that follows ti is ai . If ti happens to be the highest value (last value in the sorted
order) then the value that follows is the frst value - or ai is the frst (smallest) value in the
sorted list.
Shown below is an example depicting ti and ai values for a set of N = 8 sensor records.
ξ
S1 5

te

a

1002 1008

S2 6.78 845

848

S3 0

850

1002

S4 5

840

842

S5 4.44 848

850

S6 0

(6.5)

1008 835

S7 0.76 835

840

S8 0

845

842

The least ti value (835 for S7 ) is accompanied by a7 = 840 = t4 - the next higher value.
Similarly, a4 = 842 = t8 , and so on. Corresponding to the record S6 with the highest
t6 = 1008 is a6 = 835 = t7 , the least t value.
The reason that the sensor data is stored with an auxiliary feld is to be able to easily
offer proof to the module T that “no record is stale.” Now, with the auxiliary value ai ,
U has to provide only one sensor record - the record which includes a wrapped-around
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value (tl , al ) with al < tl (in the specifc example above, the record for S6 with values
(1008, 835)). This record indicates that al = 835 is the earliest time of expiry. Thus, as
long as al = 835 is greater than the current time t, the module is convinced that all records
are fresh.
That a leaf li indicates a value (ti , ai ) is proof that “no leaf exists in the tree with
a expiry time t covered by (ti , ai ). Such an approach is used in NSEC [76] records in
DNSSEC (DNS security) [9] for providing authenticated denial of queried records. An
NSEC record of the form (abc.example.com, add.example.com) proves that no record
pertaining to a name ac.example.com exists.

6.4.3.1

Initializing Sensor Data

A trusted authority constructs initial sensor records of the form [Si k ξi k di k ai ]
where di is the initial expiry time of Si , and the value ai is obtained by sorting all di values
in an ascending order, and choosing the value following di from the sorted list as ai .
Let r0 be the root of the tree with the initial N records as root. The monitor U is
initialized by providing all leaves to U; the module T is initialized by providing the root
r0 , and setting its clock to 0. Simultaneously, the clocks of all sensors and the alarm unit
are set to zero.
The interface Init() to initialize T can be called only by the trusted authority to provide
the value r0 (the initial root). In response, the module T i) sets its clock counter to zero;
ii) stores r0 in an internal register. From this point onwards, every received sensor record
is submitted by U to T to update the root.
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6.4.4

Updating a Sensor Record

As stored sensor records are updated (with every received sensor record), it is necessary to ensure the consistency of the ti , ai values in all N records at all times. To achieve
this, updating a sensor typically requires three records to be modifed. More specifcally,
apart from the record for which an update is received, the ai values in two other records
may need to be modifed. In some (non-typical) cases, the ai value in one other record will
need to be modifed.
For example, consider an an update for S5 with a new validity time 851 (to replace the
old validity time 848). As a result, the auxiliary value in records S2 and S3 need to be
modifed. Specifcally,
1. the value a3 needs to be changed from 1002 to 851
2. the value a2 needs to be changed from 848 to 850
As another example (of a non typical case), if an update for S5 causes the validity time to
be modifed from 848 to 849, then a2 should be modifed from 848 to 849.
More generally, to update a record for an index u with current values (tu , au ) to a new
expiry time t0u , the algorithm is as follows:
1. determine the record index p such that ap = tu (this record index p “points” to the
record indexed u to be updated).
2. determine the record index c such that (tc , ac ) covers t0u . More specifcally,
(a) if tc < ac then (tc , ac ) covers t0u if tc ≤ t0u ≤ ac ;

(b) if tc > ac , then (tc , ac ) covers t0u if t0u > tc , or if t0u < ac ;
(c) if tc = ac , then (tc , ac ) covers t0u if t0u = tc = ac .
3. If u == c, or in other words, if (tu , au ) itself covers the new value t0u , then set
ap = t0u ; the value au remains unchanged in the updated record;
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4. If u =
6 c, then set i) ap = au ; ii) au = ac ; and iii) ac = t0u ;
For the example where S5 was updated to a new validity time 851, the indices u, p and c
are respectively u = 5, p = 2 and c = 3. For the second example where S5 was updated to
a new validity time 849, the indices are u = c == 5, and p = 2.

6.4.5 Interface Update()
An interface Update() is used by the untrusted monitor U to submit new authenticated
reports from sensors to the module T to cause the module to update the root of the tree.
To update the record for a sensor Su the monitor U provides the following inputs:
1. the current leaf lu for Su (which indicates values ξu , tu and au );
2. a new record for sensor Su (authenticated by Su through MAC µu ), indicating time
of expiry t0u . This record will be verifed by the module before it replaces the old leaf
lu .
3. a current leaf lp (for sensor Sp ) with ap = tu ,
4. a current leaf lc , with the pair (tc , ac ) which covers t0u .
5. a set of “complementary” hashes vu,p,c to permit T verify the validity of the three
current records against the root.
The module T processes the inputs as follows:
1. Verify MAC µu ;
2. Verify f3 (vu , vp , vc , vu,p,c ) = r;
3. If vu == vc , modify lp and lu (to lp0 and lu0 ) as follows
(a) replace value ap in leaf lp with τu0 ; and
(b) replace values ξu and τu in lu with ξu0 and τu0 .
4. If vu 6= vc , modify lp , lu and lc (to lp0 , lu0 and lc0 ) as follows
(a) replace (in lu ) ξu with ξu0 , tu with t0u , and au with ac ;
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(b) replace (in lp ) ap with t0u ; and
(c) replace (in lc ) ac with t0u .
5. Compute vu0 = h(lu0 ), vp0 = h(lp0 ), vc0 = h(lc0 );
6. Compute the new root as r0 = f3 (vu0 , vp0 , vc0 , vu,p,c ).

6.4.6

Interface FProof()

The interface FProof() is employed periodically by the monitor U to obtain a MAC to
convince the alarm module to not trigger the alarm.
The monitor U uses this interface to submit proof that no record is stale, Specifcally,
the values provided as input are i) a leaf li with (ti , ai ) where ai < ti , and ii) a set of
complementary values vi such that f (vi , vi ) = r where vi = h(li ).
The module T frst verifes the integrity of the leaf li against r using f (); verifes that
t < ai < ti where t is the current time, and outputs a MAC µ = h(ti k KA ) where KA is
computed as h(K k A).
As illustrated in the example in Section 6.4.2, without the proposed strategy the module
will have to perform 190 + 10000 merkle tree operations every second - 190 leaf updates
and 10000 leaf verifcations per second. With the proposed strategy updating a sensor
record using interface Update() may call for updating 2 or 3 leaves simultaneously. Even if
we assume3 that updating three leaves simultaneously is equivalent to updating 3 leaves independently the complexity for the proposed approach is 3×190+1 merkle tree operations
per second.
3

In general the number of hash operations required for updating three leaves simultaneously is lower than
updating three leaves independently - especially if the common parent of the three leaves is well below the
root.
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Ensuring detection of misrepresentations of sensor states is however just one more step
towards securing SCADA systems. Once it is ensured that the untrusted monitor cannot
misrepresent (modify or hide) states {ξ1 · · · ξN } of any sensor/actuator, mechanisms are
required to verify that the state {ξ1 · · · ξN } is a “valid” one.
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CHAPTER 7
EVAULATING SCADA SYSTEM STATE

The module approach provided in Chapter 6 assures that all the sensor records are
fresh. Only the presence of fresh records is not suffcient to determine the state of the
system. A mechanism to build an evaluation function that denotes the entire state of a
system from the available records and existing rules is addressed in this chapter.
For a SCADA system with N sensors/actuators, let v1 · · · vN represent the states of the
sensors/actuators at a time t. The system is deemed to be in an acceptable state at time t if
some function f (v1 . . . vn ) evaluates to TRUE, where the function f () is specifed by the
designer of the system. Else, an alarm should be triggered.

7.1

Principle of Operation
If sensor reports cannot be impersonated, and the module T can compute the func-

tion f (v1 , v2 , . . . , vn ) specifed by the designer, the module T can then be convinced that
the system is in an acceptable state if f () evaluates to TRUE. However, that the non programmable module functionality should be usable for any SCADA system implies that
we cannot make any assumptions regarding the type of function f () or the number N of
sensors/actuators in the system. Thus, for example, the module T may not be capable of
storing all N current sensor reports.
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In the proposed approach, the modules employ a Merkle hash tree [42] to virtually
store the N current records as leaves of the Merkle tree. Only the root of the tree (a single
hash) is stored inside the module T. By performing simple sequences of hash operations
the module T can verify the integrity of any leaf against the root stored inside. In addition,
a novel concept of using “synthetic” records to specify relationships between leaves is used
to evaluate the function f ().
For our purposes the leaves are sensor records, which can be inserted/updated only
under certain conditions. A resource limited module T capable of i) storing the root, ii)
performing simple sequences of hash functions to evaluate h0 (), and iii) verifying simple
pre-conditions necessary for updating a leaf, can provide integrity assurance to a large
database of sensor records stored in an insecure location.

7.2

Sensor leaves and Synthetic Leaves
The leaves (sensor records) are stored by an untrusted computer U. The module T

stores only the root of the tree. More specifcally, the Merkle tree employs two types of
leaves, sensor leaves and synthetic leaves. Sensor leaves are of the form li = i k vi k ti
where i is a unique label for a sensor/actuator, vi is a value reported by the sensor/actuator
(the state of the sensor), and ti is the time of expiry of the record. For a system with N
sensors/actuators the tree possesses N sensor leaves.
Synthetic leaves do not correspond to sensor records. Instead, they are some function
s
= m k vm k tm k OP k i k j,
of two sensor records. A synthetic leaf is of the form lm

where i and j refer to two leaf indexes, and OP refers to one of a small number of binary
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operations. The felds OP k i k j is interpreted to imply that vm is a function of leaves
i and j. More specifcally, vm = OP (vi , vj ). For example, if OP is a code for + then
vm is computed as vi + vj ; if OP is AND, then vm = vi ∧ vj , etc. While the time of
expiry of sensor records are indicated in received sensor records, the time of expiry of
synthetic records are set as the minimum of the time of expiry of its constituents. Or
tm = min(ti , tj ).
A synthetic record may be a function of any two leaves (even leaves that contain synthetic records). It is reasonable to expect that a system with N sensors will require roughly
N synthetic records to effectively specify the function f (). As a synthetic record includes a
value which is a function of two other leaves, for a SCADA system with N real sensors we
can expect (as a rough estimate) N/2 synthetic sensors (say S1 ) each specifying functions
of two real sensors, N/4 synthetic sensors S2 each specifying functions of N/2 synthetic
sensors S1 , and so on till one synthetic record in a leaf lns is a function of all sensors. The
value vn in lns determines if the SCADA system is in an acceptable state. For example, only
if vn = 1, and tn > t (where t is the current time) will the alarm be suppressed. Note that
the expiry time of tn of lsn will be the minimum of expiry times of all sensor records.
When any sensor is updated, about log2 (N ) synthetic sensor records will also need
to be updated to ensure that lns refects the overall state. It is important to note that the
“hook” which ensures that the untrusted U will have to submit all sensor records and
update affected synthetic sensor records, is the expiry time. Unless all sensors are updated
the expiry time will not be current (as lsn will have the least expiry time of all records) and
hence the alarm cannot be suppressed.
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7.3

Operation of module
The designer of a SCADA system initializes the Merkle tree which includes all leaves

corresponding to every real and virtual sensor. In all real-sensor leaves the expiry time
is set as a period in number of clock-tick counts for which the sensor can remain silent
(without providing an update). For example, if the clock-tick frequency is 1 MHz, and
sensor corresponding to l5 is expected send a fresh measurement at least once in every 10
second interval, the expiry time t5 will be set to 10 million.
The rules that govern acceptable states are specifed as synthetic leaves. The leaf lns
which ultimately indicates if an alarm is necessary is given a special label 0. The specifc
choice of initial values v1 · vn is not important, except that they should be chosen to ensure
that they do not refect an alarm condition. The designer supplies the entire tree to the
untrusted computer U.
Before a module T can be used in a deployment, the module T requires to establish
shared secrets with the designer of the system, the SCM associated with the MTU (which
supplies all sensor records), and the alarm module. It is also assumed that some mechanism
exists for the module T to indicate its current clock-tick value to the alarm module and
SCM.
The module T expose a function INITIALIZE() which accepts the root r0 , duly authenticated by the designer. When this interface is called the module T sets the root to
r0 , and its clock-tick counter to zero, and instructs the alarm module and SCM to set their
counters to zero. From this point onwards, the SCM will modify sensor records to indicate
time of expiry in terms of the clock tick count of the module T, and outputs such sensor
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records authenticated for verifcation by module T. The sensor records are made available
to U.

7.3.1

Module Interfaces

To update a real sensor record the module T exposes an interface UPDATE() which
expects as inputs i) a record li0 authenticated by the SCM along with ii) the current record
li , and iii) a set of hashes vi such that r = h0 (li , vi ). The module T incorporates the new
record by modifying the root to refect the new record as r = h0 (li0 , vi ).
To update a synthetic record the module T exposes an interface UPDATESYN() which
s
along with ii) hashes
expects the following inputs: i) a current current synthetic leaf lm
s
against the root; iii) leaves li and lj corresponding to indexes specifed in the
to prove lm
s
along with ii) hashes to prove the integrity of leaves lj and li against the
synthetic leaf lm

root of the tree. In response the module T a) computes vm = OP (vi , vj ); b) sets the expiry
s
.
time tm to t + m = min(ti , tj ); and c) updates the root to refect the modifed lm

At a time t (when the clock-tick counter value of the module T is t), to convince the
module T that the system is in an acceptable state;
T exposes an interface SILENCEALARM() which expects as inputs i) the special synthetic
leaf lns , and ii) hashes to map the leaf to the root. If vns = 1 and tn > t, the module
T outputs a MAC for the value tn verifable by the alarm unit to indicate that the alarm
should be suppressed till time tn .
It is the responsibility of U to submit duly authenticated sensor records using the interface UPDATE() and update synthetic sensor records by using interface UPDATESYN().
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Unless U manges to keep the synthetic records updated, it cannot use the interface SILENCEALARM() to silence the alarm. It is also the responsibility of U to maintain the
leaves of the Merkle tree and the intermediate nodes, and modify the intermediate nodes
whenever any leaf is updated. However, at the risk of sounding repetitious, we still do not
need to trust U as failure to do its job will result in an alarm. Similarly, jamming attacks
which could result in preventing sensor records from reaching the MTU will not be able
to suppress the alarm. Furthermore, as the rules specifed by the designer (as synthetic
records) cannot be modifed, the fact that the system is in an unacceptable state cannot be
hidden from the module T.
The possibility of hidden malicious functionality in complex components mandates
strategies to secure critical systems that relies only on components in which we can rule out
HMF. We have outlined an approach to secure SCADA systems by relying on a trustworthy
module of trivial complexity, which can be realized in a trusted environment.
In the proposed model it is the responsibility of the untrusted computer U to ensure
that all sensor records are submitted to module T using interface UPDATE() and that all
synthetic records are updated (using interface UPDATESYN()), and that they remain updated at all times. If U fails to do so, the time of expiry of the leaf lns cannot be updated,
and thus the alarm cannot be silenced.
Updating every sensor record will require updates to about log2 N synthetic sensor
records. As updating any record requires O(log2 N ) hash operations, the complexity for
updating a sensor record is O(log22 N ). For example, for a complex SCADA system with
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million sensors (or log2 N ≈ 20), updating any sensor will require of the order of 20×20 =
400 hash operations.
The module T does not care about the specifcs of how the deployment operates. The
task entrusted to module T is clear and simple - to verify that the physics of the process
is consistent with the intent of the designer. The personnel who translate the design into a
deployment (for example by writing software logic in PLCs) may choose to impose rules
that are stricter than the rules specifed by the designer - as long as they do not violate the
rules specifed by the designer. Irrespective of logic used to control the process, an alarm
will ensue if the state of the process is in an unacceptable state as deemed by the designer.
Another benefcial side effect of the proposed strategy stems from it’s loose relationship
with deployment details. Deployed systems can be easily upgraded as demanded by ever
changing technologies. As mot SCADA system components are not trusted, the security
mechanism is not affected by changes to such components. The security mechanisms also
does not interfere with, or is unaffected by, any other security strategy that may be used in
addition. cannot use the interface SILENCEALARM() to silence the alarm. It is also the
responsibility of U to maintain the leaves of the Merkle tree and the intermediate nodes,
and modify the intermediate nodes whenever any leaf is updated. However, at the risk
of sounding repetitious, we still do not need to trust U as failure to do its job will result
in an alarm. Similarly, jamming attacks which could result in preventing sensor records
from reaching the MTU will not be able to suppress the alarm. Furthermore, as the rules
specifed by the designer (as synthetic records) cannot be modifed, the fact that the system
is in an unacceptable state cannot be hidden from the module T.
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CHAPTER 8
A SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR SCADA SYSTEMS

Our research led to identify the roles of untrusted middleman in distinct PMC systems.
The importance of identifying a minimal TCB for critical Infrastructure systems is discussed in Chapter 3. As mentioned, depending upon the nature of parameters like data,
identifers, application domain, two types of TCB modules 1. Stateful, 2. Stateless are
identifed.
Atomic relay functionality provided in Chapter 4 serves the purpose of a stateless TCB.
A stateful TCB solution for generic data dissemination system (which can also handle
dynamic DNS) is provided in Chapter 5.
The strategies for designing a TCB for SCADA systems discussed in Chapters 6, 7 do
not take most of the practical issue into account, and merely include some components of
the TCB functionality required to secure SCADA systems.
This chapter provides a complete specifcation of an architecture for securing SCADA
systems. This architecture, based on a trusted hardware module - which we refer to as a
SCADA TCB (STCB) module - is intended to be usable for any SCADA system - irrespective of the nature and size of the system. The STCB based security architecture will
include specifcations for a) the functionality of STCB modules; b) processes to be adopted
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by the designer and the deployer of the system; and c) an STCB protocol, for updating the
state of STCB modules, and obtaining SCADA state reports.

8.1

Overview of STCB Approach
The STCB security model emerges from a broad perspective of a SCADA system,

where a stake holder desires to have an accurate picture of the state of a CI system. A
SCADA system is the agent employed by the stake holder to control and report the state of
the system.
The state reports from a SCADA system can be seen as a function of the current states
of all sensors associated with the system. For a SCADA system characterized by n sensors,
let v1 · · · vn represent the states of the n sensors, and let
[o1 · · · os ] = F (v1 · · · vn )

(8.1)

represent a function that captures the “physics” of the controlled system, and reports values
[o1 · · · os ] to the stake-holder as the “state of the system.” In practical SCADA systems
evaluation of F () is performed jointly by numerous untrusted SCADA system components
that may include PLCs in multiple RTUs and MTUs, the HMI, and even actions by human
operators. Consequently, the integrity of the state reports are far from assured.
The goal of the STCB security model is to guarantee the integrity of state reports
provided by the agent. To achieve it’s goals, the STCB security model relies only on a) the
integrity of STCB modules, and b) the integrity of clearly defned processes to be adopted
by entities identifed as the designer and the deployer of the SCADA system.
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The designer is an entity with good domain knowledge (regarding the CI system); the
deployer is a security professional who is not required to possess any knowledge of the CI
system. To the extent the stake-holder trusts the integrity of the STCB modules, and the
verifable processes adopted by the designer and the deployer, the stake-holder is assured
of the integrity of the state report — even if malicious functionality may exist in SCADA
system components.
Current approaches to secure SCADA systems often possess features like a) cryptographic protection of links between RTUs and MTUs [31, 38, 53, 64, 74, 80] to prevent
message injection attacks by attackers and b) intrusion detection systems to facilitate early
detection of attacks [13, 47, 83]. Such efforts do not however address attacks that exploit
hidden functionality in SCADA system components or the IDS.
STCB based security will not interfere with any security mechanisms that may already
exist. It is a passive approach which merely monitors and evaluates the state of a SCADA
system. More specifcally, the STCB approach can not prevent hidden functionality from
being exploited. Good security practices are still necessary to a) reduce the possibility of
hidden functionality, and to b) make it diffcult for attacker to be able to actually exploit
such functionality. What the STCB approach guarantees is that if some malicious functionality is exploited to drive a CI system into unacceptable states (the defnition of which
is specifed by the designer of the system), the fact that the system is in an unacceptable
state can not be hidden from the stake-holder.
The STCB approach does not address attacks on the physical sensors themselves. It
is reasonable to assume that it is impractical for attackers to introduce hidden malicious
129

functionality in extremely simple components like sensors that can be remotely exploited.
Thus, traditional physical security measures are assumed to be adequate for protection of
sensors.

8.1.1

STCB System Components

The additional components introduced into a STCB-secured SCADA system include
1. an untrusted “STCB system manager” U,
2. STCB modules {M1 · · · Mk }, and M0 .
All STCB modules are identical, and are capable of executing a set of simple TCB functions. Modules M1 · · · Mk are “closely bound” to SCADA system sensors.
In the rest of this chapter we shall use the term sensor module (SM) for STCB modules
M1 · · · Mk , and the term central module (CM), for STCB module M0 . The untrusted STCB
manager U periodically receives sensor reports from SMs M1 · · · Mk and makes them
available to CM M0 . CM M0 evaluates F (), and outputs state reports.
From a broad perspective, the authenticity of the inputs to F () are assured by SMs
M1 · · · Mk ; the integrity of the function F () is assured by the CM.
The exact make up of the manager U is irrelevant for our purposes of guaranteeing
the integrity of F (), as U is not trusted. Unless U performs it tasks faithfully, valid state
reports can not be sent to the stake holders.
The state reports are relayed by the STCB manager U to an STCB module Mr associated with a stake-holder. Any number of stake holder modules like Mr may exist. More
generally, a stake-holder module may be the CM for another STCB deployment.
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For example, the state reports from different SCADA systems may be provided as
“sensor reports” to a system at a higher level of hierarchy. In such a scenario, the stakeholder module Mr can be seen as the CM of an STCB deployment at a higher level of
hierarchy. Module Mr considers the state reports from the CMs of systems at the lower
level as “sensor reports” from foreign STCB deployments.
Any number of hierarchical levels may exist. For example, state reports from multiple
SCADA systems in a town may be inputs to a single SCADA system that monitors the
health of all such systems in the town. The reports from such SCADA systems in different
towns may be inputs to another SCADA system at an even higher level of hierarchy, that
monitors the health of all systems in a state, and so on.

8.1.2

Evaluating F ()

The main challenge lies in the choice of a strategy for evaluating any F () (which can be
substantially different for different SCADA systems) inside the trusted confnes of severely
resource challenged STCB modules. Recall that we desire to deliberately constrain STCB
modules to possess only modest memory and computational abilities. Consequently, we
constrain STCB modules to perform only logical and cryptographic hash operations. By
performing simple logical operations the STCB modules support a simple instruction set
A.
As no restrictions are placed on the nature and scale of the SCADA system, some of
the specifc challenges are that
1. the number of sensors n (also the size of inputs to F()) can be unlimited;
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2. evaluation of F () may require evaluation of complex functions, and thus challenging
to represent using merely the instruction set A.
3. reports corresponding to different sensors may arrive asynchronously (necessitating
frequent re-computation of F (v1 · · · vn )).
All such challenges are addressed either directly or indirectly through the use of Merkle
trees [42].

8.1.2.1

Merkle Trees in the STCB Approach

In the STCB approach resource challenged STCB modules store only the root of the
tree, and have the ability to perform fv () operations. This capability is leveraged to assure
the integrity of
1. a dynamic database of n sensor measurements;
2. any number of simple static “algorithms” to evaluate F(); the algorithms are small
number of instructions (belonging to the instruction set A) supported by STCB modules; and
3. static look-up tables (of any size) for evaluating complex functions in F ().
Specifcally, the STCB module M0 for an STCB deployment stores a (static) root of a static
merkle tree, and the (dynamic) root of a dynamic merkle tree. The leaves of the static tree
are the specifcations for a specifc STCB deployment — provided by the designer and
the deployer of the system. The leaves of the dynamic tree are the current states of the n
sensors of the system. The leaves and all intermediate nodes of both trees, are stored by
the untrusted STCB manager U.
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8.1.3

STCB Designer and Deployer

One of the main motivations for clearly demarcating between the roles of a designer
and a deployer is that entities with good domain knowledge (for example, an entity with
in-depth knowledge about the domain of specifc CI system, like a nuclear plant) are often
unlikely to be security experts. Likewise, security experts are unlikely to be experts in the
domain of the specifc CI system.
In the STCB security model, the designer is a domain expert with good knowledge of
the CI system. The designer is required to be aware of the purpose of each sensor in the
system, and the interpretation of their states. For example, (say) in a water-tank control
system, “if S5 > 100 (water level greater than 100) S6 should be zero (the pump should be
off).” The responsibility of the designer is to come up with a specifcation for the function
F (v1 · · · vn ) that captures the physics of the system.
The deployer is a security professional who may not possess any CI system domain
knowledge. The responsibility of the deployer is to procure and install STCB modules.
The deployer needs to be aware of steps to be taken, for example, to
1. facilitate establishment of shared secrets between modules;
2. securely connect (for example, using tamper-evident connectors) physical sensor
outputs to SMs, and record such bindings (for example, (S5 , M8 ) indicating that
sensor S5 is connected to module M8 );
3. deploy the STCB manager U — which includes installation of all hardware/software
necessary to relay SM outputs to the STCB manager U, setting up a channel to
the CM M0 , and a channel to be used for conveying state reports to stake holders.
However, U, and such channels, are not trusted.
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8.2

STCB Design
The designer is entrusted with the responsibility of describing function F () in a special

manner comprehensible by resource limited STCB modules. Specifcally, due to the asynchronous nature of the sensor reports, it is ineffcient to evaluate F () entirely every time
a fresh report from any sensor is available. Consequently, for a system with n dynamic
inputs (corresponding to sensors S1 · · · Sn ) evaluation of F () is realized as
U1 () ◦ U2 () ◦ · · · ◦ Un (),

(8.2)

where Ui , 1 ≤ i ≤ n is evaluated whenever an fresh measurement from sensor Si is
available. It is the responsibility of the designer of the system to translate the function
[o1 · · · om ] = F(v1 · · · vn ) into an appropriate set of functions Ui , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
8.2.1 STCB Design Tree
The designer provides a specifcation of Ui , 1 ≤ i ≤ n by constructing a static merkle
tree — the design tree — with root ξs . The tree includes n + 1 leaves
ξ0 , G1 · · · Gn

(8.3)

where ξ0 is itself a root of a merkle tree with n leaves that specify the initial state of n
sensors as records Si , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The other n leaves correspond to the n design records
Gi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The sensor records and design records are of the form
Si = [Si , ti , oi1 · · · oiw , τi ]
Gi = [Si , Si,1 · · · Si,q , αi , λi , Si0 ]
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(8.4)

Each sensor is associated with a set of w + 3 dynamic values. Specifcally, the value vi
is the latest measurement of sensor Si , and ti is the time of the measurement. oi1 · · · oiw
are the w outputs of function Ui that is evaluated whenever a fresh report is available from
sensor Si . The value τi is a measure of time associated with the outputs oi1 · · · oiw .
In the design record Gi , the sensor identity Si conveys that Ui is to be evaluated whenever a fresh report from Si is available. The values Si,1 · · · Si,q specify up to q related
sensors. Such sensors are “related” to Si as the states of such sensors can infuence Ui .
Some or all of the q values Si,1 · · · Si,q can be set to zero if less than q related sensors
suffce.
The value αi = h(Ai ) is the hash of a small number (say, m) of instructions chosen
from the set A. The value λi is a one way function of a set of (say, l) constants C. Such
constants may specify various values like set-points, permitted ranges of measurements,
minimum expected frequency of reports from sensors, etc. In addition, such constant values may also be used as look up tables. The value Si0 is optional, and is the identity of a
“synthetic” sensor (explained later).

8.2.2

Inputs and Outputs of Ui

Due to limited memory inside STCB modules, there is a need for a strict upper bound
on the number of inputs to, and outputs of, each Ui . In other words, irrespective of the
total number of sensors n, note that Ui s are restricted to specifying only a) up to q related
sensors, b) l constants, c) m instructions, and d) one synthetic sensor as inputs. Each Ui
produces w outputs.
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As Ui is re-evaluated whenever a fresh report ṽi , t̃i is available from sensor Si , the inputs
necessary to evaluate Ui are stored in reserved volatile registers inside STCB modules, and
include
1. values in the record Si associated with sensor Si (stored in a register s0 inside the
module);
2. values ṽi , t̃i in a fresh report from sensor Si (register r);
3. values in records Si,1 · · · Si,q for related sensors Si,1 · · · Si,q (registers s1 · · · sq );
4. l constants in Ci (register c); and
5. m instructions Ai (some of which may be set to 0 to represent “no operation” if m
instructions are not required to evaluate Ui );
The m logical operations in Ai provide the instructions to recompute the outputs õi1 · · · õiw
of Ui following a fresh report from Si . On evaluation of Ui the record Si is modifed.
Specifcally,
1. ṽi , t̃i replace the previous values (vi , ti ),
2. outputs õi1 · · · õiw replace outputs oi1 · · · oiw of the previous execution of Ui ,
3. and τi is replaced with
τ̃i = min(τi1 · · · τiq , t̃i )

(8.5)

to refect the staleness of the w outputs.
Note that dynamic values associated with any Si may be affected not just by values corresponding to sensors directly related to Si , but also sensors indirectly related to Si — for
example sensors related to a related sensor Sj (once removed) or sensors related to a sensor
related to Sj (twice removed) and so on. Computing the value τ as in Eq (8.5) ensures that
the value τi will be the least of the sensor-report time t corresponding to every sensor that
is directly or indirectly related sensor Si .
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On a continuous basis, as and when new sensor reports are available, the states of the
reporting sensors are modifed. A subset of dynamic values corresponding to a subset of
sensors may be reported to the stake-holder as values o1 · · · om describing the state of the
system. For example, if value oj2 (second output of Uj ) is one of the values reported as the
state of the system, the time associated with the state oj2 is reported as τj .

8.2.2.1

Synthetic Sensors

The sensors S1 · · · Sn can be of three types — real sensors, state-report sensors, and
synthetic sensors.
Real sensors are physical sensors in the SCADA deployment. Specifcally, during the
STCB deployment phase, real sensors are bound to SMs.
State reports from a foreign STCB system are seen by the receiving CM as a “sensor”
report; as such reports are authenticated by the CM of the foreign deployment, state-report
sensors are bound to foreign CMs.
6 0,
Synthetic sensors are not bound to CMs or SMs. In a design record Gi , if Si0 =
implies that evaluation of Ui results in the “synthesis of a fresh report from a (synthetic)
sensor Si0 = Sj .” Just as a fresh report from a sensor Si should be followed by evaluation
of Ui , a fresh report from synthetic sensor Sj = Si0 should be followed by evaluation of Uj .
The primary motivation for using such synthetic sensors is to cater for complex Ui
where the fxed number of (m) instructions in Ai may be insuffcient. By specifying a
synthetic sensor Sj = Si0 , evaluation of Ui is continued as evaluation of Uj . Similarly,
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evaluation of Uj , specifed by the designer as Gj = [Sj , Sj,1 · · · Sj,q , αj , λj , Sj0 ] may be
continued again, if necessary, by specifying Sj0 6= 0.
8.2.2.2

Constants and Look-Up Tables

In general, the value λi — which is a one way function of constants required to evaluate Ui — may be a function of multiple sets of l constants (l constants in each set). More
specifcally, λi is itself the root of a merkle tree, where each leaf specifes a set of l constants. Any number of such leaves may exist, with a minimum of one.
Permitting an unlimited number of constants facilitates the use of look-up tables (LUT)
for evaluating Ui . An LUT for evaluating a complex function y = f (x) will have many
sets of l constants — say Cj,1 · · · Cj,l where there are no practical limits on j. In each
set c1 = Cj,1 · · · cl = Cj,l two of the l constants will specify the range of the independent
variable x, and one will specify the corresponding dependent variable y. For 2 dimensional
LUTs of the form y = f (x1 , x2 ), four of the l constants will specify the ranges for the two
independent variables, and a ffth constant will specify the corresponding value of y.
Special instructions (say LUT1 and LUT2) in the instruction set A will specify the
operands – the dependent and independent variables. As one possible design of the two
instructions, instruction LUT1 interprets constants c1 and c2 as the range of the independent
variable x and constant c3 as the corresponding dependent variable y. Before the module
executes the instruction LUT1, it expects the value of the input operand to be within the
range of constants c1 and c2 — else the execution will not proceed. If the input operand
satisfes the requirement, then the value of the output operand is set to c3 . Similarly, for
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LUT2, constants c1 and c2 specify the range of the frst input operand x1 ; c3 , c4 specify the
range of the second operand x2 ; c5 is the corresponding output y.

8.2.3

Instruction Set A

Each instruction in A specifes a logical operation (opcode), input operands (1, 2 or 3)
depending on the type of opcode, and an output operand. The operands are restricted to be
values in STCB registers s0 · · · sq , c, r, etc. Specifcally, as the instructions in each Ui can
modify only values in register s0 (the current state of sensor Si when Ui is computed), only
such values, and a temporary register T can be specifed as output operands.
Examples of simple logical operations include traditional operations like addition, logical operations, bit-wise operations, COPY, MOV, etc., and some special instructions like
LUT1 and LUT2. Other potentially useful special instructions for SCADA systems is a
bounds checking operation CHKB which checks a specifc value is within set-points specifed as constants and tolerance checking TOL where two values are verifed to be close
enough — within a tolerance specifed by a third value.
Ultimately, a comprehensive specifcation for STCB modules will fx values like the
number of related sensors q, number of outputs w, and the number of constants l (and hence
the number of addressable values in the STCB registers). Such a specifcation will also
include a detailed listing of all permitted opcodes and their interpretation. This chapter,
however, is restricted to describing some of the salient features of STCB modules.
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8.3

STCB Deployment
The deployer of the SCADA system is trusted to verify the integrity of the physical

bindings between various sensors and SMs. Specifcally, the deployer is required to permanently connect the outputs of every sensor to an SM, and apply tamper-evident seals to
such connections. The deployer specifes binding records of the form
Bi = (Si , Mj , i , θ)

(8.6)

to convey that
1. measurements corresponding to sensor Si will be reported by a module Mj ; if Si is a
real sensor, then Mj is an SM; if Si is a state-report sensor, then Mj is the identity of
the CM of a foreign system. Recall that synthetic sensors are not bound to CMs or
SMs and thus have have no binding records. The deployer may be totally oblivious
of the existence of such records.
2. i is an achievable minimum round-trip duration between module Mj , and the CM
for the deployment, and
3. θ = 0 implies a record corresponding to a real sensor; θ 6= 0 implies report from a
foreign STCB system with STCB descriptor ξsp = θ.
To indicate that a module M0 was deployed as the CM for the STCB system, the binding
records includes a record for the CM M0 as B0 = (S = 0, M0 ,  = 0, θ = 0).
Depending on the requirements specifed by the stake holder, the deployer also specifes
reporting records of the form
Rj = (Sr , Mr , Sj , l), 1 ≤ l ≤ w.

(8.7)

to indicate that the value ojl (corresponding to sensor Sj ) should be reported to the stakeholder module Mr , and that the report should indicate ojl as the latest (time τj ) “measurement” from state-report sensor Sr .
141

All such Bi and Rj are included as leaves of a static Merkle hash tree constructed by
the deployer — the STCB deployment tree. Let ξp be the root of the deployment tree with
leaves
{· · · Bi · · ·}, {· · · Rj · · ·}

(8.8)

The end-result of the design and deployment processes are two hash trees with roots ξs and
ξp . The design root ξs can be seen as concise representation of the physics F (v1 · · · vn ) of
the system. The deployment root ξp is a concise representation of the bindings between
real-sensors & SMs, and state-report-sensors & CMs of foreign STCB deployments. The
value
ξsp = h(ξs , ξp )

(8.9)

can now be seen as the root of a merkle tree with two sub-trees — the design tree to the left,
with root ξs , and the deployment tree to the right, with root ξp . The static value ξsp is the
unique descriptor for a specifc STCB deployment (deployed to secure a specifc SCADA
system).
Note that two different deployments of identical SCADA systems may have the same
design root ξs , but will have different deployment root ξp as different STCB modules will
be used in the two deployments. If h() is collision resistant, no two STCB deployments
will have the same descriptor ξsp .
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Static Descriptor ξsp – a specifcation for an STCB system
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8.3.1

STCB Operation

To commence operation in a SCADA deployment, the STCB module M0 associated
with the system is initialized with the STCB descriptor ξsp , and the value ξ0 corresponding
to the initial state of sensors. All leaves of the tree with root ξsp (which includes two subtrees — the design tree and the deployment tree) are stored by U; all n leaves of the form
Si , 1 ≤ i ≤ n corresponding to the initial states of all sensors are also stored by U.
During regular operation of the system the STCB manager U receives authenticated
sensor reports from SMs (and possibly CMs from foreign deployments), and submits them
one at a time, to the CM M0 . Such reports take the form of a message authentication code
(MAC) computed as
µ = h(S, v, t, c, ξsp , K 0 ),

(8.10)

where
1. values (S, v, t) indicates a report for sensor S to convey a fresh measurement v and
measurement time t.
2. c is the clock-tick value of the module that created the report;
3. ξsp is STCB descriptor of the creator of the report (which was the value used to
initialize the module);
4. K 0 is a shared secret between the creator (SM or foreign CM) and receiver (CM M0 ).
Along with the report from sensor Si (authenticated by a module Mj ), U also submits a
binding record Bi constructed by the deployer, consistent with the static root ξsp .
The STCB manager U is then required to submit other values required for the CM to
evaluate Ui . Such values include a) sensor state record Si , b) the state records of the (up to)
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q related sensors; c) a design record Gi consistent with descriptor ξsp ; d) l constant values
Ci ; and e) m instructions Ai .
As dynamic sensor states associated with the n sensors are maintained by U as leaves
of dynamic a merkle tree with root ξ, sensor state records provided by U will be accepted
as valid only if they can be verifed to be consistent with a copy of the dynamic root ξ
stored inside the CM M0 . The instructions Ai will be accepted as valid only if αi = h(Ai )
where αi is specifed in the design record Gi . The set of constants Ci will be accepted
as valid only if h(Ci ) can be demonstrated to be a node in the binary tree with root λi —
where λi is specifed in the design record Gi .
The values used for evaluating Ui have fxed reserved locations in the internal memory
of the STCB modules, and are specifed as the operands for the m instructions in A. An
internal module function feval (Ai ) executes every instruction sequentially. The end result
is the modifcation of the values in the sensor state record Si of Si . To “remember” changes
such changes to Si the module modifes the dynamic root ξ.
If untrusted U does not modify Si in the same manner, then Si will not longer be
consistent with the root ξ stored inside the CM. Thus, if U provides a fresh sensor report
to the CM to invoke Ui , it is forced to modify the state of Si exactly in the manner specifed
by the designer.
At any time, a reporting record R = (Sr , Mr , Sj , l ∈ {1 · · · w}) consistent with ξsp can
be provided as input, along with the state record Sj consistent with ξ, to request the STCB
module M0 to report (to module Mr ) values ojl and τl in a state-report “sensor” Sr .
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If U does not invoke functions to evaluate any Ui , the time ti associated with Si can
not be updated. Thus, in any state-report that directly or indirectly depends on sensor Si
the time τ will be stuck at ti , and will thus be recognized as stale by the stake-holder (or
CM of a foreign deployment).

8.3.1.1

STCB Interfaces

To interact with the STCB modules (SMs and CM), U employs various interfaces exposed by the modules. An interface Fpeer () is used to set up shared keys between modules
that send and receive sensor/state reports. A function Fhs () can be invoked to engage two
modules in a hand-shake sequence withing a duration , to enable the modules to estimate
their respective clock offsets with an error less than . Interface Finit () is used to initialize
a module as a CM for a deployment with identifer ξsp , or as a SM for a specifc real sensor
Sin (in an STCB deployment with identifer ξsp ).
A function Fsnd () is invoked to request a module to send a report to another module, in
which Frcv () is invoked to accept the report. Function Fld () is used to load various values
necessary to evaluate some Ui . Function Fupd () is then invoked to evaluate Ui and update
the root ξ stored inside the module. Functions Frcv (), Fld and Fupd () are utilized only in
modules used as CMs.
To the extent the SMs and the deployer (who is trusted to verify and specify bindings between sensors and SMs) are trusted, we can trust the authenticity of sensor reports
provided to the CM module. To the extent the CM module M0 , and the designer (who is re-
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sponsible for specifying the functions Ui ()) are trusted, the stake-holder trusts the integrity
of the state reports.
In practice, the SMs will need to be located as close as possible to the sensors to improve the security of the binding between sensors and SMs. The CM could be housed in
any location — for example, a secure location far removed even from the SCADA control
center. Components of U will need to be housed close to SMs, and close to the CM.

8.4

STCB Architecture
STCB modules have a unique identity, and a unique secret issued by a trusted key

distribution center (KDC). Two modules (say) Mi and Mj can use their respective secrets
(say) Qi and Qj issued by the KDC to compute a common pairwise secret Kij [49]. Specifically, associated with a pair of modules Mi , Mj is a non-secret value Pij which is also
made available by the KDC (for example, in a public repository), where Pij is computed
as
Pij = h(Qi , Mj ) ⊕ h(Qj , Mi ).
Module Mi and Mj can compute a common secret Kij = h(Qi , Mj ),
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ h(Qi , Mj ) ⊕ 0
Computed by Module Mi
Kij =
⎪
⎪
⎩ h(Qj , Mi ) ⊕ Pij Computed by Module Mj

(8.11)

(8.12)

Every module possesses three values that are affected whenever a module is powered
on:
1. a clock tick counter c, which is set to 0;
2. a non-volatile session counter σ, which is incremented; and
3. a random secret γ, which is spontaneously generated inside the module.
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8.4.1

Module Registers

Non-volatile storage inside the module is used to store three values — secret Q issued
by the KDC, session counter σ, and module identity M .
Every module has the following reserved volatile registers:
Self-secret

γ

Static root

ξsp

Dynamic root

ξ

Peer module params

p = {M 0 , σ 0 , Kin , Kout }

Constants

c = [C0 · · · Cl ]

˜ v,
Sensor report register r = {S,
˜ t̃}
Sensor state register

s0 = [S0 , u0 , t0 , o01 · · · o0w , τ0 ]

Related sensor states

s1 · · · s q

where

sj = [Ŝj , ûj , t̂j , ôj,1 · · · ôjw , τ̂j ]

Temporary register

T

SM Registers
Sin , vin
The self-secret γ spontaneously generated inside the module remains privy only to the
module. This secret is used for computing self-certifcates. A self-certifcate is a “memorandum to self,” — memoranda issued by the module for verifcation by itself at a later
time, during the same session σ.
The register ξsp is the (160-bit) descriptor of the STCB system. The register ξ is the
dynamic root of a Merkle tree. Register p contains various parameters regarding a peer
module from which a) sensor/state report has to be received, or b) a report has to be sent.
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The register c is reserved for storing a set of l constants to be used to evaluate some Ui
corresponding to a sensor Si . Values that refect the current state Si of Si should be stored
in register s0 . The states of q related sensors are stored in registers s1 · · · sq . Register r is
reserved for a freshly received sensor report from Si .
For example, if at some instant of time,
1. the contents of the dynamic record Si corresponding to sensor Si is stored in location
s0 , and
2. records corresponding to sensor Si,1 · · · Si,q are stored on location s1 · · · sq respectively, and
3. values from a fresh report from sensor Si are stored in register r, then

Si = S˜
Ŝj = Si,j
u0 = vi (measurement of Si )
ûj = vi,j (measurements of related sensors of Si )
ôjx = o(i,j)x , 1 ≤ x ≤ w
(8.13)
The SM register Sin indicates the sensor to which the module is bound (if the module
is used as a SM) or is set to zero (if the module is used as a CM). If the module is used as
an SM, the register vin always contains the (dynamic) sensor measurement.
STCB modules have a built in hash function h() which is reused extensively for binary tree (fv ()) computations, computing shared secrets, computing message authentication codes, and self-certifcates.
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An in-built function fexec (A) in every module can execute a set of m instructions A,
where each instruction (chosen from the set A) identifes a) an opcode (type of logical
operation), b) one or more input operands (from the values stored in registers s0 , s1 · · · sq ,
c, T ), depending on the type of opcode; and c) the output operand (o01 · · · o0w , or temporary
register T ).

8.4.2 Initializing Peer Parameters
The pairwise secret K that a module M shares with a peer module M 0 is used for
computing message authentication codes (MAC) for outgoing messages to peer M 0 , and for
verifying incoming MACs from peer M 0 . Specifcally, the secret used by M for computing
outgoing MACs is Kout = h(K, σ) where σ is the session counter of M ; consequently,
the secret used for verifying MACs received from M 0 is Kin = h(K, σ 0 ), where σ 0 is the
session counter of M 0 .
STCB modules possess reserved registers to store the identity M 0 of a peer module (to
which it needs to send a message, or from which it needs to receive a message), the session
counter σ 0 of the peer, and MAC secrets Kin and Kout . Function Fpeer () exposed by a
module can be invoked to populate values M 0 , σ 0 , Kin , Kout related to a peer module M 0 .
Fpeer (I, P, s){
M 0 := I; σ 0 := s; K := h(Q, M 0 ) ⊕ P ;
Kin := h(K, σ 0 ); Kout := h(K, σ);
}

To facilitate secure communications between two modules Mi and Mj , Fpeer (Mj , Pij , σj )
should be invoked on Mi , and Fpeer (Mi , 0, σi ) should be invoked on Mj . Mi computes the
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pairwise secret using the public value Pij ; Mj computes the same value without using Pij
(or Pij = 0 as XORing with 0 results in no change).

8.4.3

Self Certifcates

Two types of certifcates are computed by STCB modules — binary hash tree certifcates, and offset certifcates.

8.4.3.1

Binary Tree Certifcates

A binary hash tree certifcate is computed as
ρbt = h(x, x0 , y, y 0 , γ).

(8.14)

Such a self-memoranda states that “x is a node in a binary hash tree with root y,” and “if
x → x0 then y → y 0 .”
STCB modules expose a function Fmt () which evaluates a sequence of hash operations
fv (), and output a binary tree certifcate.
Fmt (x, x0 , vx ){
y := fv (x, vx ); y 0 := fv (x0 , vx );
RETURN ρbt := h(x, x0 , y, y 0 , γ);
}

Fmtc (x, x0 , y, y 0 , z, z 0 , ρ1 , ρ2 ){
IF (ρ1 =
6 h(x, x0 , y, y 0 , γ)) RETURN ERROR;
IF (ρ2 6= h(y, y 0 , z, z 0 , γ)) RETURN ERROR;
RETURN ρbt := h(x, x0 , z, z 0 , γ);

}

A function Fmtc () concatenates two such certifcates to create another certifcate. Specifically, a certifcate binding node x (and x0 ) to an ancestor y (and y 0 ) and a certifcate binding
a node y (and y 0 ) to an ancestor z (and z 0 ) can be combined to a certifcate binding node x
(and x0 ) to an ancestor z (and z 0 ).
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The primary need for the function Fmtc () is due to restrictions on the size of inputs to
module functions. Specifcally, we can now place a hard limit on the size of the input vx
— to (say) 8 hashes. For computing relationships between a node and the root of a tree
with a million leaves (20 levels) three calls to Fmt () (to produce certifcates binding i) a
level zero node to a level 8 node, ii) level 8 node to a level 16 node, and iii) a level 16 node
to a level 20 node) and two calls Fmtc () (to combine the frst two certifcates, and combine
the resulting certifcate with the third certifcate) can be used.

8.4.3.2

Offset Certifcates

An offset certifcate is computed as
ρos = h(M 0 , σ, σ 0 , os, , γ),

(8.15)

and states that the module M (that issued the certifcate) had performed a handshake within
a duration  with a module M 0 , and had estimated the offset between their clocks to be os.
The certifcate also states that the handshake was performed when it’s session counter was
σ and the session counter of M 0 was σ 0 . The offset certifcate is issued by a function Fhs ()
exposed by modules.
The function Fhs () can be invoked on pair of modules to perform a handshake, after
which the initiator of the handshake obtains an estimate of the clock offset of the responder.
Before Fhs () is invoked, Fpeer () should be invoked on both nodes to set up respective peer
identities, session counters, and secrets Kin and Kout to be used for incoming and outgoing
MACs.
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The function Fhs () has three inputs — a received MAC µ0 (from peer M 0 ) with time
stamp c0 , and a time-stamp c̃ that was previously sent to peer M 0 (which had triggered the
response µ0 from M 0 ). The output of Fhs () is either a MAC intended for the peer or a
self-MAC intended for itself, indicating the estimated offset for peer M 0 .
Fhs () is frst invoked on the initiator with all inputs (µ0 , c0 , c̃) set to zero; the output of
Fhs () is µ1 = h(c1i , 0, σr , h(K, σi )) where c1i and σi are the current clock-counter and the
session counter of the initiator and σr is the session counter of the responder.
Fhs () is then invoked in the responder module with inputs (µ1 , c1i , 0). If the clock tick
count of the responder is cr , the output is µ2 = h(cr , c1i , σi , h(K, σr )).
Fhs () is then invoked on the initiator for the second time, at time c2i , with inputs
(µ2 , cr , c1i ). The offset between the clock of the initiator and the responder can be estimated by the initiator to within the round-trip duration  = c2i − c1i . The best estimate of
the initiator is that, when the clock tick count of responder was cr , the clock tick count of
the initiator was (ci1 +ci2 )/2, and thus, the best estimate of the offset is os = (c1i +c2i )/2−cr .
The output of Fhs () in this case is the offset certifcate. This certifcate can be provide
to the module at any time to convince the module that “the offset to M 0 was estimated as os
with a tolerance of ,” and that “the offset to M 0 was estimated when the session counters
of the modules were σi and σr .” If any of the two session counters had changed since the
certifcate was issued, the certifcate becomes invalid.
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Fhs (µ0 , c,
˜ c0 ){
0
IF (µ = 0) //Send challenge
RETURN h(c, 0, σ 0 , Kout ); //Sent as challenge
IF (µ0 =
6 h(c0 , c,
˜ σ, Kin ) RETURN ERROR;
IF (c̃ = 0) //Respond to challenge
RETURN h(c, c0 , σ 0 , Kout );
ELSE //Process response to estimate offset
 := c − c̃; os := (c + c̃)/2 − c0 ;
RETURN ρos := h(M 0 , σ, σ 0 , os, , γ);
}

8.4.4

Initializing STCB Modules

Initializing an STCB module M implies initializing three internal registers reserved
for values ξsp , ξ and Sin . Specifcally, a module M can be initialized to participate in a
deployment ξsp only if a binding record for module M can be demonstrated to be consistent
with ξsp .
As ξ0 is a node in a tree with root ξsp , U can use Fmt () to obtain a certifcate
ρ = h(ξ0 , ξ0 , ξsp , ξsp , γ).

(8.16)

Similarly, as binding record Bi = [Si , M, , θ] that exists in deployment tree is used to
initialize the register Sin Now U can use Fmt () to obtain a certifcate
ρ = h(v, v, ξsp , ξsp , γ).
Function Finit () can be used to initialize a module M as
1. a CM for a deployment ξsp or
2. as an SM for a sensor S in deployment ξsp .
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(8.17)

To initialize a module as a CM for the deployment, the inputs (ξ1 , ξ2 , ρ) to Finit () are such
that ρ is a binary tree certifcate relating a node ξ0 = ξ1 and root ξ2 = ξsp (inputs S 0 and 0
are set to 0).
To initialize the module as a SM the certifcate, inputs S 0 and  are non-zero. The binary
tree certifcate should relate ξ1 = h(S 0 , M, 0 , 0) and ξ2 = ξsp to prove to the module that
“in an STCB system with descriptor ξsp , the module M (which is being initialized) is
authorized to report measurements corresponding to sensor S 0 .” Accordingly, the register
Sin in the module M is set to S 0 .
For a module Mj initialized as a SM for a sensor Sk , the output of the sensor Sk is
physically connected to module Mj using a tamper-evident seal by the deployer. The
physical connection ensures that the sensor measurement vk is always available in the
register vin of the SM. measurement Later (during regular operation) module Mj can not
be initialized to act as a SM for any other sensor S 0 6= Sk , as no record binding S 0 to Mj
can be demonstrated to be a part of the tree with root ξsp .
Finit (ξ0 , r, S, , ρ1 , ρ2 ){
IF (ρ1 6= h(ξ0 , ξ0 , r, r, γ)) RETURN ERROR;
x := h(S, M, , 0);
IF (ρ2 6= h(x, x, r, r, γ)) RETURN ERROR;
ξsp = r; ξ := ξ0 ; Sin = S 0 ; RETURN;
}

During regular operation, any dynamic sensor record can be loaded on to any register
s0 or s1 · · · sq using function Fld (). A record s provided as input is simply loaded onto
register sj where j is the index specifed. Specifcally, the record is loaded only if the
inputs ρ and h(s) are consistent with dynamic root ξ.
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8.4.5

Sensor and State Reports

In an STCB deployment with SMs M1 · · · Mk , and STCB module M0 , the state reports
are made available to a module Mr associated with the stake holder. In general, Mr can
be seen as an STCB module associated with a different STCB system at a higher lever of
hierarchy.
The handshake sequence (which involves two calls to Fhs () in the initiator module
and one Fhs () call in the responder module) the handshake sequence is orchestrated by U
between
1. k responders M1 · · · Mk , with M0 (as initiator)
2. Mr as initiator and M0 as responder.
After the k + 1 hand-shake sequences have been completed, k self-certifcates of type OS
ρos are created by M0 — one corresponding to each SM, and one self-certifcate is created
by Mr . Such certifcates indicate both the estimated offset os, and the maximum error  in
the estimate os.
Now modules are ready to exchange authenticated messages. More specifcally, SMs
send authenticated and time-stamped sensor reports to M0 , and STCB module M0 can send
state reports to Mr . Such messages exchanged between modules are computed as
µ = h(S, v, t, c, ξsp , Kout ).

(8.18)

where for sensor reports (from SMs to M0 )
1. S = Sin is the identity of a sensor that is bound to the module that created the report,
and v = vin ;
2. t = c is the current clock tick count of the creator of the report.
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3. ξsp is the value used to initialize the module.
A report from M0 to stake holders is made in accordance with a record [Sr , Mr , Si , 1 ≤
l ≤ w]. Such a report can be created for the beneft of Mr only if the state of sensor Si
is loaded in register s0 (or S0 = Si ), to report the value el0 and time τ0 . In such a report
S = Sr is a label assigned to the report, v = el0 , and t = τt is the time associated with
6 c).
v = el0 (or t =
Fsnd () outputs µ = h(Sin , vin , c, c, ξsp , Kout ) when invoked in a SM (with register
Sin 6= 0). When invoked on an STCB module, this function should be able to verify the
existence of an appropriate reporting record R that authorizes the module to report one of
the w values e1o · · · ew
o stored in register s0 .
Fsnd (S 0 , j, ρ){
IF (S 6= 0)
RETURN c, µ = h(Sin , vin , c, c, ξsp , Kout );
y = h(S 0 , M 0 , S0 , j);
IF (ρ = h(y, y, ξsp , ξsp , γ)
RETURN c, µ = h(S 0 , o0j , τ0 , c, ξsp , Kout );
ELSE RETURN ERROR;
}

Corresponding to a state report for a “sensor” Sr , while the STCB module M0 that
generates the report is initialized with the ξsp , the stake-holder module Mr — which in
general can be seen as the STCB module associated with a foreign STCB system may be
0
. For the module Mr to accept the report from a
initialized with a different descriptor ξsp
0
should include a
foreign system, the deployment tree in the foreign system with root ξsp

binding record
B = [Sr , M0 , , θ = ξsp 6= 0].
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(8.19)

Function Frcv () can be invoked in the STCB module to provide a fresh sensor report to
the module. Specifcally, before a sensor report from a module Mj can be provided to a
module, the function Fpeer () should be invoked on the receiving module to set M 0 = Mj .
Now,
1. inputs Si , 0 , θ to Frcv () are used to compute the leaf hash x = h(Si , M 0 , 0 , θ) of a
binding record Bi .
2. input ρ is used to confrm that x = h(Si , M 0 , 0 , θ) (the hash of the binding record)
is a node in a tree with root ξsp .
3. inputs , os and ρos are used to verify that ρos = h(M 0 , σ, σ 0 , os, , γ).
4. and inputs vi0 , t0 , c0 and µ0 are used to verify that µ0 = h(Si , vi0 , t0 , c0 , y, Kin ) where
y = ξsp if θ = 0, or y = θ if θ =
6 0.
The function returns error if  > 0 , or on failure of verifcation of inputs ρnv or ρos or µ0 .
Ultimately, the purpose of function Frcv () is to receive two values vi0 and time t0i corresponding to a sensor Si where t0i = t + os is the offset corrected time associated with vi0 .
Values Si , vi0 and t0i are then stored in a reserved register R for further processing.

}

8.4.6

Frcv (Si , θ, 0 , ρbt , os, , ρos , vi0 , ρ, t0 , c0 , µ0 , ){
IF ( > 0 ) RETURN ERROR;
IF (ρos 6= h(M 0 , σ, σ 0 , os, , γ)) RETURN ERROR;
y = (θ = 0)?ξsp : θ;
x = h(Si , M 0 , 0 , y);
6 h(x, x, ξsp , ξsp , γ)) RETURN ERROR;
IF (ρbt =
IF (µ0 6= h(Si , vi0 , t0 , c0 , y, Kin ) RETURN ERROR;
r := (S̃ = Si , ṽ = vi0 , t̃ = t0 + os);

Sensor Updates and Incremental State Evaluations

Values r in a fresh sensor report from Si are part of the inputs used to evaluate Ui .
Evaluation of Ui results in modifcations to the state Si of sensor Si . Before Ui can be
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evaluated it should be ensured that appropriate values are loaded on to registers r, s0 ,
s0 · · · sq , and c.
Recall that register r is populated by function Frcv (). Function Fld () can be used to
load the dynamic values S associated with any sensor on to any of the q + 1 registers s0 ,
s0 · · · sq .
Fld (s0 , j, ρ){
x := h(s0 );
IF (ρ 6= h(x, x, ξ, ξ, γ)) RETURN ERROR;
//Record is a leaf in the dynamic tree
sj := S;
}
Fupd (C, λ, ρc , A, ρ, ξ 0 , ρupd , Si0 ){
IF (S0 6= S̃) RETURN ERROR;
tmp = h([S0 , R1 · · · Rq , h(A), λ, Si0 ]); // hash of a design record
//tmp should be a node in the static tree with root ξsp
IF (ρ =
6 h(tmp, tmp, ξsp , ξsp , γ)) RETURN ERROR;
tmp = h(C); // hash of constant record
// should be a node in the constant tree with root λ
IF (ρc 6= h(tmp, tmp, λ, λ, γ)) RETURN ERROR;
tmp := h(s0 ); // Record before evaluation of U
˜ τ10 · · · τq0 );
τ0 := min0 (t,
T := ṽ; v0 := ṽ; t0 := t̃;
IF ((fA () = ERROR) ∨ (ρupd 6= h(tmp, h(s0 ), ξ, ξ 0 , γ)))
CLEAR-ALL AND RETURN;
ξ := ξ 0 ;
6 0) S̃ := Si0 ;
IF (Si0 =
}

The main purpose of Fupd () is to evaluate Ui corresponding to a sensor Si . For this
purpose, Fupd () verifes that all inputs required to evaluate Ui are available. If a design
record corresponding to sensor Si is
Gi = [Si , Si1 · · · Siq , αi , λi , Si0 ]
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(8.20)

it should be ensured that the current state of sensor Si is loaded onto register s0 , and the
states of related sensors Si1 · · · Siq are loaded on to registers s1 · · · sq respectively. Other
values required to evaluate Ui are provided as inputs to Fupd ().
Specifcally,
1. the constants C should be such that x = h(C) is node in a tree with root λi . This
can be demonstrated by providing a certifcate ρc = h(x, x, λi , λi , γ).
2. the instructions A should be such that h(A) = αi .
3. λi and αi should exist in the design record [S0 , Si1 · · · Siq , αi , λi ]. More specifcally,
y = h(S0 , Si1 · · · Siq , αi , λi , Ni ) should be a node in the tree with root ξsp . This can
be demonstrated by providing a certifcate ρ = h(y, y, ξsp , ξsp , γ).
4. the values S0 ∈ s (the identity of the sensor to be updated) and S̃ ∈ r (the sensor
from which a fresh report has been received) should be the same.
During execution of the algorithm A, in situations where many options exist for choosing the set of constants C consistent with λ it is the responsibility of U to choose the
correct set of constants that satisfy the range of the independent variable(s). On successful
evaluation of the algorithm A the status of sensor S0 in register s0 will be updated. If x is
the hash of register s0 before the update, and if x0 is the hash of register s0 after the update,
then a new root ξ 0 and a certifcate ρ should be provided as input satisfying
ρ = h(x, x0 , ξ, ξ 0 , γ).

8.5

(8.21)

STCB Protocol
The STCB protocol can be seen as the actions to be performed by the untrusted STCB

manager U to submit sensor reports from SMs and CMs of foreign deployments to the
CM M0 of the STCB deployment, obtain state-reports from M0 , and submit such reports
to stake holders (or CMs of foreign deployments).
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8.5.1

Generation of Offset Certifcates

The frst step in the operation of an STCB deployment is that of performing handshakes
between various modules to obtain offset certifcates. In general one offset certifcate will
be generated for every module specifed in the binding records of the deployment.
For a STCB system with n sensors (real, state-report and synthetic) the total number
of binding records is n0 + 1, where n − n0 is the number of synthetic records: no binding
record exists for synthetic records, and one binding record is for the CM M0 . The total
number of distinct modules in general will be n00 ≤ n0 . Specifcally, while there will exist
one module corresponding to every real sensor, as a single CM may report multiple states,
the number of state-report sensors may be greater that the number of foreign CMs that
provide state reports.
A total of n00 hand shake sequences will be invoked to obtain n00 offset certifcates.
Recall that each such sequence begins with a challenge from the CM M0 generated using
Fhs () to which a response is generated by invoking Fhs () in the responder module, and
fnally, the response is submitted to the CM to generate the certifcate. If any SM is rebooted, the offset certifcate corresponding to the SM has to be regenerated. If the CM is
rebooted, all offset certifcates will need to be regenerated.
Before Fhs () is invoked, Fpeer () should be invoked on both modules to set up the MAC
secrets Kin and Kout .
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8.5.2

Generating Static Binary Tree Certifcates

The second step is for U to obtain binary tree certifcates corresponding to all leaves
of the static tree with root ξsp . Specifcally, as U maintains the tree with root ξsp , U can
readily provide the complementary nodes for any leaf in the static tree to function Fbt (),
and obtain certifcates of the form
ρs = h(xs , xs , ξsp , ξsp , γ)

(8.22)

where xs is the cryptographic hash of the sth leaf of the static tree. The total number of
static leaves is (n + 1) + (n0 + 1) + m where
1. n is the number of design records: one for each sensor (real, state-report, or synthetic)
2. one leaf corresponds to the value ξ0 in the design tree.
3. n0 + 1 is the number of binding records (including one for the CM M0 ), and
4. m is the number of reporting records.

8.5.3

Initialization and Regular Operation

The third step is the initialization of STCB modules to operate in deployment ξsp —
by invoking Finit () on each STCB module. For initializing the modules the two binary
tree certifcates are required: one linking ξ0 to ξsp , and one linking a binding record for the
module with the static root ξsp .
On completion of the three steps, the STCB manager maintains a dynamic merkle tree
with leaves as sensor records. As the initial values of such records are specifed by the
designer, the root of the tree should be the same as the initial value ξ = ξ0 stored by the
STCB module.
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Once all STCB modules have been initialized, sensor reports from SMs (or CMs of
foreign deployments) are submitted to the CM as and when they are received. In general,
not all sensors may report at the same frequency.
As all SMs send messages only to the CM, Fpeer () needs to be invoked only once on
each SM (which was already performed before invoking Fhs () to generate offset certifcates).
To create a sensor report from an SM, U will invoke Fsnd () on an SM. Some sensor
reports corresponding to state reports from foreign CMs may also be received by U.
Once a sensor report for some sensor Si has been received, U is expected to make
appropriate modifcations to the sensor state Si , and accordingly, modify the Merkle tree
maintained by U. Let ξ → ξ 0 be the change in the root of the dynamic tree, corresponding to the modifcation Si → S0i triggered by the received sensor report. If h(Si ) = x
and h(S0i ) = x0 , U can readily determine complementary nodes required to obtain the
certifcate
ρbt = h(x, x0 , ξ, ξ 0 , γ)

(8.23)

The STCB manager invokes Fpeer () followed by Frcv () to submit the report to the CM.
Recall that inputs to Frcv () include a MAC received from an SM/CM, a binding record
along with a certifcate linking the record to ξsp , and an offset certifcate corresponding to
the reporting module.
Corresponding to the sensor state record for sensor Si and q related sensors U invokes
Fbt () to obtain q + 1 certifcates binding the sensor state records to dynamic root ξ. Fol163

lowing this, the STCB manager uses Fld () up to q + 1 times to load the a) previous sensor
state Si on to register s0 and b) the states of related sensors on to registers s1 · · · sq .
Finally, the STCB manager invokes Fupd (). Recall that the inputs to Fupd () include ρbt
obtained as per Eq (8.23), a certifcate binding design record Gi to STCB descriptor ξsp ,
the set of m instructions Ai , a set of l constants, and a certifcate binding the constants to
a value λ in the design record. Only if the modifcation Si → S0i computed by the CM is
exactly the same as that performed by the STCB manager U will the update be successful
in modifying the dynamic root ξ stored inside the CM to ξ 0 .
At any time the STCB manager can invoke a Fupd () to load a state record consistent
with ξ on to register s0 . Now Fsnd () can be invoked to create a state-report. Note that when
Fsnd () is invoked on a CM a certifcate binding a reporting record to the static root should
be provided as input.
The ever growing complexity of systems poses a severe threat — the possibility of
hard-to-detect hidden functionality that can be exploited to take control of the system.
Current strategies for securing SCADA systems are predominantly focused on development of suitable intrusion detection systems. Such security measures ignore the very real
possibility of hidden functionality in the intrusion detection systems themselves.
In the proposed approach to secure SCADA systems only STCB modules are trusted to
provide the assurance that “no attack will go undetected.” The proposed approach involves
three stages — a design process carried out by a designer with good domain knowledge,
a deployment process carried out by a security professional, and regular operation of the
STCB system. The designer and deployer together specify a concise description ξsp of the
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system. During regular operation, an STCB module reports the state of a system identifed
as ξsp to stake-holders.
Some of the important features of the STCB approach that make it well suited for any
SCADA system of any size include
1. the ability to support hierarchical deployments;
2. the ability to support any type of function U - if necessary through the use of 1-D, or
2-D look up tables (which are also specifed as leaves of the design tree), and
3. the ability to specify synthetic sensors.
Such features are intended to enable the use of STCB modules for securing any SCADA
system.
The frst pre-requisite for deployment of STCB based security solutions is the actual
availability of STCB modules/chips. Towards this end, the work that has been performed is
a small frst step — identifcation of a functional specifcation of the such chips. In arriving
at an appropriate functional specifcation, some our main goals have been
1. reduce computational and memory requirement inside STCB chips,
2. reduce interface complexity (size of inputs and outputs to/from the STCB chips), and
3. simplify the STCB protocol - which is a specifcation of a sequence of interactions
with the STCB modules - to realize the desired assurances.
The proposed functional specifcation (for STCB modules) is merely a specifcation, and
not the specifcation. Just as there are numerous ways to realize a block-cipher or a hash
function, there are numerous ways to arrive at a “set of STCB functions” (which can be
leveraged to realize the same assurances). The functional specifcation in this chapter is
however the frst of its kind.
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8.5.4

STCB Design Example

Precipitator
Boiler

Turbine
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Generator

S6
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Coolant
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S3
Fire

Figure 8.4
Example: Simplifed version of thermal power plant

As an example of the design process for a SCADA system, let us consider a simplifed
version of a thermal power plant with six sensors S1 · · · S6 , (see Figure ??).
S1

temperature sensor inside boiler

S2

coal weight sensor (coal fed into the boiler).

S3

position of fre regulator.

S4

temperature inside turbine cell.

S5

pressure inside turbine cell.

S6

speed of turbine.
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Let v1 · · · v6 be the values reported by sensors S1 · · · S6 required to determine the state
of the system.
Let us assume that the state report expected by the stake-holder is a single bit value —
o1 = 1 if the system is in an acceptable state, and o1 = 0 otherwise. According to the
designer, the system is in an acceptable state if the following conditions are satisfed:
1. v1 · · · v6 are all within thresholds (x1l , xh1 ) · · · (x6l , xh6 ) respectively, where (xil , xih )
represents lower and higher thresholds for sensor Si .
2. The speed of turbine should be between upper and lower limits depending on the
temperature and pressure inside the turbine cell. v6 = f1 (v4 , v5 ) ± δ1 where δ1
is another threshold (the speed of the turbine should be a specifc function of the
pressure and temperature inside the turbine cell)
3. The position of the fre regulator should be between upper and lower limits depending on the current speed of turbine v6 and the current temperature and pressure values
inside the boiler cell. v3 = f2 (y1 , v6 ) ± δ2 where y1 = f3 (v1 , v2 ) is a function of the
temperature and pressure of the boiler.
Let the maximum number of related sensors be q = 3; the number of outputs of each U
be w = 2; and the number of constants l = 8. A possible design of functions Ui , 1 ≤ i ≤ 6
is as follows:
1) U1 checks if v1 , v2 are within thresholds (x1l , xh1 ), (x2l , xh2 ) respectively. The inputs
are v1 , v2 and constants. The output is written in o01 . For evaluation of U1 , S2 is specifed
as a related sensor. As no other related sensors are used, S12 and S13 are set to 0;
2) U2 performs LUT2 operation for function f3 (). The inputs are v1 , v2 and an LUT
leaf. The output is written o02 . For chaining the output of U1 (now stored in register s1 )
to entire system state, the current value at output register o11 of S1 is copied to S2 ’s output
register o01 .
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3) U3 regards S2 and S6 as related sensors, and perform LUT2 operation f2 () on o12 (an
output of of related sensor S2 ) and value u2 = v6 of other related sensor S6 (now stored in
register s2 . The contents of output register o11 of S2 are copied to o01 of S3 .
4) U4 checks if v4 , v5 are within thresholds (x4l , x4h ), (x5l , x5h ) respectively. The inputs
are v4 , v5 and constants. The output is provided in register o01 . S5 is specifed as a related
sensor of S4 .
5) U5 regards S4 as related sensor and perform a LUT2 operation f1 () on value v4 of
related sensor S4 (value u in record s1 ) and v5 (u in register s0 ), the output is stored in o02 .
The content register o11 (of S4 ) are copied to o01 (of S5 )
6) U6 regards S3 and S5 as related sensors. This function checks if v3 , v6 are within
thresholds (x3l , x3h ), (x6l , x6h ) respectively and the output is stored at register o01 of S6 . In
addition, U6 also performs the following steps
1. if v3 available at u1 satisfes f2 ± δ2 — the result of f2 is now available at o12 of
related sensor S3 ; the result of the check is stored at o02 of S6 . The result of an AND
operation performed on outputs in o01 and o02 is stored back in o01 .
2. if v5 available at u2 satisfes f1 ± δ1 — the output of f1 is available at o22 of related
sensor S5 ; the 1/0 result is stored in register o02 .
A result of AND operation of output registers of S6 – 001 , 002 placed in 001 of S6 represents
the entire state of system (acceptable -1 , unacceptable - 0).
The constants required to evaluate Ui are provided as a leaf that can be proved against
corresponding root λ. The designer specifes the following constant trees:
1. A tree with one leaf with 8 constants [x1l , x1h , xl2 , xh2 , xl4 , x4h , x5l , x5h ] with root λa .
2. A tree with one leaf with 8 constants [δ1 , δ2 , x6l , x6h , xl3 , xh3 , 0, 0] with root λb .
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3. Three trees — one for a 2D LUT for function f1 () with root λc ; one for a 2D LUT
for function f2 () with root λd ; and the third for 2D LUT for function f3 () with root
λe ;
With available information from U1 · · · U6 the designer specifes the following design
records:
G1 = [S1 , {S2 , 0, 0}, α1 , λa , 0]
G2 = [S2 , {S1 , 0, 0}, α2 , λe , 0]
G3 = [S3 , {S2 , S6 , 0}, α3 , λd , 0]
G4 = [S4 , {S5 , 0, 0}, α4 , λa , 0]
G5 = [S5 , {S4 , 0, 0}, α5 , λc , 0]
G6 = [S6 , {S3 , S5 , 0}, α6 , λb , 0]
(8.24)
where α1 · · · α2 are hashes of instructions outlined in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1
Instruction Set for Thermal Plant
Algorithm OPCODE Input registers

Output registers

α1

CHKB
CHKB
AND

c :C1 , s0 :u0
c :C3 , s1 :u1
T, s0 :o02

T
s0 :o02
s0 :001

α2

LUT2
COPY

s1 :u1 , s0 :u0
s1 :o11

s0 :o02
s0 :o01

α3

COPY
LUT2

s1 :o11
s1 :o12 , s2 :u2

s0 :o01
s0 :o02

α4

CHKB
CHKB
AND

c :C5 , s0 :u0
c :C7 , s1 :u1
T, s0 :o02

T
s0 :o02
s0 :o01

α5

LUT2
COPY

s1 :u1 , s0 :u0
s1 :o11

s0 :o02
s0 :o01

α6

CHKB
CHKB
AND
MOV
TOL
AND
MOV
TOL
AND

c :C3 , s0 :u0
c :C5 , s1 :u1
T, s0 :o02
c :C2
s1 :o12 , s1 :u1
s0 :o01 , s0 :o02
c :C1
s2 :o22 , s2 :u2
s0 :o01 , s0 :o02

T
s0
s0
T
s0
s0
T
s0
s0
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:o02
:o01
:o02
:001
:o02
:001

CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Accompanying the growing complexity of systems is a severe security threat — that
hard-to-detect hidden functionality in system components could be exploited to take control of the system. Current strategies for securing complex systems are predominantly
focused on development of suitable intrusion detection systems, often ignoring the very
real possibility of hidden functionality in the intrusion detection systems themselves. The
threat of hidden functionality is especially severe for critical infrastructure systems due to
the increased likelihood of sophisticated state sponsored attacks.
The broad contribution of this dissertation is an alternate approach to secure systems
by clearly identifying a minimal set of components that need to be trusted, and ensuring
that such components are indeed worthy of trust.

9.1

Contributions
The specifc contributions of this dissertation are architectures for securing two major

critical infrastructure domains: data dissemination systems (DNS, dynamic look up service) and SCADA systems. For each domain, the proposed security architecture identifed
1. a specifcation of TCB functionality, to be executed inside a trustworthy boundary
2. a security protocol, which is a specifcation of the nature of interactions between
untrusted components and the TCB modules.
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For DNS we identifed the TCB function to be a simple atomic relay function. For dynamic
DNS the TCB functionality supported enabled establishment of a shared secret between
any user and a module associated with a look-up server. In addition, the TCB functionality
enabled the module to maintain and index ordered Merkle tree. For SCADA systems the
TCB functionality included the ability to maintain merkle hash trees, and the ability to
support a simple instruction set.
The following publications resulted from this research:
1. Trustworthy TCB for DNS Servers, International Journal of Network Security, Vol.14,
No.3, PP. 187-205, May 2012.
2. Minimizing the TCB for Securing SCADA Systems, The 7 annual CSIIR workshop
2011, ACM ICPS.
3. An Effcient Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for a SCADA System Monitor, The
10th International Information and Telecommunication Technologies Conference,
I2TS 2011, Floripa, Brazil.
4. An Effcient TCB for a Generic Data Dissemination System, International Conference on Communications in China: Communications Theory and Security (CTS),
ICCC12-CTS, China.
5. An Effcient TCB for a Generic Content Distribution System, International Conference on Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC)
2012.
6. A Security Architecture for SCADA systems, submitted to the IEEE transactions on
Cybernetics (2013 March).

9.2

Future Research
The frst pre-requisite for deployment of TCB based security solutions is the actual

availability of TCB modules/chips. Towards this end, the work that has been performed is
a small frst step — identifcation of a functional specifcation of such chips. In arriving at
an appropriate functional specifcation, some of our main goals have been to
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1. reduce computational and memory requirement inside TCB chips,
2. reduce interface complexity (size of inputs and outputs to/from TCB module), and
3. simplify the TCB protocol — which is a specifcation of a sequence of interactions
with the TCB modules — to realize the desired assurances.
The proposed functional specifcation is merely a specifcation, and not the specifcation.
Just as there are numerous ways to realize a block-cipher or a hash function, there are
numerous ways to arrive at a “set of TCB functions” (which can be leveraged to realize
the same set of desired assurances). The functional specifcations in this dissertation —
for DNS modules and STCB modules — are however, the frst of their kind, and should
therefore be evaluated against similar competing efforts in the future.
While the basis for choosing one of several competing hash functions (that are equally
strong from a security perspective) — for example, factors like complexity of hardware
and software implementation, speed, delay, etc., are well appreciated, a quantitative basis
for evaluating two competing sets of functional specifcations needs further investigation.
As any modifcation to the DNS module / STCB functionality will affect the corresponding
security protocol (which specifes how such functionality is utilized), any new functional
specifcation should be accompanied by a corresponding protocol specifcation. Thus, evaluation of competing efforts should also consider trade-offs between TCB complexity and
overhead for the security protocol.
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APPENDIX A
STCB INSTRUCTION SET
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This appendix illustrates a possible design of an STCB instruction set by outlining
memory layout for addressable volatile registers in the STCB module and identifying useful logical operations on values stored in such registers. The memory layout Y is given
in Table A.1, where index represents the position. For simplicity, we have associated each
index with a more-easy-to-remember mnemonic.
A register used for storing the intermediate results during the execution of an algorithm
A is given index 0 and mnemonic TMP. Y[1-3] are values received in an authenticated
sensor report. Y[4-10] correspond to values in a sensor state s0 , Y[11-16] correspond to
sensor state s1 , Y[17-22] corresponding to sensor state s2 , Y[23-28] correspond to sensor
state s3 . Y [29-37] correspond to the l constants. For illustration let the maximum number
of related sensors be q = 3; the number of outputs of each U be w = 3; and the number of
constants l = 8.
newspacing1
The algorithm A consists of m sets of three byte instructions (m × 3, m = 8) of the
form (o, a1 , a02 ) where
1. the frst byte o specifes one of 256 possible operations including 0 (no operation);
2. the second byte a1 specifes the address of the frst operand (an address between 0
and 64);
3. the third byte a02 = a2 k i specifes using its MSBs a2 , the address of the second
operand (between 0 and 64); the two LSBs i = {0, 1, 2, 3} specify the address of
destination of the result of the operation as follows:
i output address
0 TMP
1 E01 (o01 )
2 E02 (o02 )
3 E03 (o03 )
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Table A.1
Memory Layout of Y
Index
0
1
4
8
11
14
17
20
23
26
29
33
37

Mnemonic
TMP
RID (S̃)
SID0 (S0 )
E01 (o01 )
SID1 (S1 )
E11 (o11 )
SID2 (S2 )
E21 (o21 )
SID3 (S3 )
E31 (o31 )
C0
C4
C8

Index

Mnemonic

Index

Mnemonic

2
5
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
34

RVAL(ṽ)
V0 (u0 )
E02 (o02 )
V1 (u1 )
E12 (o12 )
V2 (u2 )
E22 (o22 )
V3 (u3 )
E32 (o32 )
C1
C5

3
6
10
13
16
19
22
25
28
31
35

RTS (t̃)
T0 (t0 )
E03 (o03 )
T1 (t1 )
E13 (o13 )
T2 (t2 )
E23 (o23 )
T3 (t3 )
E33 (o33 )
C2
C6

Index

Mnemonic

7

TM ( τ0 )

32
36

C3
C7

Thus, the instructions A can only modify contents of locations TMP, E01, E02 and E03.

A.1

Opcodes
A partial listing of the interpretation of some opcodes are depicted in Table A.2.

Table A.3 illustrates the execution of some sample 3 byte instructions, depicting the
type of operation, the operands involved, and the location of the output.
In general, while two bytes in an instruction specifes two inputs and one output, operations like ENC3, ADD3, AND3, OR3, etc., have three inputs and one output. For such
operations, the third input is the same as the output (which can be TMP, E01, E02 or E03).
On execution of the operation, the output overwrites the third input.
Operations with mnemonic ending with 4 also have three inputs and one output, but the
third input is distinct from the output. This is achieved by using the frst address byte a1 to
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Table A.2
A Partial Listing of Opcodes and their Interpretation

OPCODE

Interpretation

0
CHKC
ULUT
ULUT2
ULUT3
AND11
AND10
AND00
AND3
OR11
OR10
OR00
AND3
ADD11
ADD10
ADD00
ADD3
LT
LTE
EQ
ENCS3
ENC3
CENC3
CMP
LIM4
..
.

No operation
Next two bytes indicate identifer for a set of constants
Use 1-D LUT
Use 2-D LUT
Use 3-D LUT
Logical AND operation
Logical AND operation after negating the frst operand
Logical AND operation after negating both operands
Logical AND of three operands
Logical OR operation
Logical OR operation after negating the frst operand
Logical OR operation after negating both operands
Logical AND of three operands
Add frst and second operand
Add frst operand with negative of second operand
Add negative of both operands
Addition of three operands
frst operand < than second
frst operand ≤ than second operand
both operands are equal
Strict Enclosure
Enclosure
Circular Enclosure
Compare if frst operand is </==/> than second
Check if operand 2 is within lower and upper limits
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Table A.3
Examples Illustrating 3-byte Instructions.

Instruction

Interpretation

(AND00,C4,T1 k 0)
(OR00, V2, TMP k 1)
(OR10, V3, C8 k 2)
(LT, V3, C8 k 3)
(ENCS3, V2, T1 k 1)
(ENC3, V2, T1 k 2
(CMP,V0,C5 k 1)

!Y [C4]∧!Y[T1] → Y[TMP]
Y [V2] ∨ Y[TMP] → Y[E01]
Y [V3]∨!Y[C8] → Y[E02]
Y [E03] = Y[V3] < Y[C8]?1 : 0
Y [E01] = (Y[V2] < Y[E01] < Y[T1])?1 : 0
Y [E02] = (Y[V2] ≤ Y[E02] ≤ Y[T1])?1 : 0
IF Y [V0] < Y[C5] then Y [E01] = −1
IF Y [V0] > Y[C5] then Y [E01] = 1
IF (Y [V0] = Y[C5]) then Y [E01] = 0
IF Y [E01] < Y[C1] then Y [E01] = −1
IF Y [E01] > Y[C5] then Y [E01] = 1
IF Y [C1] ≤ Y[E01] ≤ Y[C5] then Y [E01] = 1
Y [E02] = Y[E02] + Y[E11] + Y[C5]
Y [E03] = (Y[C1] < Y[V0] < Y[C1 + 1])?1 : 0

(CMP3, C1,C5 k 1)
(ADD3, E11,C5 k 2)
(LIM4,C1,V0 k 3)
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specify two operands. Specifcally, if a1 = x, two operands are Y [x] and Y [x + 1]. The
byte a2 (as usual) specifes the third input (6 MSBs) and the output location (two LSBs).
While most operations are trivial and obvious from the mnemonic employed for the
operation, some are not. An algorithmic representation of the execution of some not so
obvious operations is provided in Figure ??.

A.1.1

Internal Functions

Internal function (see Figure A.1) fexec () execute the 24 byte instruction in STCB
memory v. Specifcally, fexec () makes 8 calls to feoc () (which executes one three byte
instruction o, a1 , a02 ).

fexec () {
FOR (j= 0 TO 7)
x := feoc (v[3j], v[3j + 1], v[3j + 2]);
IF (x) RETURN x;
}

Figure A.1
Internal function fexec ()

Function feoc (o, a1 , a02 ) has three possible return values
1. 0 - on successful execution;
2. 1 - if o = 0, signifying that no more instructions are available.
3. ERROR - if any of the preconditions necessary for execution of the instruction is not
satisfed.
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If feoc () returns 0 the function fexec () proceeds with the next instruction (unless it is the
last instruction). If feoc () returns 1, fexec stops the execution and returns 1; if feoc returns
ERROR, fexec () returns ERROR.
The frst byte specifes an instruction. For most operations, byte a1 specifes an input
address (between 0 and 64), and byte a02 simultaneously specifes an input address (between
0 and 64) and an output address (between 0 and 3).
Specifcally, a02 = a2 k i where the six MSBs a2 represents an input address and the
two LSBs op ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} represents an output address out = { TMP,E01,E02,E03}.
Figure A.2 provides a partial listing of function feoc (). Note that for all operations with
a mnemonic that ends with 3, one input is the same as the output Y [out]. The operation
CENC3 (circular enclosure) returns true if input Y [out] is circularly enclosed by values
Y [a1 ] and Y [a2 ]. A value x is circularly enclosed by v1 and v2 is strictly enclosed by v1
and v2 or if v2 < v1 and x < v2 ; or if v2 < v1 and x > v1 .
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x := feoc (o, a1 , a02 )
{
IF (o=0) RETURN 1;
IF (o=CCHK)
IF (Y [C0] 6= a1 + (a02 << 8)) RETURN ERROR;
ELSE RETURN 0;
a2 := a02 >> 2; // six MSBs of a2 is operand 2 address;
out := a02 << 6;//two LSBs of a2 is output address;
IF (out = 0) out := V0;
ELSE IF (out = 1) out := E01;
ELSE IF (out = 2) out := E02;
ELSE out := E03;
ELSE IF (o = ULUT)
IF !(Y [C1] < Y[a1 ] < Y[C2])) RETURN ERROR ;
RETURN 0;
IF (o = ULUT2)
IF !(Y [C1] ≤ Y[a1 ] < Y[C2]) RETURN ERROR ;
IF !(Y [C3] ≤ Y[a2 ] < Y[C4]) RETURN ERROR ;
RETURN 0;
IF (o = ULUT3)
IF !(Y [C1] ≤ Y[a1 ] < Y[C2]) RETURN ERROR ;
IF !(Y [C3] ≤ Y[a2 ] < Y[C4]) RETURN ERROR ;
IF !(Y [C5] ≤ Y[out] < Y[C6]) RETURN ERROR ;
RETURN 0;
ELSE IF (o = LIM4)
Y [out] := (Y [a1] < Y [a2] < Y [a1 + 1]); RETURN 0;
ELSE IF (o = CENC3)
Y [out] := (Y [a1] < Y [out] < Y [a2]) ∨ (Y [a2] < Y [a1] < Y [out])
Y [out] := Y [out] : ∨(Y [out] < Y [a2] < Y [a1]);
RETURN 0;
ELSE IF (o = ENCS3)
Y [out] := (Y [a1 ] < Y [out] < Y [a2 ]); RETURN 0;
ELSE IF (o = ENC3)
Y [out] := (Y [a1 ] ≤ Y [out] ≤ Y [a2 ]); RETURN 0;
ELSE IF · · ·
..
.
}

Figure A.2
Internal function feoc ()
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A.2

Illustration of STCB System Design
In this section we illustrate the process of construction of the design tree by considering

a simple SCADA system for controlling a water-tank, with four sensors and two actuators.
The four sensors labelled HH, HI, LO and LL are level sensors placed at different heights
in the water tank (see Figure ??). An actuator PP turns on/off the pump which pumps water
into the tank, and an actuator VL turns on/off the outlet valve.
We shall represent by PP, VL, HH, HI, LO and LL, the identities of the six sensors/actuators. We shall denote by p, v, hh, hi, lo, ll their respective instantaneous states.
Specifcally,
1. p = 1 if the pump is on; p = 0 if the pump is off;
2. v = 1 if valve is on; v = 0 when valve is turned off (no discharge);
3. hh = 1 implies water level at or above above the height at which the sensor HH is
placed, hh = 0 implies water level below position of sensor HH. The same logic
holds for other sensor states hi, lo and ll.

A.2.1

Design Steps

The steps in the design of the system are as follows:
1. specify unique identities for each sensor/actuator.
2. specify minimal acceptable frequency of reports from the sensor (by specifying duration of validity).
3. specify up to three dependent sensors/actuators for each sensor/actuator,
4. specify up to 24 bytes of instructions for each sensor (if necessary),
5. specify constant values, if required
6. construct Merkle hash tree and compute root ξs .
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PP

HH
HI

LO
LL

VL

Figure A.3
Water tank SCADA system

The freedom to specify the dependent sensors, instructions, and constants is used to describe the physics of the system.
The frst two steps are trivial. For the frst step we shall assume that the sensor/actuator
identities are PP, VL, HH, HI, LO and LL. For the second step we shall impose that level
sensors are expected to report their state (0 or 1) at least once every ten seconds, and that
the actuators PP and VL are required to report at least once every 5 seconds.

A.2.1.1

Valid and Invalid States

Among the sixteen possible states of four bits representing hh, hi, lo and ll all but
fve are unacceptable as they indicate failure of a sensor. For example, if hh = 1, then
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hi = lo = ll = 1. If lo = 1 the it follows that ll = 1, and so on. The Karnaugh map [34]
in Table A.4 depicts the fve acceptable conditions for sensors HH, HI, LO and LL.
Table A.4
Karnaugh Maps for Water Tank System.

hh = 0, hi = 0
1
1
1
0

hh = 0, hi = 1
0
0
1
0

hh = 1, hi = 1
0
0
1
0

hh = 1, hi = 0
0
0
0
0

lo = 0, ll = 0
lo = 0, ll = 1
lo = 1, ll = 1
lo = 1, ll = 0

p = 0, v = 0
0
1
1
0

p = 0, v = 1
0
1
1
0

p = 1, v = 1
0
1
0
0

p = 1, v = 0
1
1
0
0

hh = 0, ll = 0
hh = 0, ll = 1
hh = 1, ll = 1
hh = 1, ll = 0

From inspection of the map it is obvious that the current sensor states are acceptable
only if the expression
¯ ∧ hi
¯ ∧ ¯lo) ∨ (hh
¯ ∧ hi
¯ ∧ ll) ∨ (hi ∧ lo ∧ ll)
e1 = (hh

(A.1)

evaluates to TRUE.
Furthermore, it is desired that
1. if water level is above HH then pump should be off
2. if water level is below LL then pump should be on and valve should be off.
A Karnaugh map depicting acceptable states of values p, v, hh and ll is also depicted in
Table A.4.
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From inspection of the map
¯ ∧ ll) + (p ∧ v̄ ∧ hh)
¯
e2 = (¯
p ∧ ll) ∨ (hh
evaluates to TRUE for acceptable states. Overall, the water tank system is deemed to be
in an acceptable state only if both e1 and e2 are true. In other words, evaluation of the
function F () for this SCADA system (to determine of the system is in an acceptable state)
boils down to evaluation of e1 ∧ e2 .
A.2.2

Design Tree Leaves

For this particular example, no predefned constants are required to evaluate F(). Thus,
the design tree will possess only six leaves - one corresponding to each sensor/actuator.
Recall that the design records have the sensor id , identities of all the related sensors,
and an instruction set (24 byte instruction) A. Those values mentioned in design record
are specifed by the designer. All the rest of values like are set to 0 at design time.
Let us assume that e1 is evaluated every time a fresh value corresponding to sensor HH
is provided. For this purpose the current values of three other sensors HI, LO and LL are
required. Towards this end the designer specifes HI, LO and LL as dependent leaves for
leaf HH. More specifcally, in the design leaf for sensor HH, we have
S0 = HH, S01 = HI, S02 = LO, and S03 = LL
The 24 bytes A specifed in leaf HH evaluates e1 .
Similarly, let us assume that e2 is evaluated every time a fresh value corresponding to
sensor PP is provided. For this purpose as current states of actuator VL, and sensors HH
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and LL , are required, they are specifed as the dependent sensors of PP. In other words, in
the leaf for sensor PP, we have
S1 = PP, S11 = VL, S12 = HH, and S13 = LL
The 24 bytes A specifed in leaf PP evaluates e2 .
The other four leaves - viz, VL, HI, LO and LL do not require dependent leaves to be
specifed. Furthermore, no A need to be specifed for such leaves. The table below depicts
the contents of values of the six leaves in the design tree:

Sid

PP

VL

HH

HI

L0

LL

Sid1

VL

0

HI

0

0

0

Sid2

HH

0

LO

0

0

0

Sid3

LL

0

LL

0

0

0

A.2.3

Instructions for Leaves PP and HH

The instructions specifed in leaf HH evaluates the e1 . Before the instructions are
executed Fupd () ensures the following
1. The current contents of leaf HH - values - are stored in locations are stored in locations s0
2. Contents of a fresh report from HH (indicating sensor identity, sensed values and
time stamp) are stored in locations r.
3. Y [SID0] = HH = Y[RID]
4. Value Y [V0] is updated (by setting it equal to Y [RVAL])
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5. Value Y [T0] is updated based on time stamp Y [RTS]
6. The current contents of leaf HI are stored in locations are stored in locations s1 .
7. The current contents of leaf LO are stored in locations are stored in locations s2 .
8. The current contents of leaf LL are stored in locations are stored in locations s3 .
For computing e1 , the required values are
hh = Y [V0], hi = Y[V1], lo = Y[V2] and ll = Y[V3]
The 24 bytes in Acompute
¯ ∧ hi
¯ ∧ ¯lo) ∨ (hh
¯ ∧ hi
¯ ∧ ll) ∨ (hi ∧ lo ∧ ll)
e1 = (hh
using the following sequence of six operations
¯ ∧ Y [V1]
¯ → Y [TMP] or (AND00, V0, V1 k 0)
1. Y [V0]
¯ ∨ Y [V3] → Y[E01] or (OR10, V3, V2 k 1)
2. Y [V2]
3. Y [TMP] ∧ Y[E01] → Y[E01] or (AND11,24, 0 k 1)
4. Y [V1] ∧ Y[V2] → Y[TMP] or (AND11,V2,V1 k 0)
5. Y [TMP] ∧ Y[V3] → Y[TMP] or (AND11, V3, 0 k 0)
6. Y [TMP] ∨ Y[E01] → Y[E01] or (OR11, E01, 0 k 1)
As only six instructions are required, the last two instructions in A are set to (0,0,0). At
the end of the execution , location E01 - which corresponds to o01 of leaf HH, contains the
result e1 of the evaluation.
The 24 byte instruction specifed in leaf PP evaluates the e2 , and e1 ∧ e2 . Before the
instructions are executed, Fupd () ensures the following
1. The current contents of leaf PP - values at s0
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2. Contents of a fresh report from PP are stored in r
3. Y [SID0] = PP = Y[RID]
4. Value Y [V0] is updated
5. Value Y [T0] is updated
6. s1 = VL
7. s2 = HH.
8. s3 = LL.
For computing e2 , the required values are
p = Y [V0], v = Y[V1], hh = Y[V2], ll = Y[V3], and e1 = Y[E21]
Note that e1 is the value loaded to Y [E21] . Also every time Fupd () is performed Y [TM] is
updated to min(Y [T0], τ10 , τ20 , τ30 )
The instruction set A in leaf PP is executed to compute
¯ ∧ ll) + (p ∧ v¯ ∧ hh)
¯
e2 = (¯
p ∧ ll) ∨ (hh
= (!Y [V0] ∧ Y[V3]) ∨ (!Y[V2] ∧ Y[V3]) ∨ (Y[V0]∧!Y[V1] ∧ Y[V2]),
after which e2 is made available in location Y [E01]. This value is combined with e1 in
Y [E21] to compute and e1 ∧ e2 , using the following sequence of six operations
¯ ∧ Y [V2]
¯ → Y [TMP] or (AND00, V0, V2 k 0)
1. Y [V0]

2. Y [V3] ∨ Y[TMP] → Y[TMP] or (OR11, V3, TMP k 0)
3. Y [V0]∧!Y[V1] → Y[E01] or (AND10, V0, V1 k 1)
4. Y [E01] ∧ Y[V2] → Y[E01] or (AND11,E01, V2 k 1)
5. Y [E01] ∨ Y[TMP] → Y[E01] or (OR11, E01, TMP k 1)
6. Y [E01] ∧ Y[E12] → Y[E01] or (AND11, E01, E12 k 1), (e1 ∧ e2 )
Ultimately, the state of the system is indicated by the value o11 in sensor state of PP.
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